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Abstract 
Apart from persistently pursuing one’s personal goals, disengaging from goals that 
have become unrealistic or too troublesome is essential for successful self-regulation and 
well-being. Recent findings suggest that goal disengagement is often preceded by an action 
crisis, an intrapsychic conflict between the opposing options of holding on to and letting go of 
a personal goal. Extending previous work, this dissertation addresses how the action crisis fits 
into the goal disengagement process by instigating changes on the level of individuals’ goal-
related experience and behavior. It shows that an action crisis predicts change in individuals’ 
subjective appraisal of goal desirability and attainability, and that, reversely, goal attainability 
predicts change in the experience of action crisis. It suggests that an action crisis buffers 
(goal-related) performance, and that it may threaten a person’s self-integrity. Drawing from 
this, it tests whether a strategy that alleviates self-threat helps to form a preference for 
persistence or disengagement that is based on the subjective desirability and attainability of 
the goal in question. In sum, this dissertation extends previous knowledge of how an action 
crisis is experienced, how it shapes and defines the goal disengagement process, and offers a 
starting point for the investigation of interventions that may help to resolve it in either way. 
 
Neben der Persistenz in der Verfolgung persönlicher Ziele ist die Ablösung von 
Zielen, die sich als nicht erreichbar oder zu kostenreich erweisen, die zweite Facette 
erfolgreichen Zielstrebens, die für die Aufrechterhaltung subjektiven Wohlbefindens von 
Bedeutung ist. Forschungsbefunde zeigen, dass der Zielablösung häufig eine Handlungskrise 
vorangeht, die als intrapsychischer Konflikt zwischen der Weiterverfolgung und Aufgabe 
eines persönlichen Ziels definiert ist. Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht, wie sich eine 
Handlungskrise durch Veränderungen auf der Ebene zielbezogenen Erlebens und Verhaltens 
in den Prozess der Zielablösung einfügt und diesen gestaltet. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass 
sich im Zuge einer Handlungskrise die Sicht auf den Wert und die Realisierbarkeit des Ziels 
verändert, die wahrgenommene Zielrealisierbarkeit aber auch das künftige Erleben einer 
Handlungskrise vorhersagt. Sie zeigt auf, dass in Folge einer Handlungskrise die 
(zielbezogene) Leistung abnimmt und die Selbstintegrität einer Person in Frage gestellt wird. 
Darauf aufbauend wird untersucht, ob eine Strategie zur Wiederherstellung der 
Selbstintegrität die Entscheidungsfindung für oder gegen die Weiterverfolgung des Ziels 
unterstützt. Damit trägt die Arbeit zum Verständnis des Zielablösungsprozesses bei und bietet 
einen Ansatpunkt für die Identifikation von Strategien zur Lösung einer Handlungskrise.  
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Summary 
Part I of this dissertation thesis shows that reciprocal influences between an action 
crisis and appraisals of goal desirability and attainability shape the disengagement process 
from personal goals. Two longitudinal studies reveal that an action crisis in the goal to 
complete a university degree predicts a devaluation of its desirability and attainability, and 
reversely, low goal attainability (but not desirability) predicts an increase in action crisis. 
Findings further suggest that life satisfaction benefits from devaluing goal desirability when 
disengagement is considered (i.e, in an action crisis) or actually immiment.  
Part II points out that an action crisis not only affects individuals’ goal appraisals but 
also the measurable outcomes of their goal pursuit. Students with more severe action crises in 
the goal to complete their university degree achieve a lower academic performance at the end 
of the term, controlling for prior-term performance levels. Individuals in whom the experience 
of action crisis (vs. unobstructed goal striving) had experimentally been induced perform 
worse in a subsequent task, suggesting a causal performance effect of the action crisis that 
spills over to unrelated, temporally close tasks. 
Part III tests the assumption that an action crisis is self-threatening. Findings of a 
correlational and an experimental study suggest that merely reflecting on a personal goal 
about which an action crisis is experienced (vs. unobstructed goal striving) causes negative 
affect, detriments self-worth, and buffers expectations to perform well on an upcoming task.  
Building on this knowledge, Part IV documents a series of experiments testing 
whether individuals in an action crisis benefit from a strategy known to alleviate self-threat. 
Based on findings that self-affirmation enables people to impartially process threatening 
information and rely on self-relevant experiences, it was hypothesized that affirming an 
unrelated value increases reliance on the goal’s attainability and desirability when forming a 
preference about whether to hold or to fold. While two studies offered supportive evidence, 
two studies did not. Potential explanations are given and limitations discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
Nothing is so insufferable to man as to be completely at rest, without passions, 
without business, without diversion, without study. (Pascal, 1660/2003, p. 37) 
 
We form our lives by setting and pursuing goals. From an infinite number of potential 
occupations, we choose the ones that appear to us as paramount and purposeful, from which 
we promise ourselves fulfillment and happiness, or, at least, the absence of punishment and 
negative self-regard. Those chosen goals, the “internal representations of desired states” 
(Austin & Vancouver, 1996, p. 338) that we wish to achieve in the future or to maintain, we 
devote a large part of our precious, since limited time. We organize our daily routine to serve 
their attainment, allow them to occupy our consciousness, and base our well-being on the 
current status of their pursuits (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Brunstein, 1993; Emmons, 2003; 
Klinger, 1977; Moskowitz & Grant, 2009). 
In light of the defining properties of personal goals, a lot of importance is placed on 
their attainment. However, the pursuit of most high-level goals is not completely clear of 
obstacles, and few of our goals would ever be achieved without sustained effort and 
perseverance even in the face of occasional adversity (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013; Feather, 
1962; Heckhausen, 1991). Therefore, the pledge to be persistent and never give up on 
personal dreams is for many individuals source of inspiration and one of the most prominent 
in popular guidebooks on motivation and goal striving. It is this capacity that ultimately leads 
individuals to success, and contributes to the continued existence and viability of our society 
(Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003). 
The goal concept has developed into a key unit also in the scientific study of human 
motivation (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 2005; Emmons, 2003), where it 
has been investigated under a variety of terms, including current concerns (Klinger, 1975), 
personal strivings (Emmons, 1991), personal projects (Little, 1983), and personal goals 
(Brunstein, 1993; Sheldon & Kasser, 1998). While goals can theoretically reside on all levels 
of abstraction, and many low-level goals are trivial and without much relevance for well-
being (Emmons, 2003), the noted approaches focus on the mid- and high-level goals that are 
subjectively important and pursued over prolonged periods of time. 
With the aim to identify conditions under which personal goals contribute to well-
being (Brunstein, 1993; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Emmons, 2003), for long, the driving 
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concern in motivation and volition psychology has been to understand how individuals can 
reduce discrepancies to their goals, by investigating processes related to goal selection 
(motivation) and goal striving (volition). With the predominant focus on goal attainment, it 
has to some extent been neglected that persistence can become futile and even produce cost. 
This may, for instance, apply when a discrepancy cannot be closed because the goal is out of 
reach (Brandstätter, 2003; Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1982; Wrosch et al., 2003). Then, 
disengagement is imperative to live an overall happy and fulfilled life. 
A dark side of persistence 
The dark side of unmistrusted persistence in the face of adversity has first been studied in 
related disciplines. The investigation was based on the observation in politics and business 
that individuals sometimes persist in an initiated course of action, even though it seems quite 
obvious that continued investments (e.g., time, money) will not yield the hoped-for success. 
In social and organizational psychology, the phenomenon has evoked great interest under the 
nearly synonymous terms escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976, 1981) and entrapment 
(Brockner, 1992), both describing the tendency to become locked in a previously chosen, yet, 
failing course of action by investing new resources. Taking similar lines, sunk cost (Arkes & 
Blumer, 1985) refers to the irrational human propensity to continue actions once having 
invested in them, unconsidered their outcomes.  
The two main explanatory approaches to misguided persistence are based on self-
justification theory (Aronson, 1968) and the principle of loss aversion derived from prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Self-justification theory, an extension of theory of 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), posits that when a course of action fails that 
individuals feel responsible for, they may become entrapped because they do not want to 
admit to themselves and others that the decision to initiate the action was wrong. As deviating 
from the initiated path would be visual proof of exactly this, people choose to reaffirm their 
commitment to the failing action. A highly credible means to demonstrate one’s trust in a 
chosen path is to allocate more resources in it (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1976). 
The prospect-theoretical explanatory approach builds on another defining feature of 
entrapment situations, namely the uncertainty whether additional investments will turn the 
failing project around (Brockner, 1992). Depending on the ultimate outcome, which is 
unknown, allocated resources will turn out to be worthwhile investments that led to success, 
or regrettable expenses that were made in vain. Drawing from the basic principle that people 
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are loss-averse, but risk-seeking in the domain of loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the 
approach predicts that, when confronted with a failing project, individuals will not accept the 
sure loss, but invest even more, often throwing good money after bad (Brockner, 1992). 
Studies on entrapment and escalation of commitment typically have experimentally 
manipulated feedback (negative vs. positive) and the need to justify prior resource allocations, 
for instance, by varying levels of personal responsibility (high vs. low). Often, this has been 
done in the context of business cases where students with an affiliation to management had to 
partition investments among several divisions of a fictional company. If resource allocations 
were higher among subjects responsible (vs. not responsible) for a failing first investment, 
this was seen as indicative of escalation of commitment / entrapment and the operation of 
self-justification concerns (Schultze, Pfeiffer, & Schulz-Hardt, 2012; Staw, 1976). Other 
studies have linked the self-reported motivation to justify prior actions with behavioral 
measures of escalation (Brockner, 1992; Strube & Lott, 1984). 
The major contribution of this strand of research has been to point out that persistence 
may not only become futile, but produce high costs. Given that explanatory approaches to 
misguided persistence jointly assume that at the heart of the phenomenon is experienced self-
threat, it is surprising how few studies have explicitly tested this claim; usually, the need for 
self-justification is simply inferred from the observation that people stay on course 
(Brandstätter, 2003). A notable exception are studies by Zhang and Baumeister (2006), who 
experimentally manipulated self-threat and showed that it leads to entrapment. A second 
limitation is the almost exclusive study of assigned task goals and investment decisions, 
questioning the generalizability of the phenomenon to personal goals (Brandstätter, 2003). 
Addressing this limitation, the present research draws a link between the experience of self-
threat and an action crisis, a phase in personal goal striving in which multiple setbacks have 
been experienced and giving up has become an option (Brandstätter, 2003). 
Goal disengagement is beneficial, sometimes 
After a long period of undue neglect, the topic of goal disengagement is increasingly studied 
also in the context of personal goals (Brandstätter, 2003; Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; 
Carver & Scheier, 2005; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003). There is now scientific 
consensus that persistence is only one side of the coin, and effective self-regulation and 
maintenance of well-being likewise require an individual to disengage from goals that are 
unattainable or too costly. As no one goes through a life without being confronted with a goal 
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that cannot be attained, the position has been taken that disengagement is an inevitable aspect 
of life, that “everyone must quit sometimes” (Wrosch et al., 2003, p. 2). 
The advantages of disengaging from an unattainable goal are twofold. The first is 
related to the circumstance that life is short and resources are limited, implying that 
individuals have to constraint themselves to a finite number of goals (Wrosch et al., 2003). 
Sticking to a futile endeavor is a waste of resources, as their investment in the chosen path 
does not have the desired effect, and they are no longer available for more promising projects. 
Accordingly, disengaging from a futile goal means to free precious resources. The second 
advantage of disengagement is to protect individuals from the harmful consequences to well-
being and self-esteem that arise from repeated failure in trying to attain an unattainable goal. 
Evidently, not only giving up, but also holding on can have negative implications for an 
individual’s sense of self (Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1982; Wrosch et al., 2003). 
Despite the occasional importance of letting go, researchers acknowledge that doing so 
is difficult, especially when important goals are at stake. Successful disengagement not only 
requires people to stop investing in a personal goal, but also to relinquish goal commitment – 
if efforts were ceased while remaining committed, high distress would have to be expected 
(Wrosch et al., 2003). Because “the self is partly made up of the person’s goals” (Carver & 
Scheier, 2005, p. 528), disengagement can require to redefine one’s identity in some aspect 
(Wrosch et al., 2003). While the phenomenon of maladaptive persistence is well-known in the 
economic and political context, also in personal goal striving, one can see people clinging to 
unfulfilled intimate relationships, persisting with unpleasant courses of studies, and sticking 
to unprofitable self-employments or creative projects (Brandstätter & Herrmann, 2015).  
In the following sections, influential theoretical approaches in the field of 
disengagement from personal goals will be introduced that build the theoretical framework of 
this research. Then, the concept of action crisis will be presented, which was the starting point 
of this investigation. 
Factors facilitating (or hindering) goal disengagement 
Previous research on goal disengagement has identified a host of different factors that makes 
it easier or more difficult for a person to give up (Wrosch et al., 2003). This chapter does not 
provide a comprehensive overview, but highlights some factors related to the goal and the 
person. In research on escalation of commitment and entrapment, many situational factors, 
moreover, have been examined (Sleesman, Conlon, McNamara, & Miles, 2012), often 
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without a clear theoretical framework (Brandstätter, 2003). Examples for situational factors 
that make disengagement more difficult are high investments and low estimated distance to 
goal completion (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). On the contrary, alternatives can make it easier to 
give up (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999). 
Goal-related factors  
A long tradition of expectancy-value models (Atkinson, 1964; Feather, 1982; Vroom, 1964) 
suggests that the motivation to pursue a goal is defined by its value (cf. desirability, 
importance) as well as the expectancy that it can be attained (cf. attainability). Accordingly, 
the subjective value of a goal has been highlighted as crucial determinant for the ease with 
which individuals let go. Whereas trivial goals are easy to disengage from, the higher the goal 
in the individual’s goal hierarchy, the closer connected to his/her core values and self-
definition, and the less easily substitutable, the more painful and troublesome it is to give up 
(Carver & Scheier, 2005; Klinger, 1975, 1977; Wrosch et al., 2003). It has been argued that 
for highly valued goals, even low outcome expectancies suffice to convince people to hold on. 
However, when goal attainability drops below a certain threshold and even maximal effort 
seems futile, people will give up (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Brehm & Self, 1989; 
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Wrosch et al., 2003). Wrosch and colleagues (2003) suggested that 
other things being equal, a higher clarity with which people see their goal’s attainability 
should facilitate decisions about persistence and disengagement. 
Person-related factors 
Individuals vary widely in how they respond to unattainable goals (Brandtstädter & Renner, 
1990; Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). Accordingly, interindividual difference variables 
were identified. Two of the most prominent dispositional approaches to goal disengagement 
are presented below. 
The dual process model of assimilative and accommodative coping (Brandtstädter & 
Rothermund, 2002) suggests that individuals have two kinds of coping processes at their 
disposal to reduce discrepancies between factual and desired life circumstances: assimilation 
and accommodation. Assimilation includes intentional agency directed at modifying one’s 
environment to come in line with a desired outcome. Accommodation implies a change of 
cognitions and valuations that helps to deconstrue a discrepancy that cannot be genuinely 
closed. Hence, accommodation corresponds to neutralization more than actual problem 
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solving (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002). To successfully disengage, people have to 
switch from the assimilative to the accommodative coping mode. How smoothly this 
transition proceeds is, apart from characteristics of the goal and the situation, thought to be 
influenced by individuals’ habitual tendency to engage in the assimilative and accommodative 
coping mode. These habitual tendencies can be assessed by questionnaire (Brandtstädter & 
Renner, 1990): The Tenacious Goal Pursuit Scale, assessing the tendency to tenaciously 
adhere to goals even in the face of adversity and under high risk of failure (e.g., “If I run into 
problems, I usually double my efforts”), corresponds to assimilative coping. The Flexible 
Goal Adjustment Scale, assessing the tendency to easily accept, find meaning in, or positively 
interpret discrepancies (e.g., “In general, I am not upset very long about an opportunity passed 
up”), corresponds to accommodative coping (Brandstätter & Renner, 1990).  
Even though the subscales are only weakly correlated, studies by Brandstätter and 
Renner (1990) showed that both are linked to well-being (i.e., optimism, life satisfaction, 
perceived control, lower depression). The main empirical interest has been to investigate age-
related differences in Tenacious Goal Pursuit and Flexible Goal Adjustment. In cross-
sectional comparisons, older adults scored higher on the flexibility subscale than younger 
adults, whereas for tenacity the reverse pattern emerged. This presumable shift from mainly 
assimilative to mainly accommodative coping was suggested to help the aging individual to 
maintain high well-being and a sense of personal control despite decreasing abilities and 
opportunities to redefine life (Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990).  
Another group of researchers (Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003) 
proposed two independent capacities in the context of disengagement that they in combination 
denoted as goal adjustment capacities. One capacity refers to being able to disengage from 
unattainable goals, and the other, equally important capacity refers to being able to reengage 
in new, more feasible goals. Wrosch et al. developed a 10 items comprising Goal Adjustment 
Scale (GAS) to assess the ease to withdraw behavioral efforts and psychological commitment 
across a variety of goal domains (e.g., “It’s easy for me to reduce my effort toward the goal”, 
“It’s easy for me to stop thinking about the goal and let it go”), as well as individuals’ 
capacity to identify, reengage with, and start pursuing new goals (e.g., “I start working on 
other new goals”), when having to stop pursuing an important goal. Self-reported goal 
adjustment capacities emerged to be moderately stable over time (Dunne, Wrosch, & Miller, 
2011) and the two subscales only weakly correlated, in line with assumptions (Wrosch et al., 
2013). 
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Pointing to interindividual variation, Wrosch and colleagues’ work shows that persons 
with higher goal adjustment capacities are able to maintain higher well-being and health when 
confronted with an unattainable goal, controlling for other personality variables like the Big 
Five, dispositional optimism, and dispositional assimilation and accommodation (Wrosch et 
al., 2013). In line with the assumption that disengagement from an unattainable goal prevents 
individuals from the negative implications of repeated failure, high disengagement capacities, 
across samples and contexts, mainly predicted lifts in impaired well-being, like reductions in 
depressive symptoms, while they contributed less to positive aspects of well-being, like 
purpose and positive affect (Wrosch, Amir, & Miller, 2011; Wrosch & Miller, 2009). These 
positive aspects of well-being were theorized to be mainly predicted by reengagement 
capacities. Indeed, goal reengagement capacities were less suited to predict relief from 
subjective ill-being, but were in several studies associated with positive aspects of well-being 
(Wrosch & Miller, 2009; Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013; Wrosch et al., 2003). 
Goal adjustment capacities not only predict well-being, but also physical health. 
Wrosch et al. (2013) assumed that higher subjective well-being as a result of goal adjustment 
capacities translates into physiological functioning and vulnerability for disease, in short, 
physical health; also direct paths of goal adjustment capacities on physical health were 
assumed. Empirical studies found that higher goal disengagement capacities were associated 
with fewer health problems, a more normative diurnal pattern of cortisol secretion, and better 
sleep (Wrosch, Miller, Scheier, & Pontet, 2007). Adolescents with lower dispositional 
disengagement capacities experienced an increase in C-reactive protein concentrations over 
time, a marker of systemic inflammation known to contribute to several medical conditions 
(Miller & Wrosch, 2007). First empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between goal 
disengagement capacities and health can be mediated by subjective well-being. Goal 
reengagement capacities did not predict physical health to the same extent (Wrosch et al., 
2007; Wrosch et al., 2013).  
Taken together, research by Wrosch and colleagues illustrates that people differ in 
their ability to let go of unattainable goals and their ability to identify new goals; capacities 
that cannot likewise be explained by other dispositions. If people possess these capacities, 
they are able to maintain well-being and health even in critical life situations, in which they 
are confronted with the necessity to deal with the loss of a central and self-defining goal. To 
note, the concept of goal adjustment capacities takes as starting point the situation in which a 
valued goal has become unattainable (due to age-related changes, altered life circumstances, 
or lack of skills). It describes individuals’ adjustment in case of an externally imposed, clear 
Introduction 15 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
necessity to give up a goal, and does so from a perspective of interindividual differences. 
Much less is known about the process of coming to release a valued goal, although first 
evidence suggests that goal adjustment capacities might predict the use of specific coping 
strategies (Wrosch et al., 2011). 
Whereas some situations in life certainly imply the clarity that a goal has to be 
abandoned, for instance, when people have to deal with the death of or separation from a 
spouse, in many other instances, the crucial question is to judge whether a goal is unattainable 
or just hard to reach; even though the difference may seem minimal, the implications that 
result from the two conclusions could not be more different (disengagement vs. increased 
efforts). This ambiguity has only received minimal attention in empirical research, and not 
much is known about how people come from high hopes in goal striving to the point where 
they have realized that they have to abandon their goal. Even though the temporal dynamics 
of disengagement on the level of specific personal goals are empirically not well understood 
(Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013), some theoretical assumptions exist. These will be reviewed in 
the following section. 
The process of goal disengagement 
Theoretical considerations about the process of goal disengagement were formulated by Eric 
Klinger. In his view, “behavior and experience are organized around the enjoyment and 
pursuit of incentives” (Klinger, 1975, p. 1), which, by the act of committing to them, become 
to goals. Due to the life-organizing properties of current concerns, the representations that 
individuals hold about their goals, Klinger understood the process of ending a current concern 
as self-involving and troublesome.  
With the incentive-disengagement cycle, Klinger (1975) proposed an orderly sequence 
of four phases, which he considered continuous rather than discrete. He argued that when a 
person faces obstacles in goal striving, he or she will, at first, try to remove them by bringing 
up greater force. In this initial phase of invigoration, the blocked incentive appears even more 
attractive, whereas alternative incentives are seen as less so. This may result in a “loss of 
‘perspective’” (p. 9) and an over-involvement in the obstructed goal. Frustration comes up 
when invigorated efforts do not lead to the hoped-for success (aggression). After some time, 
frustration gives way to depression, which in intensity may reach from mild displeasure to 
despair. Despite its aversiveness, depression is considered adaptive in its function to decrease 
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incentive value, needed for dissolving the blocked goal. When life circumstances offer new 
incentives, in the phase of recovery, depression lifts and the person readjusts (Klinger, 1975).  
Klinger’s model is of high theoretical value and continues to influence resarchers’ 
understanding of goal disengagement. Its major contribution is to sketch goal disengagement 
as a lengthy, emotional process, which, for some time, turns an individual’s world upside 
down (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press). Due to the process perspective and the 
conceptualization of disengagement on the level of concrete goals, the model puts several 
phenomena in chronology (e.g., the mobilization of efforts and reactive enhancement of an 
obstructed goal; frustration-depression sequence). It offers a new perspective on depression, 
which is not only regarded as normal response, but, due to its drive- and incentive-reducing 
function, as necessary for disengagement to occur. Therewith, Klinger highlights in one 
model the evolutionary benefit of trying harder, and the adaptive value of a stopping 
mechanism that prevents the organism’s exhaustion while being aversive enough to be 
parsimonious in use.  
In light of the attention that has been devoted to Klinger’s model, it is astonishing how 
rarely its assumptions have been subjected to an empirical test (but see Klinger, Barta, & 
Kemble, 1974). Wrosch and Miller (2009) tested Klinger’s idea of the adaptive value of 
depression and found that adolescent girls with higher baseline levels of depressive symptoms 
over time improved their goal disengagement capacities to a stronger extent. This improved 
ability to disengage from goals was linked to a reduction in depressive symptomatology. 
Despite insightful, an investigation of the model assumptions on the level of concrete goals is 
still missing (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press).  
Another theory with assumptions about goal disengagement is the motivational theory 
of life-span development (Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010). It conceives individual 
agency as organized around a series of developmental goals and contends that, across the life 
span, opportunities for the realization of self-developmental goals (e.g., graduating from 
school, having children, building a career) emerge, increase, peak, and decline. Individuals 
are thought to use these action cycles of improving and decreasing opportunity structures to 
shape their life course and personal development. Most pertinent to the question of how 
individuals disengage from concrete goals, for the pursuit of each developmental goal, a 
timeline of motivational and volitional processes is sketched, which uses as its basis the 
Rubicon model of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer, 2012; Heckhausen & 
Gollwitzer, 1987).  
Introduction 17 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
The Rubicon model segments a course of action into four consecutive phases, each 
with a specific task to be accomplished. In a first motivational phase, individuals select out of 
various desires the ones that seem, given their perceived desirability and attainability, worth 
striving for (pre-decision). With setting a goal, individuals cross the “Rubicon” and enter a 
volitional phase directed at the identification and planning of action steps (pre-action). These 
are implemented in the subsequent actional phase. In the post-actional, again motivational 
phase, individuals evaluate if the goal has been reached or whether further goal striving is 
required (Gollwitzer, 2012).  
The action phase model of developmental regulation (Heckhausen, 1999; Heckhausen, 
Wrosch, & Fleeson, 2001) extends the Rubicon model by a second discrete transition, the 
deadline. The deadline constitutes the point at which opportunities for goal realization 
disappear or sharply decline. This radical shift in goal attainability is anticipated by the 
individual and influences his or her striving. When the deadline approaches and a goal has not 
been reached, the prospect of decreasing opportunities leads to increased goal engagement. 
When goal striving becomes “urgent”, control processes that were applied previously 
are intensified. Selective primary control strategies subsume active attempts to reach the goal 
by investing time, skills, and effort; selective secondary control include motivational 
processes that support primary control striving (e.g., positive illusions about one’s 
competencies, enhanced valuation of the chosen and devaluation of non-chosen goals). 
Individuals may additionally employ compensatory primary control, which entails seeking 
support and advice from others, using technical aids, or unusual means to goal attainment. 
Individuals’ behavior is thought to change drastically, once a deadline has been passed 
without success. Then, urgent goal striving should immediately stop and preference be given 
to disengagement. This is achieved by compensatory secondary control, self-protective 
strategies that are intentionally employed to ward off negative implications of goal failure. 
Such strategies include downgrading goal value, downward social comparison, and positive 
reappraisals. According to Heckhausen et al. (2010, p. 41), “It is active disengagement in 
terms of withdrawal of effort and breaking of commitment that achieves this rapid and radical 
shift”. 
While the model inspires a perspective on goal pursuit that acknowledges that even 
well-intended striving does not necessarily lead to success, and emphasizes the need to use 
control processes under consideration of changing opportunities, what seems questionable is 
to what extent deadlines can be thought of as discrete. Even in the studied goal contexts (e.g., 
a child wish that is bound to the age-limits of fertility), it is not so clear whether a discrete 
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deadline exists; even if so, it will be an individual deadline rather than a universally valid one, 
and where it lies will often reside in the unknown. Of course, people may anticipate a 
deadline, and the theory has a good point in acknowledging this. However, the question 
whether one has already passed the deadline or sufficient goal attainability is still given seems 
to be the crucial question when dealing with a blocked goal. Questioning the theory’s 
assumption of a clear deadline, it becomes debatable how sudden people’s switch to 
disengagement can be, and how streamlined their withdrawal of effort and commitment.  
The assumption of conflict at the transition between goal engagement and 
disengagement is inherent in the dual process model of assimilative and accommodative 
coping (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002). As outlined before, the model distinguishes two 
classes of coping processes that reduce discrepancies between factual and desired outcomes in 
opposed, yet, complementary ways. For assimilation and accommodation, some chronology 
has been proposed: Assimilative processes are thought to dominate as long as a goal 
discrepancy can be altered by preventive or corrective action. When assmilative efforts “reach 
a zone of diminishing returns” (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002, p. 135), that is, become 
ineffective, the balance tips toward accommodative processes. A critical situation arises when 
assimilative processes are run with maximal strain yet low return, and accommodative 
processes come into play. The simultaneous activation of both processes may produce 
stressful conflict and a “wavering between holding on and letting go” (Brandtstädter & 
Rothermund, 2002, p. 123). Particularly when important goals are concerned, difficulty in 
switching from the assimilative to the accommodative mode is manifested in depressive 
symptoms; depression, in turn, helps to deconstrue the cognitive orientations that maintain 
assimilation. Thus, depression is manifestation of conflict and promoter of accommodation 
alike (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002). 
In contrast to Heckhausen et al. (2010), Brandtstädter and Rothermund (2002) assert 
that accommodative processes cannot be employed strategically, but are beyond intentional 
control. In content, they equal what is comprised in the concept of secondary compensatory 
control (Heckhausen et al., 2010). By promoting the devaluation of the blocked goal, a 
reappraisal of the initially aversive situation, and the identification of alternative goals, 
accommodation permits a sense of control in situations in which control is actually missing. 
Consequently, Brandtstädter and Rothermund (2002) consider the relative neglect of 
accommodative processes in empirical research and the frequently made reference to failure 
and resignation as unjustified and misleading. 
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Subsuming the three theories, what can be concluded about the disengagement 
process? First, the reviewed theories share the assumption that obstacles in goal striving or the 
anticipated end of opportunities motivate an individual to bring up greater force. Second, they 
jointly predict that when a person realizes that intensified efforts remains futile or a deadline 
has been passed, he/she will disengage. Third, in two of the three models, depression is 
assigned an important function in dissolving commitment from barren goals. Related to this, 
fourth, disengagement is thought to not only require a withdrawal of effort, but also 
relinquishment of commitment to the goal. Fifth, even though researchers disagree with 
respect to whether disengagement is self-regulatory act or unintentional change beyond 
individuals’ control, the processes assumed to lead to disengagement are basically the same.  
In light of this research, two points merit attention. The first is that even though all 
models include some turning point between persistence and disengagement, instigated by the 
realization that outcome expectancies are too unfavorable, this transition either seems 
unrealistically abrupt, or underlying processes are not well specified. This is unfortunate 
given that the challenge to achieve an adequate balance between the contrasting options of 
holding on and letting go has been denoted as key to optimal living in philosophy and 
contemporary psychology (Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990; Carver & Scheier, 2005; Emmons, 
2003; Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1982; Lench & Levine, 2008; Wrosch et al., 2013). 
Researchers have for instance referred to it as “goal dilemma” (Jostmann & Koole, 2009, p. 
338) or “stability-flexibility dilemma” (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002, p.120), pointing 
out that people often have a hard time deciding whether they should keep up the struggle or 
let it go. In light of the complexity and relevance of personal goals, the assumption of sudden 
and easy turnovers from persistence to disengagement seems unlikely. 
The second point refers to the current state of empirical verification. Whereas only few 
studies have tested Klinger’s assumptions (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press), the other two 
approaches were mostly investigated from a life-span perspective, often by comparing 
individuals of different age. To test the predictions of motivational theory of life-span 
development, researchers have for instance used quasi-experimental designs, comparing 
individuals before a deadline with individuals who had clearly passed the deadline. A theory-
consistent finding was that individuals before a deadline used more control strategies related 
to (urgent) goal striving, whereas individuals who had passed the deadline used control 
strategies to facilitate disengagement; a phase-congruent use of control strategies predicted 
higher well-being (Heckhausen et al., 2001; Wrosch & Heckhausen, 1999; Wrosch, 
Heckhausen, & Lachman, 2000). Predictions of the dual process model of assimilative and 
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accommodative coping were often tested at the transition to late adulthood, where resources 
needed for assimilation decline, and individuals need to shift to accommodation to maintain 
high levels of well-being (Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994; Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 1994). 
Thus, even though the models’ predictions would be applicable to the non-developmental 
context (Heckhausen et al., 2010), the affective, cognitive, and behavioral processes involved 
in the disengagement from specific goals have not been systematically analyzed (Brandstätter 
& Herrmann, in press). This is where the concept of action crisis (Brandstätter, 2003) steps in.  
The action crisis 
Contrary to previous models on goal disengagement (Heckhausen et al., 2010; Klinger, 1975), 
the action crisis puts the experience of conflict between the antagonistic forces to persist and 
disengage into the explicit focus of attention. It marks the time when people are torn between 
holding on to and letting go of a personal goal after a series of obstacles in goal striving has 
been experienced and/or the goal has lost part of its appeal (Brandstätter, 2003; Brandstätter 
& Schüler, 2013). The intensity of action crisis is measured with respect to idiographic 
personal goals and operationalized by several cognitive and behavioral characteristics that 
have, in an unpublished pilot study, been identified to accompany this kind of intra-goal 
conflict (i.e., doubt, disengagement impulses, recurrent setbacks, implemental disorientation, 
rumination, and procrastination). Despite the seemingly diversity of its experiential features, 
the Action Crisis Scale (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013), with which the intensity of action 
crisis is measured, is across studies of high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α typically above 
.75), strengthening the view of a coherent syndrome that may come up in obstructed goal 
striving. 
Given that in the action crisis, the option of goal abandonment has come into 
individuals’ focus, it can be considered as part of a disengagement process that has just begun. 
This does not mean, however, that an action crisis inevitably leads to full disengagement, 
defined by the behavioral and emotional withdrawal from the goal (Herrmann & Brandstätter, 
2013). While a recent finding shows that goal abandonment is in many cases preceded by an 
action crisis, and more severe action crises predict goal abandonment with shorter timely 
distance (Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015), the action crisis may also be overcome with goal 
striving gaining new momentum. This may be the case when the individual rediscovers value 
in the goal, identifies new ways to goal attainment, or when conditions for goal attainment 
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ameliorate (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press). This outcome-openness supports the 
conceptualization of the action crisis as phase of conflict.  
Fully in congruence with Klinger’s model, the action crisis analytic approach views 
goal disengagement as a process rather than a binary event that starts long before individuals 
give up on their goal. By repeatedly assessing individuals’ experience with respect to a 
specific goal, the temporal dynamics of goal disengagement on various levels of experience 
can be studied (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013).  
Affective, cognitive, and behavioral correlates 
Previous studies have investigated the affective, cognitive and behavioral correlates of an 
action crisis. Conforming to previous accounts of goal disengagement as emotional and 
troublesome process (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Carver & Scheier, 2005; Klinger, 
1975; Wrosch et al., 2003), longitudinal studies have linked the action crisis to the experience 
of negative affect and reductions in psychological and physical well-being over time. 
Specifically, individuals with more severe action crisis reported a decrease in life satisfaction, 
an increase in psychosomatic symptoms, and an increase in sleeping disorders (Brandstätter, 
Herrmann, & Schüler, 2013).  
The action crisis was also found to instigate change on the cognitive level 
(Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). Mindset theory of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990; 
Gollwitzer, 2012; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987) holds that each action phase is associated 
with a distinct cognitive orientation (i.e., mindset) functional for the accomplishment of 
phase-specific tasks. Goal realization is supported by an implemental mindset, narrowing 
individuals’ focus on goal implementation and biasing information processing in favor of the 
goal. Goal setting is supported by a deliberative mindset characterized by impartial 
information processing and openmindedness (Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012). Building on the 
Rubicon model, Brandstätter and Schüler (2013) expected that the action crisis would expel 
individuals from their implemental mindset. They found that when an action crisis was 
experimentally induced or measured with respect to a personal goal, cost-benefit-thinking as a 
feature of the deliberative mindset strongly increased. An incidental learning paradigm further 
revealed that the preferential processing of implementation- over deliberation-related material 
was attenuated in an action crisis, compared to unobstructed goal striving. Brandstätter and 
Schüler (2013) concluded that the action crisis is associated with a distinct cognitive 
orientation, in which features of the prevalent implemental mindset are mixed with features of 
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a resurging deliberative mindset. This finding has been validated on the neural level of 
analysis (Herrmann, Baur, Brandstätter, Hänggi, & Jäncke, 2014).  
Starting from the mindset-shift, Brandstätter and colleagues (2013) reasoned that an 
action crisis restores pre-decisional impartiality also with respect to goal appraisals 
(Beckmann & Gollwitzer, 1987; Gagné & Lydon, 2001; Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; 
Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). Indeed, higher levels of 
action crisis in personal goals predicted a subsequent decrease in goal desirability and 
attainability over a study period of 14 weeks (Brandstätter et al., 2013). This breakup of the 
implemental bias was regarded as sign of accommodation (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 
2002) and necessary requirement for disengagement processes to seep in (Brandstätter et al., 
2013). 
At the same time, the concern has been expressed that the action crisis impedes goal 
striving and leads to reduced goal-related performance, given that the opposing tasks of 
efficient goal implementation and impartial deliberation now coexist (Herrmann et al., 2014; 
Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015). Indeed, individuals who experienced higher levels of action 
crisis with regard to their goal to run a marathon achieved a slower running time in the race 
two weeks later, when potentially confounding variables were controlled. A steeper increase 
in saliva cortisol over the course of the run, which may indicate increased stress, partly 
mediated these performance impairments (Brandstätter et al., 2013). In a similar vein, 
students with higher levels of action crisis in their studies reported to have collected a lower 
number of ECTS credits by end of the first academic year (Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015). 
While these studies clearly point to impaired performance in consequence of the action crisis, 
they cannot fully thwart the alternative explanation that individuals with more severe action 
crises were less prepared to meet the demands posed by their goal, therefore experienced an 
action crisis, and showed lower performance later on. A further investigation of the predictive 
effects of an action crisis on goal-related performance has, thus, been expressed as a need for 
further research (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press). This research conforms to this 
expressed need. 
Risk and protective factors for experiencing an action crisis 
Apart from the investigation of affective, cognitive, and behavioral correlates of an action 
crisis, research has started to address factors involved in its development and resolution. 
Factors related to the goal and the person will be described in the following. 
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Goal-related factors. Action crises are thought to develop when obstacles in goal 
striving have accumulated and/or the goal has lost part of its appeal (Brandstätter & Schüler, 
2013). These instances can be subsumed under the expectancy-value-theoretical notion 
(Atkinson, 1964; Feather, 1982; Vroom, 1964) of limited outcome expectancy (i.e., goal 
attainability) and/or limited goal value (i.e., goal desirability). Note that the action crisis 
analytic approach, contrary to previous approaches to goal disengagement, acknowledges 
both insufficient goal attainability and insufficient goal desirability as legitimate reason to 
question a goal. Empirically, the predictive effects of the goal’s motivational features on the 
experience of action crisis are untested. The present research aims to close this gap. 
Recently, the autonomous motivation to pursue a goal was studied as protective factor 
for the development of action crises (Holding, Hope, Harvey, Jetten, & Koestner, 2016). 
Some goals are rather externally controlled, for instance, when a person complies with an 
obligation expressed by other people, whereas other goals are pursued for more autonomous 
reasons, when they reflect the person’s true values and interests. Goal self-concordance as the 
degree to which individuals’ motivation to pursue a goal is autonomous rather than controlled 
has been linked to higher goal progress and well-being (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon et 
al., 2004). When studying autonomous and controlled motivation in the context of the action 
crisis, Holding et al. (2016) found that autonomous motivation was associated with lower 
action crisis severity measured several weeks later, controlling for dispositional factors like 
action- versus state-orientation, neuroticism, and goal-adjustment capacities. Controlled 
motivation was associated with more severe action crises (Holding et al., 2016). A similar 
pattern was earlier reported for goal ambivalence (Koletzko, Herrmann, & Brandstätter, 
2015), which can be assumed to share experiential features with the action crisis. These 
findings suggest that pursuing self-concordant goals may be a protective factor that shields 
individuals from having an action crisis (Holding et al., 2016). 
Person-related factors. Herrmann and Brandstätter (2013) followed a similar line of 
reasoning when they examined action (vs. state) orientation as a predictor residing within the 
person. Action orientation describes individuals’ dispositional ability to regulate positive and 
negative affect, which is, according to theory of personality-systems interactions (Kuhl, 2001) 
needed to flexibly alternate between effortful self-control and intuitive self-maintenance (i.e., 
self-regulation) as the two complementary modes of volitional action control. Consistent with 
findings that the ability to regulate basic affect supports self-congruent goal setting (Kuhl & 
Kazén, 1994), individuals with higher action orientation were less prone to develop an action 
crisis over the studied time period of 14 weeks (shielding effect). In accordance with the view 
Introduction 24 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
that successful affect regulation fosters effective goal striving and the overcoming of 
obstacles (Diefendorff et al., 1998; Fuhrmann & Kuhl, 1998), the study further revealed that 
among individuals who already experienced an action crisis, high dispositional action 
orientation was associated with its faster resolution (resolution effect). Cross-sectionally, 
these effects were mediated by increased self-concordance on the level of concrete goals 
(Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2013), what nicely links the investigation of person-related and 
goal-related factors. Although research has started to identify factors that may shield 
individuals from developing an action crisis, not much is known about people may overcome 
an action crisis once experiencing it. To investigate the effectiveness of one specific strategy 
is an announced objective of this research.  
The present research 
The action crisis offers an excellent theoretical and methodological framework to address 
questions that have been raised in the context of goal disengagement. Unlike previous 
investigations that were mostly taken from an interindividual difference perspective 
(Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990; Wrosch et al., 2003), the action crisis account to goal 
disengagement implies the possibility to investigate temporal dynamics by repeated 
measurement (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press; Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2013). Apart 
from the process perspective, also people’s immediate experience and behavior in a specific 
“goal dilemma” is open to investigation. In this thesis, I used both approaches: Part I and Part 
II address longer-term changes in subjective goal appraisals and goal-related performance in 
relation to the action crisis, with potential contributions to the understanding of the goal 
disengagement process. Part III and Part IV focus on the immediate experience of the action 
crisis as arguably self-threatening intrapsychic conflict, with potential contributions how the 
conflict between further goal pursuit and disengagement might be resolved. 
Part I: The dynamic interplay between the experience of action crisis and appraisals of 
goal desirability and attainability 
Part I of this research builds upon previous investigations of the action crisis and extends their 
findings. Brandstätter et al.’s (2013) investigation had revealed that the action crisis, arguably 
due to the mindset-shift, predicts a reappraisal of the motivational features of the goal, a 
change that was regarded as necessary requirement for disengagement to occur (Brandstätter 
et al., 2013). In addition, Brandstätter and Herrmann (in press) noted, in line with expectancy-
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value models of motivation (Atkinson, 1964; Feather, 1982; Vroom, 1964) and theoretical 
assumptions in the field of goal disengagement (Carver & Scheier, 2005; Wrosch et al., 
2003), that an action crisis develops as a result of a loss in subjective goal attainability and/or 
desirability. Empirically, this latter assumption remained untested. Combining these two 
assumptions, Part I investigates a dynamic interplay between the action crisis and individuals’ 
subjective goal appraisals in the disengagement process from a high-level personal goal (i.e., 
the goal to complete a university degree). The main proposition is that the action crisis not 
only predicts the successive devaluation of the goal’s attainability and desirability 
(Brandstätter et al., 2013), but, in turn, low subjective goal attainability and desirability 
contribute to an increase in action crisis over time. When analyzed among individuals who 
ultimately abandon their goal (i.e., drop out of their studies), this pattern should be manifested 
in continuously increasing levels of action crisis and steadily decreasing appraisals of goal 
attainability and desirability until the time when individuals finally abandon their goal. 
Related to this, a second aim of Part I is to test whether devaluing a goal’s desirability might 
help to maintain life satisfaction when goal disengagement is considered or actually 
imminent; an idea which is inherent in several theoretical approaches outlined in the 
introduction (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Heckhausen et al., 2010; Klinger, 1975; 
Wrosch et al., 2003). 
Part II: The effects of an action crisis on goal-related and goal-unrelated performance 
While Part I addresses the processes instigated by the action crisis on the level of individuals’ 
subjective goal appraisals, Part II focuses on the question how the action crisis relates to 
objective outcomes of goal pursuit. In light of existing evidence that the action crisis is linked 
to impairments in goal-related performance (Brandstätter et al., 2013; Herrmann 
& Brandstätter, 2015), a further analysis of performance effects in consequence of the action 
crisis has been advocated (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press). To test the hypothesis that the 
action crisis is detrimental to performance, two studies with complementary methodological 
approaches are presented. In a first longitudinal study, students with higher levels of action 
crisis in their university degree, measured at the beginning of the term, are expected to 
achieve a lower academic performance by the end of that term. Methodologically extending a 
previous investigation (Hermann & Brandstätter, 2015), academic performance (i.e., GPA and 
number of ECTS credits obtained) is determined on the basis of the university’s official 
records, and prior-term academic performance is statistically controlled. As a longitudinal 
study offers insights about processes in real-life goal striving, but does not allow conclusions 
Introduction 26 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
about causality, Study 2 is designed to conduct a causal test. It additionally diverges from 
Study 1 in that it studies performance impairments in a task that is goal-unrelated in content. 
If the experience of action crisis, as expected, consumes relevant cognitive resources, 
performance impairments should even be observable on unrelated tasks executed in temporal 
proximity. Supporting evidence would point to the broader relevance of an action crisis within 
an individuals’ goal system. 
Part III: The action crisis as a threat to the self 
Personal goals are usually seen as defining individuals’ identity and self-conceptions 
(Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; Emmons, 2003). Accordingly, researchers in the field of goal 
disengagement have asserted that giving up a goal can shake a person’s self to the core 
(Wrosch et al., 2003; Klinger, 1975; Carver & Scheier, 2005). The implications of goal failure 
for subjective self-integrity are assumed to be that far-reaching that people sometimes cling to 
a futile course of action despite financial or emotional costs (Brockner, 1992). Based on these 
assumptions, Part III of this research scrutinizes in one correlational and one experimental 
study the hypothesis that experiencing an action crisis in a personal goal is self-threatening. 
Subsuming the experiential effects of the action crisis under the theoretical framework of a 
threatened self may promote a better understanding of this critical phase in goal striving. 
From other research traditions (Sherman & Cohen, 2006), much is known about people 
respond to threat, and this knowledge might be used to make predictions about individuals’ 
behavior in an action crisis. In particular, it might give an indication what people in an action 
crisis may benefit from (i.e., strategies that alleviate self-threat). Such an approach was, for 
the first time, taken in Part IV. 
Part IV: Investigating a potential intervention for resolving the action crisis 
Researchers have pointed to the significance of the development of interventions for the 
action crisis (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press). Despite its assumed aversiveness and self-
threatening nature (see Part III), shielding an individual from its experience would not be the 
right conclusion, as it would ignore the benefits of disengagement from goals that are not 
worthwhile or out of reach. Therefore, more than preventing action crises, interventions 
should be targeted at their optimal resolution. As knowing when to hold and when to fold is 
key for optimal living (Lench & Levine, 2008; Wrosch et al., 2003), people might benefit 
from a strategy that promotes a decision that incorporates relevant information, while ignoring 
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factors that are secondary for ultimate decision quality (e.g., self-justification or face-saving 
concerns). Drawing from expectancy-value models of motivation (Feather, 1992), factors 
immediately relevant to the decision whether to further pursue a goal are its attainability and 
desirability.  
As self-threat is assumed to distort decisions about persistence and disengagement 
(Brockner, 1992; Zhang & Baumeister, 2006) and has been associated with restricted 
information processing (Cohen & Sherman, 2014), a strategy that alleviates self-threat might 
be of use in the action crisis. Part IV tests self-affirmation (Steele, 1988) as such a strategy. A 
large body of research shows that in threatening situations, short affirmations of overall self-
adequacy can prevent defensive responses (for a review, see Cohen & Sherman, 2014). When 
affirmed, threatening information can be approached and processed more thoroughly, with 
implications for the conclusions derived from it (Klein, Harris, Ferrer, & Zajac, 2011). 
Moreover, affirmed individuals were found to more readily internalize the informative value 
of self-relevant experiences, like success and failure, and act accordingly (Vohs, Park, & 
Schmeichel, 2013). Based on these findings, four experimental studies are presented that test 
whether, in an action crisis, the affirmation of a goal-unrelated value helps people to base 
their preference for further goal pursuit versus disengagement on the subjective desirability 
and attainability of their goal. 
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Abstract 
To date is it not well understood how individuals disengage from goals. A recent approach 
suggests that disengagement is often preceded by an action crisis, a motivational conflict in 
which the individual is torn between holding on to and letting go of a personal goal. We 
postulate that a dynamic interplay between the experience of action crisis and appraisals of 
goal desirability and attainability shapes the disengagement process from personal goals. In 
two longitudinal studies (N = 364), an action crisis in the goal to complete a university degree 
predicted devaluations of its desirability and attainability, and reversely, low goal attainability 
(but not desirability) predicted an increase in action crisis. Moreover, studies provided first 
evidence that devaluing goal desirability might be functional for well-being in an action crisis. 
Studies strengthen the view that disengagement is shaped by reciprocal processes between the 
experience of action crisis and changes in goal appraisal. 
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Introduction 
Imagine a student who started his medical degree with the best intentions to become a 
physician, but some semesters and failed exams later drops out of university, convinced that 
medicine is not for him. Or picture two newlyweds, firmly committed to stay together in good 
times as in bad, who, after some stormy years, conclude that the best thing they can do is part 
ways. How did they come to the conclusion to let go of a previously valued goal and what 
does the process of disengagement look like? These are the questions the present research 
aims to address. 
Goal disengagement as an essential capacity in life 
There are endless examples of personal goals individuals pursue in their lives; projects that 
were carefully weighed before starting them; goals that, once set, define individuals’ identity 
and guide their everyday life (Emmons, 2003). Despite good intentions, not all of them can be 
achieved. In the last two decades, psychological research has come to acknowledge that aside 
from the importance to persist in the face of obstacles, turning away from unfruitful endeavors 
is an adaptive response at times (Brandstätter, 2003; Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; 
Wrosch et al., 2003). It is when strivings have become too costly or expectations of success 
too low that goal disengagement frees resources and relieves psychological distress that 
would arise from repeated failure when sticking to the goal (Wrosch et al., 2003). Although 
individuals were shown to differ in their goal adjustment capacities, with higher capacities 
predicting better well-being and health (Wrosch et al., 2013), the mechanisms explaining how 
individuals disengage are largely unknown, the process of disengagement not well 
understood.  
Yet, there are theoretical considerations, formulated 40 years ago, that shape today’s 
scientific discourse about the disengagement from personal goals. Klinger (1977) conceived 
disengagement as a lengthy and difficult process comparable with a “psychic earthquake that 
sends shudders and rumbles through a person’s life” (p. 137). The four-phase sequence of 
events, known as the incentive-disengagement cycle (Klinger, 1975), starts with hardly 
surmountable obstacles in goal striving, which the individual confronts with an increase in 
commitment and the devaluation of alternative goals (invigoration). If efforts to overcome 
obstacles go astray, the individual enters a phase of aggression characterized by signs of 
frustration. At some point, the person begins to give up and falls into a state of desperate 
avolition. This phase of depression is highly aversive but comes with the advantage of 
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loosening most commitments, inclusive the commitment to the blocked goal. Finally, the 
individual enters a phase of recovery, in which he or she rediscovers interest in incentives and 
may end the cycle by committing to a new goal (Klinger, 1975). Although insightful and 
much cited, an empirical test of the model is lacking. Only recently have researchers started to 
test Klinger’s assumptions (Wrosch & Miller, 2009) and investigate the disengagement 
process on the level of concrete goals.  
Resuming the process perspective on goal disengagement: The action crisis 
A recent approach favoring a process perspective on goal disengagement comes with research 
on the action crisis (Brandstätter, 2003; Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). Even though not 
conceptualized as an element of Klinger’s model, the action crisis may be located at the point 
when invigorated attempts to overcome obstacles have not led to the hoped-for success, and 
frustration about it has come up. Due to the notion of distinct phases, in the incentive-
disengagement cycle the transition between intensification of efforts and downswing into 
depression seems abrupt. Research on the action crisis adds to the understanding of the 
disengagement process by pointing to the experience of conflict between the opposing forces 
of holding on to and letting go of a personal goal and by conceptualizing the transitional 
phase between persistence and withdrawal, in which individuals, while still being concerned 
with goal implementation, feel increasing goal-related doubt.  
The intensity of action crisis with regard to specific goals is operationalized by 
individuals’ reports of several facets constitutive of conflict. Higher levels of action crisis are 
inferred when people, with respect to a goal to which they still feel committed, experience 
recurring doubts, repeated setbacks, implemental disorientation, goal related rumination, 
disengagement impulses, and when they procrastinate (Brandstätter et al., 2013; Brandstätter 
& Schüler, 2013). Although an action crisis does not have to result in the abandonment of the 
goal, but may likewise be overcome by a renewal of commitment (e.g., if people identify new 
means to goal attainment), recent findings show that it usually precedes goal termination 
(Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015). Consistent with Klinger’s (1975) reasoning, goal 
disengagement, in this approach, is regarded as a gradual process rather than a discrete event, 
which starts considerably before individuals give up on their goals (Brandstätter et al., 2013; 
Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013).  
Previous research has addressed the affective, behavioral, and physiological correlates 
of an action crisis. In line with its understanding as intrapsychic conflict, it was found to 
concurrently and longitudinally predict impairments in psychological and physical well-being 
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(Brandstätter et al., 2013). First evidence further suggests that it compromises goal-related 
performance. Individuals who, in the preparation of a marathon, experienced higher levels of 
action crisis performed worse in the marathon two weeks later, controlling for experience, 
amount of training, age, and body mass index. This effect was partly mediated by steeper 
increases in saliva cortisol, a physiological indicator of stress, measured repeatedly during the 
run (Brandstätter et al., 2013).  
As experimental and longitudinal studies have revealed, an action crisis also affects 
individuals’ goal-related cognitive orientation, that is, their mindset (Brandstätter & Schüler, 
2013). Mindset theory of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012) holds that different phases in 
goal striving evoke mindsets functional for the accomplishment of phase-specific tasks. The 
phase of goal striving promotes an implemental mindset, which colors individuals’ outlook in 
favor of the goal and contributes to persistence and goal attainment (Armor & Taylor, 2003; 
Brandstätter & Frank, 2002). In an action crisis, this firm orientation towards goal 
implementation is attenuated, while deliberative cost-benefit thinking resurges. This change 
in cognitive orientation, which has been denoted as mindset-shift (Brandstätter & Schüler, 
2013), is regarded as an important requirement for disengagement processes to seep in 
(Brandstätter et al., 2013).  
Reciprocal influences between the experience of action crisis and appraisals of goal 
desirability and attainability 
Based on the mindset-shift, Brandstätter and colleagues (2013) expected that an action crisis 
entails changes in how individuals evaluate their goal in terms of its desirability (i.e., the 
value attributed to the goal) and its attainability (i.e., the expectancy that the intended 
outcome can be attained). They built this prediction on studies showing that the deliberative 
mindset, to support well-balanced goal setting, fosters an impartial evaluation of goal 
desirability and attainability (Beckmann & Gollwitzer, 1987), whereas the implemental 
mindset, to immunize individuals against undue termination in face of obstacles, is 
characterized by an enhancement of the goal’s features (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; Harmon-
Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002). With the resurgence of a deliberative mindset in the action 
crisis, Brandstätter et al. (2013) concluded that individuals would come to see the desirability 
and attainability of their goal more skeptically. Indeed, higher levels of action crisis in 
personal goals predicted devaluations of goal desirability and attainability over the period of 
14 weeks. This was attributed to a reduction of the implemental bias in consequence of the 
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mindset-shift and accommodative processes facilitating disengagement (Brandstätter et al., 
2013).  
While this finding shows that appraisals of goal desirability and attainability are 
updated to match and reflect the current status in goal striving, the reverse influence of goal 
desirability and attainability on the experience of action crisis remains unclear. On theoretical 
grounds, there is reason to assume that this influence exists. Expectancy-value models 
(Atkinson, 1964; Feather, 1982; Vroom, 1964) hold that the motivation to pursue a goal is 
defined by its value as well as expectancy that it can be attained. These features do not solely 
shape motivation before a goal is set; when people confront difficulties in goal striving, they 
periodically step outside the behavioral stream to reassess the likelihood of success. If the 
assessment turns out unfavorably, the result is an impetus to cease further effort, and 
potentially disengage from the goal itself (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Jostmann and Koole 
(2009) noted:  
If the goal is highly valuable, people are more inclined to hang on to it than when 
the goal is less valuable. …. When people expect that they still have the capacity to 
attain the goal, they are more likely to persist compared to when they consider their 
capacities as insufficient. (p.338) 
Thus, when people confront obstacles in goal striving or the goal loses its appeal, 
disengagement comes into question.  
Yet, not every impetus to disengage is translated into action (Carver & Scheier, 1998). 
There are things that tie individuals to their goals, in the form of previous investments (Arkes 
& Blumer, 1985) or the implications of the goal for identity and daily routines (Emmons, 
2003). Hence, low value or bleak outcome expectancies might rather evoke motivational 
conflict (i.e., an action crisis). When drawbacks prevail or goal striving is aggravated as a 
result of the action crisis (Brandstätter et al., 2013), this should add to individuals’ account of 
adversity experienced, further dampen expectations of success, and predict increased levels of 
action crisis.  
Based on these considerations, we assumed that not only does an action crisis predict a 
devaluation of the goal’s desirability and attainability, but reversely, low goal desirability 
and/or attainability predict an increase in action crisis. Therewith, the relationship would not 
be unidirectional, but reciprocal influences would exist. 
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Potential adaptive functions of devaluing goal desirability in an action crisis 
Besides an analysis of reciprocal influences between the action crisis and goal appraisals, our 
aim was to shed light on the idea that particularly the devaluation of goal desirability serves 
adaptive functions for well-being if the pursuit of a goal is questioned, and constitutes part of 
individuals’ self-regulatory ability to disengage from goals. This assumption has been 
formulated by several researchers investigating goal disengagement (Brandstätter et al., 2013; 
Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; 
Klinger, 1977; Tunali & Power, 2002; Wrosch et al., 2003) but, to our knowledge, not been 
empirically tested yet. 
According to Klinger (1975), a goal’s incentives, closely connected to its desirability, 
play a prominent role in people’s lives. If the realization of a desired end is turned into 
question, successfully adjusting to the situation not only requires the individual to refrain 
from attempts to reach the goal, but likewise to withdraw goal commitment. This has to be 
achieved through some reorganization of the incentive system. Wrosch et al. (2003) noted:  
Relinquishment of commitment … seems to involve a reduction in the importance 
that is attached to the goal. Reducing the goal’s importance, helping redefine it as 
not necessary for satisfaction in life (cf. Sprangers & Schwartz, 1999), allows the 
person to accommodate to the inability to reach the goal (Brandtstädter & Renner, 
1990). (p.11) 
Thus, when experiencing an action crisis, downgrading the goal’s desirability might 
inherit the function of maintaining life satisfaction.  
First evidence supports this reasoning. Couples’ appraisals of the goal to have a child 
changed in line with the outcomes of fertility treatment and couples who, 6 months after 
unsuccessful treatment, still attributed higher desirability and/or lower attainability to their 
goal to have a child reported the highest levels of depressive symptoms (Salmela-Aro & 
Suikkari, 2008). Tunali and Power (2002) found that mothers of autistic children seemed to 
redefine the importance of various needs for living a fulfilled life, as they placed higher 
emphasis on being a good parent and lower emphasis on career success, compared with 
women without an autistic child. Moreover, women with the highest life satisfaction ordered 
various needs in a way that was more consistent with raising an autistic child. Based on 
findings that depression facilitates the withdrawal of effort and commitment and promotes a 
realistic view (Alloy & Abramson, 1988), Wrosch and Miller (2009) concluded that 
“depressive symptoms can be useful” (p. 1181). In a longitudinal study, girls with more 
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severe depressive symptoms improved their disengagement capacities to a greater extent, 
which predicted subsequent reductions in depressive symptomatology (Wrosch & Miller, 
2009). Although not a direct test for beneficial effects of devaluing goal desirability, findings 
implicitly build on this assumption.  
The present research 
The present research seeks to explore the dynamic interplay between an action crisis and goal 
appraisals in the process of disengagement from a personal goal. Our aims were twofold. 
First, we intended to replicate the finding that an action crisis predicts a devaluation of goal 
desirability and attainability, and aimed to extend previous knowledge by testing whether, in 
turn, low goal desirability and/or attainability predict an increase in action crisis. Second, we 
wanted to test the assumption that by downgrading goal desirability, individuals might 
immunize themselves against the affective consequences of repeated failure and prevent 
negative implications for well-being which would arise if they abandoned their efforts without 
relinquishing commitment to the goal (Wrosch et al., 2003). We hypothesized that, in the 
presence of an action crisis, individuals who devalue goal desirability experience higher life 
satisfaction compared to individuals who do not devalue the desirability of their goal.  
Hypotheses were tested in two longitudinal studies, in which levels of action crisis, 
goal desirability, attainability, and life satisfaction were tracked over the period of 6 months 
(Study 1) or 1½ years (Study 2). We focused on the goal to obtain a university degree as a 
high-level goal many people pursue in their early twenties. By choosing this goal, several 
requirements were met that we deemed important for an adequate test of our hypotheses. 
First, we could ensure that participants were actively engaged in goal pursuit, allowing change 
in the relevant variables to occur between measurement points. Second, completing a 
university degree offers sufficient feedback, for example, in the form of grades, engagement 
in extracurricular study-relevant activities, and by comparisons with classmates. If goal 
striving provided scarce feedback, individuals could only give hazy estimations of goal 
desirability and attainability, and these might not be meaningful enough to affect future levels 
of action crisis. Third, whereas many students pursue their studies highly motivated, a 
considerable proportion ends their studies without obtaining a degree. In the United States, 6 
years after enrollment, 29.7 % have left college without earning a credential (National Student 
Clearinghouse Research Center, 2016). At Swiss universities, eight years after enrollment, 
24% did not obtain a Bachelor’s degree, and 35 % changed their major or university before 
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completing their degree (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2015). This points to study dropout 
as a highly relevant phenomenon.  
Study 1 
The first objective of Study 1 was to shed light on reciprocal influences between an action 
crisis and goal appraisals. We predicted that students with higher (vs. lower) levels of action 
crisis would, over time, devalue the desirability and attainability of their studies to a stronger 
extent. We further expected that students who perceived their study degree as less desirable or 
attainable than their peers would be more inclined to experience an increase in action crisis. 
The second objective was to test whether downgrading the study goal’s desirability was 
linked to an increase in life satisfaction when experiencing an action crisis.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. Data were collected within a longitudinal study on self-
regulation and well-being. It comprised two measurement points, one at the beginning (T1) 
and one at the end (T2) of the semester, as well as an intermediate experience sampling 
period. As all relevant measures were collected at T1 and T2, diary data are not of interest to 
this research. Participants were recruited through announcements during lectures, notice via 
the department mailing list, and advertisements on university billboards. At T1, the sample 
consisted of 157 students (132 women; Mage = 22.96 years, SDage = 4.05 years) enrolled in 
different fields of study (92 psychology students) at a public Swiss university. One hundred-
thirty-eight students (117 women; 76 psychology students; Mage = 23.09 years, SDage = 4.26 
years) participated in T2. The study was run online and compensated with partial course credit 
or app. $72. 
Measures. All measures were assessed at both T1 and T2. 
Action crisis. Level of action crisis with regard to the goal to successfully complete 
one’s study degree was measured with an adapted version of the Action Crisis Scale 
(ACRISS; Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). The six items (e.g., “I have thought of quitting my 
studies”, αT1 = .78; αT2 = .80) were answered on a 5-point Likert type scale from 1 = strongly 
disagree to 5 = strongly agree.  
Goal desirability. The extent to which participants valued their study goal was 
assessed with four items (e.g., “Pursuing my studies is important to me”, 1 = strongly 
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disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Due to sufficient internal consistency (αT1 = .78; αT2 = .74), we 
combined items to a scale representing goal desirability.  
Goal attainability. The extent to which participants viewed their study goal as 
attainable was measured with three items (e.g., “Successfully pursuing my studies seems 
difficult to me”, recoded, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Due to sufficient internal 
consistency (αT1 = .71; αT2 = .70), we collapsed them into a scale representing goal 
attainability.  
Life satisfaction. Participants rated their life satisfaction on the German version of the 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Glaesmer, Grande, 
Braehler, & Roth, 2011). The scale consists of five statements (e.g., “In most ways my life is 
close to my ideal”, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) of high internal consistency (αT1 
= .82; αT2 = .85). 
Results 
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among the study 
variables.  
Table 1: Means (SDs) and Zero-Order Correlations Among Variables in Study 1 
 
Note. T (in T1– T2) = time.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
To test whether an action crisis predicts changes in goal desirability and attainability 
and, vice versa, goal desirability and attainability predict changes in action crisis, we used a 
cross-lagged change regression model (McArdle, 2009). The model estimates base-free 
change in the variables of interest by adding an unobserved (i.e., latent) variable (ΔT1-T2) to a 
variable measured at two time points. By setting the effect of T1 predicting the criterion 
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Action crisis (T1) 2.49 (0.47) ––
2. Action crisis (T2) 2.23 (0.73) –.63*** ––
3. Goal desirability (T1) 4.35 (0.55) –.28*** –.32*** ––
4. Goal desirability (T2) 4.36 (0.57) –.34*** –.45*** .61*** ––
5. Goal attainability (T1) 3.92 (0.67) –.46*** –.47*** .29*** .19* ––
6. Goal attainability (T2) 3.92 (0.66) –.42*** –.62*** .24*** .20* .71*** ––
7. Life satisfaction (T1) 5.24 (1.01) –.36*** –.25*** .20*** .18* .29*** .18* ––
8. Life satisfaction (T2) 5.21 (1.05) –.25*** –.34*** .17*** .12* .20*** .18* .76***
Variable
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variable at T2 to a fixed value (= 1), the latent change captures the variance of the variable at 
T2 that is not identical to the variance at T1. Thus, ΔT1-T2 represents the residual change that 
has occurred from T1 to T2; as this change is not directly measured, it is considered latent 
(McArdle, 2009). 
For testing our hypothesis, we included regression paths between goal desirability 
(goal attainability, respectively) at T1 and the latent change in action crisis. Moreover, we 
included regression paths between action crisis at T1 and the latent change in goal desirability 
(goal attainability, respectively). To control for the influence of the respective other variable 
when predicting changes in goal desirability or attainability, we included regression paths 
between (a) goal attainability at T1 and the latent change in goal desirability and (b) goal 
desirability at T1 and the latent change in goal attainability. The model was estimated in 
AMOS (Arbuckle, 2010). 
Findings are displayed in Figure 1. Cross-sectionally (T1), there was a moderate 
negative correlation between action crisis and goal attainability and a smaller, but still 
significant negative correlation between action crisis and goal desirability. As hypothesized, 
students with higher levels of action crisis at T1 had a steeper decline in goal desirability over 
the course of the term, controlling for initial goal attainability. Furthermore, individuals with 
higher levels of action crisis at T1 experienced a stronger decrease in goal attainability, 
controlling for initial goal desirability; this effect was smaller and only marginally significant. 
Reversely, students with lower goal attainability at T1 experienced a stronger increase in 
action crisis, controlling for initial goal desirability. Unexpectedly, goal desirability did not 
significantly predict changes in action crisis. Still, results provide support for our assumption 
of reciprocal influences between an action crisis and the appraisal of the goal. 
To test the hypothesis that devaluing goal desirability is beneficial for life satisfaction 
when experiencing an action crisis, we ran a multiple regression analysis in SPSS (version 
20). We saved the standardized residuals to indicate change in goal desirability from T1 to T2 
and the unstandardized residuals to indicate change in life satisfaction over the same time 
period as new variables in our data file. Then, residual change in life satisfaction was 
regressed on standardized residual change in goal desirability, z-standardized action crisis 
scores at T1, and their product term
1
. The analysis revealed, R
2 
= .06, F(3,129) = 2.59, p = 
.056, that initial levels of action crisis,  = -.07, b = -0.05, SE = 0.06, t(129) = -0.74, p = .463,  
                                                 
1
 When including goal attainability at T1 as covariate, its effect was not significant, β = -.05, b = -0.03, 
SE = 0.06, t(128) = -0.52, p = .604. As results were, moreover, unchanged, we did not include it in the 
final model. 
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and change in goal desirability,  = -.01, b = -0.01, SE = 0.06, t(129) = -0.16, p = .877, were 
no significant predictors for change in life satisfaction. As hypothesized, the interaction 
between action crisis and change in goal desirability was significant,  = -.24, b = -0.17, SE = 
0.06, t(129) = -2.70, p = .008.  
 
 
Figure 1: Cross-lagged change regression model for the reciprocal effects between an 
action crisis and goal appraisals in Study 1. 
Note. Squares represent observed variables. Circles represent latent variables. Single-headed 
arrows indicate regression paths. Double-headed arrows indicate correlations. Regression 
paths relevant for hypothesis testing are printed in bold. Displayed parameters are 
standardized regression coefficients. R
2
 gives the amount of explained variance in an 
endogeneous variable. Res represents residual variance in the prediction of endogeneous 
variables. As the model is saturated, fit cannot be estimated. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013, Model 1) we found that in case of low 
initial action crisis (1 SD below the mean), increases in goal desirability tended to predict 
increases in life satisfaction, b = 0.16, SE = 0.10, t(129) = 1.72, p = .089 (see Figure 2). In the 
presence of high initial action crisis (1 SD above the mean), this relationship was reversed: 
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Now, decreases in goal desirability were linked to increases in life satisfaction, b = -0.16, SE 
= 0.08, t(129) = -2.17, p = .032. When goal desirability decreased over the course of the 
semester (1 SD below the mean), initial action crisis did not significantly predict changes in 
life satisfaction, b = 0.12, SE = 0.08, t(129) = 1.53, p = .130. When, however, goal desirability 
increased over the course of the semester (1 SD above the mean), higher initial levels of 
action crisis were linked to decreases in life satisfaction, b = -0.22, SE = 0.10, t(129) = -2.26, 
p = .025. Thus, among students with action crisis levels one standard deviation above the 
mean, those who downgraded the desirability of their studies over the course of the semester 
experienced a simultaneous improvement in life satisfaction. 
 
Figure 2: Change in life satisfaction as a function of initial action crisis and change in 
goal desirability at ±1 SD in Study 1. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Brief discussion 
Results supported our assumption of reciprocal influences between an action crisis and goal 
appraisals, even though not all hypothesized paths were significant. Replicating previous 
research (Brandstätter et al., 2013), students with higher levels of action crisis downgraded 
their studies’ desirability and attainability to a greater extent. Reversely, students with lower 
goal attainability experienced a stronger increase in action crisis. Against our expectation, an 
analogous finding did not emerge for goal desirability. The reason might be that we studied a 
goal from the achievement domain, where insufficient attainability might be a frequent cause 
for conflict; also random error may account for it. We also found support for our second 
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hypothesis: Whereas an increase in goal desirability tended to be associated with increases in 
life satisfaction in unobstructed goal striving, it was a decrease in goal desirability that 
seemed to be beneficial for life satisfaction when experiencing an action crisis in one’s studies 
as an identity-defining goal. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, we sought to replicate findings of Study 1 with a larger sample and higher number 
of measurement points. This allowed us to test the dynamic processes within individuals, what 
we deemed especially insightful for investigating how individuals, as a function of their own 
experiences, disengage from goals. We expected that when a student’s action crisis with 
regard to his/her studies was higher than usual, this “deviation” from the own average predicts 
that, at the following measurement point, goal desirability and attainability are lower than 
usual. Likewise, when a student rates the desirability or attainability of the study goal as 
lower than usual, in the following, action crisis levels should be higher than usual. Using this 
approach, interindividual differences (e.g., personality) cannot account for the effects. 
Due to its large sample size and long duration, Study 2 came with the methodological 
advantage that some students dropped out of university while participating in our research 
project. We did not assume that, in this subsample, processes between action crisis and goal 
appraisals would be contentually different from those of students who were in an action crisis 
but stuck to their study goal, as this decision might depend on many factors unrelated to this 
research. Still, we expected this data to give us a better understanding of the processes that 
occur in the final weeks and months before individuals abandon their goals. Specifically, we 
aimed to test whether reciprocal influences between action crisis and goal appraisals would 
perpetuate until the time of goal termination, causing a steady increase in action crisis and 
linear decreases in goal desirability and attainability when approaching study dropout. We did 
so by looking at individuals’ trajectories in action crisis, goal desirability, and attainability 
when heading towards study dropout. As we assumed that an action crisis prompts regulatory 
processes that distance individuals from their goals, we expected higher initial action crisis to 
predict stronger devaluations (i.e., steeper negative slopes) of goal desirability and 
attainability. Reversely, increases in action crisis should be stronger as a result of lower initial 
goal desirability and attainability. 
A study dropout usually marks the irreversible withdrawal of effort to complete the 
study goal. As it may be self-determined, but likewise be determined by external events, 
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withdrawal of commitment as the second part of disengagement may or may not have 
occurred. Withdrawing effort to reach a goal while remaining committed to it generates 
distress (Wrosch et al., 2003). As the devaluation of goal desirability might be understood as 
part of the emotional detachment from the goal, we hypothesized that individuals who 
devalue the desirability of their studies experience better life satisfaction shortly after study 
dropout, compared to individuals who do not devalue its desirability before this transition. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. Data were collected within a larger research project on 
the pursuit of personal goals. Participants, 207 freshmen (145 women, Mage = 21.0 years, 
SDage = 3.61, 72 psychology students) at a public Swiss university, were contacted at 12 
measurement points (T1 – T12) over a period of four semesters (1 ½ years). The study was 
advertised via an email delivered by the legal department of the university, through flyers, 
announcements during lectures, and advertisements on university billboards. Participants 
completed the study online and received a coupon of a popular mail-order company (worth 
approximately US$33 for the first and US$11 for each subsequent measurement point) in 
return for their participation
2
. 
Measures. Measures of action crisis (α  .77), goal desirability (α  .83), goal 
attainability (α  .63), and life satisfaction (α  .85) were the same as in Study 1 and presented 
to participants at all 12 measurement points. 
Study dropout. At 11 measurement points (T2 – T12), students reported whether they 
still pursued or had dropped out of their studies. If a dropout had occurred, participants rated 
their life satisfaction (and other measures not relevant for this investigation) and were 
excluded from further measurement points. 
Results 
Due to the dependency of observations, we analyzed our hypotheses by means of hierarchical 
linear modeling. The advantage of this approach is that it captures correlations between 
repeated measures by introducing random effects (Bauer, Preacher, & Gil, 2006). Our data 
corresponded to random intercept random slope models with two levels. Level 1 included 
between-person variability (i.e., the person mean) and within-person variability (i.e., 
                                                 
2 Participants who did not take part in two consecutive measurement points were excluded from the 
study. 
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fluctuations around the person mean). Level 2 represented between-person variability. Models 
were estimated in R (version 3.1.1; R Core Team, 2014) with the multilevel package (Bliese, 
2013) using maximum likelihood estimation. Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, 
and zero-order correlations (aggregate level) among the study variables.  
Table 2: Means (SDs) and Zero-Order Correlations (Aggregate Level) Among 
Variables in Study 2 
 
Note. ICC = Intraclass Correlation Coefficient.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.  
 
Analyses with the full sample. We had hypothesized that an action crisis predicts a 
devaluation of the goal’s desirability and attainability and, reversely, low goal desirability and 
attainability predict an increase in action crisis. We statistically analyzed the proposed time-
delayed effects from one measurement point to the next. Therefore, we created new variables 
in which data entries of our predictor variables were shifted by one measurement point, such 
that our criterion variables at any given time point t could be regressed on the predictor 
variables at the previous time point t-1. In line with recommendations to distinguish the 
between- and within-subjects level of analysis (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013), we isolated the 
within-person variability of a specific predictor (Level 1) from the person’s average across 
measurement points (Level 2). Thus, in our models, for each variable we entered a) a grand 
mean centered person mean and b) the person mean centered raw score for the specific 
measurement point. A time variable Timeij (0-11) was included in all models to control for 
possible changes over the research project.  
The first random intercept random slope model tested whether goal desirability at a 
specific measurement point (Goal Desirabilityij) was predicted by fluctuations in action crisis 
at the previous measurement point (γ10), when the person mean in action crisis (γ20) and 
fluctuations in goal desirability at the previous measurement point (γ30) were controlled. 
Analogously to Study 1, the person mean in goal attainability (γ40) and fluctuations in goal 
ICCt M (SD) 1 2 3 M (SD) 1 2 3
1. Mean action crisis .94 2.35 (0.67) –– 2.93 (0.78) ––
2. Mean goal desirability .97 4.34 (0.61) –.56*** –– 3.93 (0.70) –.61*** ––
3. Mean goal attainability .96 3.60 (0.60) –.66*** .33*** –– 3.28 (0.66) –.67*** –.42** ––
4. Mean life satisfaction .97 5.24 (0.94) –.57*** .38*** .36*** 4.88 (0.95) –.50** .39* .40**
Full sample Subsample with study dropout
Variable
The Process of Disengagement From Personal Goals 44 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
attainability at the previous measurement point (γ50) were controlled. Finally, time (γ60) was 
included. Random slopes were estimated for fluctuations in action crisis at the previous 
measurement point (u1j). The full model reads:  
Goal Desirabilityij = γ00 + γ10(ActionCrisist-1 – PMActionCrisis) + 
γ20PMActionCrisis + γ30(GoalDesirabilityt-1 – PMGoalDesirability) + 
γ40PMGoalAttainability + γ50(GoalAttainabilityt-1 – PMGoalAttainability) + 
γ60Time + u0j + u1j(ActionCrisist-1 – PMActionCrisisij) + Ɛij 
Results are summarized in Table 3. The intercept represents the level of goal 
desirability when all other variables in the model are zero. For our hypothesis, the regression 
weight for fluctuations in action crisis at the previous measurement point was the most 
informative (γ10). Results supported the assumption that when levels of action crisis were 
higher than usual, the subjective desirability of the study goal was lower than usual at the next 
measurement point.  
The second model tested whether goal attainability was predicted by individual 
fluctuations in action crisis at the previous measurement point, when the person mean in 
action crisis, fluctuations in goal attainability at the previous measurement point, the person 
mean in goal desirability, fluctuations in goal desirability at the previous measurement point, 
and time were controlled. Random slopes were estimated for fluctuations in action crisis at the 
previous measurement point. Findings were as hypothesized (see Table 3). When levels of 
action crisis were higher than usual, the perceived attainability of the study goal was lower 
than usual at the next measurement point.  
In the third model, action crisis levels were predicted by fluctuations in goal 
desirability and goal attainability at the previous measurement point, when the person mean in 
the respective variables and time were controlled; random slopes were allowed for the two 
focal predictors, fluctuations in goal desirability and attainability at the previous measurement 
point. As Table 3 illustrates, students who perceived their study degree as less attainable than 
they usually did experienced relatively higher action crisis levels at the next measurement 
point. Replicating findings of Study 1, fluctuations in goal desirability did not significantly 
influence action crisis levels at the next measurement point.  
Together, findings demonstrate that, also on an intraindividual level, above average 
experiences of action crisis forecast devaluations of goal desirability and attainability. 
Reversely, low goal attainability predicted an increase in action crisis, whereas goal 
desirability did not.  
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Table 3: Results of Three Multilevel Models Predicting Fluctuations in Goal 
Desirability, Goal Attainability, and Action Crisis in the Full Sample of 
Study 2 
 
Note. t –1= previous measurement point, B = unconditional model estimate, SE = standard 
error,  
Est = estimate, CI = confidence interval, Corr = correlation of random slope and random 
intercept, AIC = Akaike Information Criteria, BIC = Bayesian Information Criteria. Results 
are based on 199 participants and 1’768 observations. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
We also tested whether devaluing the goal’s desirability might benefit life satisfaction 
in an action crisis. Results of a random intercept random slope model revealed a marginally 
significant interaction (between-subjects level) between action crisis and residual change in 
goal desirability between two consecutive measurement points on life satisfaction at the later 
measurement point. However, the pattern of the interaction did not justify the conclusion that 
downgrading the goal’s desirability benefits life satisfaction in an action crisis; rather, life 
satisfaction was reduced irrespective of students’ change in goal desirability. Partially 
replicating results of Study 1, in the absence of an action crisis, upgrading the study goal’s 
Fixed effects B (SE) Lower Upper B (SE) Lower Upper B (SE) Lower Upper
4.313 (0.040) *** 4.235 4.391 3.567 (0.037) *** 3.495 3.639 2.331 (0.037) *** 2.259 2.403
Action crisis t –1 –0.090 (0.035) * –0.158 –0.021 –0.107 (0.032) *** –0.170 –0.045 –0.195 (0.029) *** 0.139 0.250
Goal desirability t –1 –0.095 (0.029) *** 0.039 0.151 –0.097 (0.032) ** –0.160 –0.034 0.004 (0.046) –0.085 0.094
Goal attainability t –1 –0.001 (0.024) –0.049 0.047 0.110 (0.028) *** 0.055 0.164 –0.111 (0.036) ** –0.182 –0.040
Time 0.000 (0.003) –0.005 0.006 –0.001 (0.003) –0.006 –0.007 –0.001 (0.004) –0.006 0.008
Action crisis –0.603 (0.075) *** –0.751 –0.456 –0.667 (0.061) *** –0.786 –0.548
Goal desirability –0.061 (0.065) –0.118 0.067 –0.431 (0.055) *** –0.540 –0.323
Goal attainability –0.059 (0.082) –0.222 0.104 –0.611 (0.057) *** –0.723 –0.500
Random effects Est Corr Lower Upper Est Corr Lower Upper Est Corr Lower Upper
Residual 0.342 0.330 0.355 –0.399 0.384 0.413 –0.423 0.407 0.439
Intercept 0.501 0.450 0.557 0.434 0.388 0.484 0.414 0.369 0.465
Action crisis t –1 0.329 –0.155 0.275 0.394 0.220 –0.262 0.163 0.297
Goal desirability t –1 0.315 –0.174 0.232 0.429
Goal attainability t –1 0.244 –0.030 0.174 0.342
Model fit Est Est Est
–2 log likelihood ––994.253 –1166.835 –1281.599
AIC –2010.506 –2355.670 –2591.197
BIC –2070.716 –2415.880 –2667.828
ICC –0000.681 –0000.640 –0000.606
Goal desirability t Goal attainability t Action crisis t
Intercept
Level 1 (within-person)
Level 2 (between-person)
CI 95 CI 95 CI 95
CI 95 CI 95 CI 95
Level 1 (within-person)
Level 2 (between-person)
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desirability was descriptively linked to higher life satisfaction, and this benefit was nullified 
in an action crisis. The analysis is documented in detail in the Supplement of Part I.  
Analyses with the subsample of students who dropped out of their studies. Next, 
we turned to the subsample of students (n = 42) who dropped out of their studies over the 
course of our research project. As a study dropout could occur at any time and participants 
were excluded from further measurement points, the number of observations we had for each 
individual was highly diverse (M = 6.81, SD = 3.25, range = 1 to 12). To analyze individual 
slopes in action crisis, goal desirability, and goal attainability, we adjusted individuals’ 
observations at the time of study dropout, and, in the following, denote this measurement 
point as T. T-1 was the final measurement before study dropout, and hence, the last time that 
goal-related variables (i.e., action crisis, goal desirability, goal attainability) were assessed. 
Following this principle, T-n marks the measurement n time points before an individual 
reported his or her study dropout. Figures 3 to 5 display individual trajectories (raw data) in 
action crisis, goal desirability, and goal attainability when approaching study dropout.  
 
Figure 3: Individual trajectories of action crisis in the subsample of students (n = 42) 
who drop out of their studies in Study 2. 
Note. T (in T-1 to T-11) = time before study dropout. Lines indicate individual trajectories. 
Bold line represents mean trajectory of the sample. 
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Figure 4: Individual trajectories of goal desirability in the subsample of students (n = 
42) who drop out of their studies in Study 2. 
Note. T (in T-1 to T-11) = time before study dropout. Lines indicate individual trajectories. 
Bold line represents mean trajectory of the sample. 
To statistically model intra-individual slopes, we ran three random intercept random 
slope models. In each, we regressed the respective criterion variable (action crisis, goal 
desirability, or goal attainability) on Timeij (-11 to 0), indicating the number of measurement 
points before study dropout. The random effect for Timeij represented the amount of 
individual change in the criterion from T-n to study dropout. By inspecting the significance of 
the fixed effect for Timeij, we could tell that action crisis levels increased with decreasing 
temporal distance to study dropout, b = 0.12, SE = 0.02, t(207) = 6.53, p < .001. 
Concurrently, there was a significant decrease in how desirable, b = -0.06, SE = 0.01, t(207) = 
-3.98, p < .001, and attainable, b = -0.06, SE = 0.01, t(207) = -4.83, p < .001, students 
deemed their study goal.  
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Figure 5: Individual trajectories of goal attainability in the subsample of students (n = 
42) who drop out of their studies in Study 2. 
Note. T (in T-1 to T-11) = time before study dropout. Lines indicate individual trajectories. 
Bold line represents mean trajectory of the sample. 
To analyze whether goal desirability and attainability declined as a function of higher 
initial action crisis, and reversely, increases in action crisis occurred as a function of lower 
initial goal desirability and attainability, we extracted individuals’ slope parameters 
(indicating the predicted change until study dropout) in action crisis, goal desirability, and 
goal attainability from the models described above and saved them as new variables in our 
data file. Then, we ran three multiple regression analyses using the pequod package (Mirisola 
& Seta, 2015).  
In the first regression, individuals’ initial levels of action crisis were used to predict 
their slope in goal desirability. Like in previous analyses, initial goal attainability was 
controlled,  = .02, b = 0.001, SE = 0.01, t(39) = 0.07, p = .909. Supporting our line of 
argument, students with an initially more severe action crisis downgraded the desirability of 
their studies to a greater extent,  = -.53, b = -0.02, SE = 0.007, t(39) = -3.17, p = .003, R2 = 
.30, F(2,39) = 8.26, p = .001.  
In the second regression, individuals’ initial levels of action crisis were used to predict 
their slope in goal attainability, controlling for initial goal desirability,  = -.04, b = -0.0005, 
SE = 0.002, t(39) = -0.22, p = .830. Results revealed that students with an initially more 
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severe action crisis downgraded the attainability of their study degree to a marginally greater 
extent,  = -.37, b = -0.004, SE = 0.002, t(39) = -2.00, p = .052, R2 = .12, F(2,39) = 2.70, p = 
.080.   
In the third regression, individuals’ initial levels of goal desirability and goal 
attainability were used to predict their slope in action crisis. Individuals with lower goal 
attainability experienced a stronger increase in action crisis,  = -.35, b = -0.02, SE = 0.01,  
t(39) = -2.23, p = .032, R
2 
= .16, F(2,39) = 3.65, p = .035. Contrary, individuals with lower 
goal desirability did not experience a stronger increase in action crisis,  = -.10, b = -0.01, SE 
= 0.01, t(39) = -0.62, p = .536. That is, replicating results of Study 1 and the full sample, 
higher initial levels of action crisis predicted stronger devaluations of goal desirability and 
attainability. Reversely, lower levels of goal attainability (but not desirability) forecasted 
stronger increases in action crisis until the point in time when individuals abandoned their 
study goal. 
Next, we tested whether devaluing the studies’ desirability predicts higher life 
satisfaction shortly after dropout. In a multiple regression, life satisfaction after study dropout 
(T) was regressed on the individual slope in goal desirability before study dropout, controlling 
for life satisfaction shortly before study dropout (T-1). The model, R
2 
= .45, F(2,25) = 10.25,   
p < .001, revealed that life satisfaction at T-1 significantly predicted life satisfaction after 
study dropout,  = .73, b = 0.74, SE = 0.17, t(25) = 4.47, p < .001. Contrary to our 
expectation, there was no effect of the slope in goal desirability on life satisfaction after study 
dropout,  = -0.19, b = -7.38, SE = 6.33, t(25) = -1.17, p = .255. Exploratorily, we conducted 
another regression analysis in which we controlled for life satisfaction two measurement 
points before study dropout. Also in this model, R
2 
= .69, F(2,20) = 21.75, p < .001, life 
satisfaction at T-2 was a significant predictor of life satisfaction after study dropout,  = .89, b 
= 0.99, SE = 0.15, t(20) = 6.58, p < .001. The effect of the slope in goal desirability on life 
satisfaction after study dropout was marginally significant,  = -.25, b = -10.09, SE = 5.41, 
t(20) = -1.86, p = .077. When running a third regression analysis, R
2 
= .74, F(2,19) = 26.30, p 
< .001, controlling for life satisfaction at T-3,  = .93, b = 1.28, SE = 0.18, t(19) = 7.24, p < 
.001, the effect of the slope in goal desirability was significant,  = -.30, b = -11.98, SE = 
5.18, t(19) = -2.31, p = .032. This analysis suggests that individuals with a steeper decrease in 
goal desirability report higher life satisfaction shortly after study dropout
3
. 
                                                 
3 Of 42 participants who reported their study dropout, 28 shortly stated the reason for it. We coded 
participants’ answers regarding whether they referred to low desirability (1 = yes, 0 = no) and/or low 
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Brief discussion 
Study 2 confirmed that an action crisis predicts decreases in the desirability and attainability 
students ascribe to their study goal. Supporting our assumption of reciprocity, low perceived 
attainability of completing one’s studies contributed to an increase in action crisis. 
Inconsistent with our prediction, the desirability of the goal to complete one’s studies did not 
have this effect. Besides replicating results of Study 1, this study adds to previous knowledge 
by verifying processes on an intraindividual level of analysis. Moreover, analyses in the 
subsample of students who dropped out of their studies revealed that action crisis levels 
linearly increase until study dropout (and do so more as a function of low initial goal 
attainability), whereas the study goal’s desirability and attainability steadily decline (and do 
so more as a result of high initial action crisis). The conclusion that downgrading goal 
desirability serves adaptive functions for life satisfaction in an action crisis was not justified 
based on the full sample of this study, although findings suggest that the relationship between 
goal desirability and life satisfaction might be different in an action crisis than in unobstructed 
goal striving. Among students who dropped out of their studies, those who beforehand more 
strongly downgraded the desirability of their study goal reported higher life satisfaction after 
study dropout. Improvements in life satisfaction might start well before this transition. Due to 
limited sample size, this finding is preliminary and should be replicated in future studies.  
Discussion 
Two longitudinal studies investigated the dynamic interplay between an action crisis, the 
phase in goal pursuit in which further striving is called into question, and appraisals of goal 
desirability and attainability in the disengagement process from a personal goal. Focusing on 
students’ endeavor to complete a university degree as a self-defining, high-level goal, we 
replicated Brandstätter and colleagues’ (2013) finding that an action crisis predicts 
devaluations of goal desirability and attainability. Going beyond earlier studies, we proved the 
relationships both in between- and within-subjects analyses. Therewith, findings provide 
                                                                                                                                                        
attainability (1 = yes, 0 = no). Sixteen participants (57.14%) mentioned a desirability-related reason 
(e.g., lack of interest for study topic) and 9 (32.14%) mentioned an attainability-related reason. Of the 
latter 9 participants, 5 (17.86%) mentioned low performance (e.g., failed exams, poor grades) and 4 
(14.29%) mentioned external factors limiting attainability (e.g., child-care, poor health). That, 
retrospectively, desirability-related reasons were almost twice as frequent as attainability-related 
reasons (even though increases in action crisis resulted from low attainability) points to the relevance 
of downgrading goal desirability in disengaging from an unattained goal. 
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consistent evidence that an action crisis activates regulatory processes that distance 
individuals from their goals.  
The present studies extend previous knowledge by testing an assumption that we 
formulated on the basis of expectancy-value models of motivation (Atkinson, 1964; Feather, 
1982; Vroom, 1964); the assumption that subjective desirability and attainability are relevant 
predictors for the experience of action crisis. Previous studies (Brandstätter et al., 2013) did 
not enable an adequate test of this hypothesis (given that experiences with regard to goals 
from different domains were averaged, regular goal striving and feedback on goal desirability 
and attainability were not ensured). Findings of both studies showed that, when analyzed 
between- and within-subjects, low goal attainability, but not goal desirability, predicts an 
increase in action crisis. This corroborates our reasoning that confronting obstacles in goal 
striving leads individuals to call successful goal attainment into question. If obstacles prevail, 
initial concerns may develop into a period of severe doubt, in which the option of 
disengagement over time is given increasing weight.  
That we did not find analogous effects for goal desirability was unexpected; however, 
the consistency across studies speaks against random error. We think that non-significance 
may result from the fact that we focused on a goal from the achievement domain, where 
unfavorable outcome expectancies are the most frequent cause for conflict. The desirability of 
the goal to complete one’s degree, by contrast, might be generally high among students, and 
indeed, descriptive statistics point to this. Thus, for most subjects, goal desirability might not 
have fallen below a necessary threshold to account for increases in action crisis. This 
reasoning implies that in other contexts (e.g., relationships), insufficient goal desirability 
might well predict increases in action crises. Although we intentionally chose the goal to 
complete one’s studies as a suitable context to test our hypotheses, the fact that we focused on 
one single goal limits the generalizability of our findings. To draw final conclusions about the 
predictive power of goal desirability for the development of action crises, processes have to 
be studied with respect to goals in varying domains. This, however, might be challenging as 
the pursuit of most personal goals (outside university) follows a much less defined course, 
and is often marked by heterogeneity and high interindividual variance.  
Another limitation is that we cannot provide evidence on the causes of an action crisis, 
but can only speak about its development over time (Brandstätter et al., 2013). Making 
inferences about causality would call for a prospective study design, in which no participant is 
experiencing an action crisis when entering the study. Clearly, an experimental design would 
The Process of Disengagement From Personal Goals 52 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
be the neatest way of investigation, however, when being interested in naturalistic goal 
striving, this could be difficult from a methodological and ethical point of view.  
What was striking to us was that the pattern of reciprocity we found pointed out a 
certain asymmetry, inasmuch as the experience of an action crisis increased as a result of low 
goal attainability, whereas discounting processes as a timely consequence of the action crisis 
affected the goal’s desirability more than its attainability. It is not far to seek that regarding 
the goal to complete a study degree, it is more difficult to discount its attainability than its 
desirability (in a self-serving way), due to the presence of many other students who pursue the 
same degree successfully. In broader terms, what we think this pattern suggests is that even 
when goal pursuit is questioned as a result of unfavorable outcome expectancies, individuals 
mainly “support goal abandonment through increasing the availability of cognitive content 
that undermines the attractiveness of the blocked goal” (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002,  
p. 127). This is in line with Klinger's (1975) theorizing, who argued that depression is 
adaptive as it releases commitment to a desired end. It also converges with more recent 
theoretical and empirical advancements, where the devaluation of goal desirability is 
understood as a way of accommodation (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002) and the 
relinquishment of goal commitment represents part of people’s ability to disengage from 
goals (Wrosch et al., 2003).  
What the present studies are silent about is whether the devaluation of the goal occurs 
automatically or is intentional to some extent. The change in appraisals might result from the 
resurgence of a deliberative mindset, which has been linked to unbiased evaluations of goal 
desirability and attainability (Gollwitzer, 1990). Alternatively, it might be negative affect, 
common in an action crisis, that attenuates goal commitment and brings goal-related 
judgments down to earth (Klinger, 1977). The devaluation of the goal’s features might also 
equal an unintentional accommodative process (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002) or a self-
regulatory strategy that individuals employ to distance themselves from an obsolete goal 
(Heckhausen et al., 2010). At present, several strands of research may explain the results 
differently, and future studies might want to identify the most convincing explanation. 
Whatever the explanation may be, researchers agree about the self-protecting effects 
of emotional relinquishment when a goal is out of reach (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; 
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Wrosch et al., 2003). In the present studies, we have provided first, 
though not final evidence that devaluing goal desirability may be adaptive. Whereas an 
increase in goal desirability seems to be linked to an increase in life satisfaction in 
unobstructed goal striving, in an action crisis, life satisfaction might benefit from discounting 
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the desirability of the goal (Study 1). Moreover, life satisfaction after study dropout was better 
for students who had beforehand downgraded the desirability of their study goal (Study 2). 
Notable in this respect is the very limited sample size, which points to the need of replication. 
Relating devaluations of goal desirability before goal abandonment to outcomes after this 
transition (e.g., well-being, health) might be an interesting avenue for future research. 
Future studies might also investigate the adaptive potential of an action crisis for the 
development of alternatives to the obstructed goal. Presumably, seeing a goal through the 
rose-colored glasses of an intact implemental mindset prevents the consideration of alternative 
endeavors, and breaking the implemental bias might be a necessary precondition for other 
pathways to be taken into account. It would be interesting whether devaluations of the goal as 
predicted by the action crisis covary with the simultaneous or time-lagged upgrading of 
alternative endeavors that might step in as substitute to the obstructed goal. 
Leaving several questions for future research, what we hope our studies to offer is a 
perspective on goal disengagement that has rarely been applied before. Whereas the majority 
of social-psychological studies takes unidirectionality of effects as their basis (Kuhl, 2001), 
complexity in real life suggests that often causes cannot be separated from consequences. In 
these studies, reciprocal processes became apparent when analyses were conducted between 
and within individuals, in the full sample as well as in the subsample of students who gave up 
their goal. We see this as support for the reasoning that goal disengagement is not a single 
event, but a “slow-acting back-door feedback process” (Carver & Scheier, 1998, p. 203). A 
dynamic interplay between feelings of doubt and goal related appraisals might explain how 
individuals eventually come to release a once firmly held goal.  
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Abstract 
An action crisis marks the experience of conflict between the opposing forces of holding on to 
and letting go of a personal goal after goal striving has been severely obstructed and/or the 
goal has lost part of its appeal. In this research, we argue that experiencing an action crisis 
interferes with goal-directed action and compromises performance. In Study 1 (N = 236), 
students with higher levels of action crisis regarding the completion of their study degree 
achieved a lower grade point average and obtained fewer credits at the end of the term, 
controlling for prior-term performance. In Study 2 (N = 74), individuals in whom the 
experience of action crisis (vs. unobstructed goal striving) had experimentally been induced 
showed worse performance in a subsequent, goal-unrelated task. Implications of performance 
impairments resulting from the action crisis for goal striving in general and the disengagement 
process in particular are discussed. 
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Introduction 
When we pursue a goal, be it to acquire an academic qualification or to run a marathon, and 
we experience doubt, question the further adherence to our goal – how does that affect our 
performance, in relation to the goal as well as other tasks we currently work on? Can we put 
doubts aside when we go for a run or study for upcoming exams? Or do performance 
impairments, on the contrary, have to be expected, which increase the weight of evidence in 
favor of goal abandonment, and bring us closer to the point where it is a clear necessity to 
abandon the goal? 
We investigated these questions in the context of the action crisis, a motivational 
conflict between further persistence and disengagement marked by renewed deliberation and 
doubt, which arises after a series of obstacles in goal striving has been experienced and/or the 
goal has lost part of its appeal (Brandstätter, 2003; Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). Based on 
previous findings (Brandstätter et al., 2013; Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015), which will be 
reviewed in the introduction, we assumed that being in an action crisis causes performance 
impairments, beyond those that might have contributed to the emergence of an action crisis in 
the first place. Evidence for this notion would, in our view, contribute to a better 
understanding of the goal disengagement process.  
Goal disengagement and the concept of action crisis  
After a long period of undue neglect in psychological research, the topic of goal 
disengagement, for two decades, has received increasing attention (Brandstätter, 2003; 
Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Wrosch et al., 2003). Despite now existing knowledge of 
the advantages of disengagement from a goal that is not attainable for well-being and the 
balancing of endeavors that may be pursued in life (Wrosch et al., 2003), the processes that 
lay between determined goal striving and the point where emotional and behavioral 
disengagement is complete still live a shadowy existence. Theoretical assumptions were 
formulated early by disengagement pioneer Eric Klinger (1975), but have experienced 
surprisingly little empirical verification. 
The concept of action crisis investigates goal disengagement from a process 
perspective on the level of concrete personal goals. The approach favors the understanding of 
disengagement as a lengthy and troublesome endeavor, which starts considerably before 
individuals ultimately give up their goal (Brandstätter et al., 2013; Brandstätter & Schüler, 
2013). Although recent findings show that goal disengagement is often preceded by an action 
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crisis, and more intense action crises predict goal abandonment with shorter temporal distance 
(Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015), an action crisis does not have to lead to disengagement, but 
may also be overcome with renewed goal commitment (Brandstätter et al., 2013; Brandstätter 
& Schüler, 2013). Thus, the action crisis marks the experience of conflict between the 
opposing options of holding on to and letting go of a personal goal, resulting in increasing 
forces to disengage from a goal to which one still feels committed. 
In line with this conceptualization as conflict, the action crisis has been linked to 
negative affect and impairments in psychological and physical well-being over time 
(Brandstätter et al., 2013). Action-crisis specific shifts were also observed on the level of 
individuals’ mindset, that is, their cognitive orientation towards their goal (Brandstätter 
& Schüler, 2013; Herrmann et al., 2014). According to the Rubicon model and mindset theory 
of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer, 2012), the actional phase of goal realization is 
supported by an implemental mindset, which promotes persistence and successful goal 
attainment (Armor & Taylor, 2003; Brandstätter & Frank, 2002). The action crisis, despite 
being classifiable to the actional phase, is characterized by a mixture of implemental and 
deliberative thoughts (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013); the latter known from the phase in 
which individuals weigh the pros and cons to decide whether a goal should be set 
(Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). Therewith, the action crisis unifies features of two phases 
that are usually distinct, which emphasizes its exceptional standing to the prototypical course 
of goal striving sketched in the Rubicon model. 
The disruption of the implemental mindset by upcoming deliberation in the action 
crisis has been denoted as a necessary precondition for goal disengagement to proceed 
(Brandstätter et al., 2013). Consistent with findings that individuals hold overly positive 
appraisals of goal desirability and attainability under the influence of an implemental (vs. 
deliberative) mindset (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995), longitudinal 
studies found a devaluation of the goal’s desirability and attainability to occur in timely 
succession of the action crisis (Brandstätter et al., 2013; Ghassemi, Bernecker, Herrmann, & 
Brandstätter, 2017). Especially the devaluation of goal desirability was assigned an important 
function in the self-regulatory ability to disengage from goals: By downgrading goal 
desirability, people might immunize themselves against the negative implications for well-
being, which would arise if efforts were ceased without relinquishing commitment to the goal 
(Brandstätter et al., 2013; Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Ghassemi et al., 2017; Klinger, 
1975; Tunali & Power, 2002; Wrosch et al., 2003). 
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Despite recent advancements in the understanding of the role of the action crisis in the 
disengagement process, its implications for individuals’ performance have not yet been 
conclusively testified (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press). This investigation, however, is of 
pivotal interest. By further dampening chances of successful goal attainment, performance 
impairments as a result of the action crisis might have a relevant function in the 
disengagement process. They might “drive the system out of the intermediate zone of 
uncertainty or conflict” (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002, p. 123) and towards the 
abandonment of the goal. Thus, reductions in goal-related performance as a result of an action 
crisis might clarify a situation of prior ambiguity. Therewith, an action crisis would not only 
lead to goal disengagement due to existing difficulties in goal striving (and resulting 
appraisals of low goal attainability), but also due to processes set in motion by its experience 
(Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015). 
Predictive effects of the action crisis on performance 
Why could performance impairments in consequence of the action crisis be expected? As 
indicated by devaluations of goal desirability and attainability (Brandstätter et al., 2013; 
Ghassemi et al., 2017), the action crisis might be associated with motivational costs. If it is 
not clear what more can be done, and there is a high risk that efforts will be in vain, the 
motivational basis for wholehearted goal pursuit is not given. Based on the principle of 
expectancy-value models of motivation (Atkinson, 1964; Feather, 1982; Vroom, 1964), low 
goal desirability and attainability run counter to individuals’ motivation to pursue the goal. 
This may translate into the delay or avoidance of goal-related activity. Indeed, one defined 
feature of the action crisis is procrastination (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013), for which 
negative effects on performance have been documented (Steel, 2007).  
Apart from motivational deficits, the action crisis might demand cognitive resources 
that, consequently, are not available for goal implementation, accounting for performance 
deficits (cf. Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011; 
Mikulincer, 1989). As outlined before, the action crisis is denoted by a questioning of the goal 
and the renewed balancing of pros and cons (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). Its 
conceptualization as conflict suggests that deliberation does not reach a clear solution, but is 
resumed repeatedly and takes ruminative forms. As a reassessment of the goal can be initiated 
by encountering obstacles in goal striving that force individuals to pause (Carver & Scheier, 
1990), the action crisis should consume cognitive resources even in the situations in which 
individuals try to implement their goal. This means that as long as the action crisis prevails – 
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until the point where the individual either dissipates doubts or decides to abandon the goal – 
he or she faces the need to (impartially) re-evaluate the pros or cons of goal pursuit while 
keeping up efforts to attain the goal. “Doing the splits” between two conflicting tasks that 
consume cognitive resources typically results in not being ideally prepared for either of them 
(Herrmann et al., 2014). On this notion, it has been argued that the action crisis compromises 
performance on the goal (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press; Herrmann & Brandstätter, 
2015). Reasoning from the consumption of limited cognitive resources, even performance in 
unrelated tasks may be affected, if worked on concurrently with the experience of action 
crisis.  
Previous studies have provided first evidence for performance impairments in relation 
to an action crisis. Brandstätter et al. (2013) measured marathon runners’ action crisis levels 
two weeks prior to the run to predict running time as an objective indicator of performance. 
Individuals with more severe action crises achieved a lower performance in the marathon, 
controlling for age, body-mass-index, running experience, training, and running-specific 
physical complaints. Steeper cortisol increases during the run, which may indicate heightened 
mental and physical strain, partly mediated the link between action crisis and reduced 
performance (Brandstätter et al., 2013). In the academic domain, university freshmen with 
higher levels of action crisis with respect to their goal to complete their studies collected 
fewer ECTS credits in the first academic year (Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015). The 
European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS) is a standardized performance 
measurement system in higher education in the European Union and collaborating countries 
(e.g., Switzerland), specifying that a bachelor’s degree in any field requires the acquisition of 
180 ECTS credits.  
Although these findings offer preliminary evidence that an action crisis is associated 
with impaired performance, they are not fully conclusive of the action crisis – performance 
link due to methodological limitations of the correlational approach, which cannot fully rule 
out the possibility that more severe action crises were experienced by individuals with lower 
capability, accounting for their performance impairments later on. Moreover, while past 
research has focused on performance in relation to the goal, potential effects on goal-
unrelated performance shown in temporal proximity to the experience of action crisis have not 
been investigated. Thus, further investigation of the effects of action crises on performance 
has been expressed as a need for future research (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press).  
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The present research 
This research tested the hypothesis that higher levels of action crisis predict reduced 
performance. Based on previous findings, Study 1 aimed to verify that impairments in goal-
related performance occur in timely succession of the action crisis, even when prior levels of 
performance are controlled. As a longitudinal design offers benefit in providing insights about 
longer term processes that occur in real-life goal striving, but does not allow conclusions 
about causality, Study 2 was designed to conduct a causal test of our assumptions. Study 2 
further diverged from Study 1 in that it studied the hypothesized performance impairments in 
a task that was content-wise unrelated, but processed in temporal proximity to the experience 
of action crisis. Therewith, Study 2 trials the assumed predictive effect of the action crisis, 
and is a clear methodological advancement to prior research (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in 
press; Brandstätter et al., 2013).  
Study 1 
Study 1 was conducted in the context of the goal to complete a university degree as a high-
level goal that many people pursue in their early twenties. In the pursuit of a study degree, the 
experience of doubt is common, and study dropout is a relevant phenomenon for individuals 
and society (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2015). A particular advantage of this context of 
investigation is that, with the university’s official academic records, objective and externally 
valid indicators of goal-related performance are given. We asked participants to authorize the 
release of their official academic records of three consecutive terms, and calculated for each 
term the number of ECTS credits they obtained as well as their end-of-term grade point 
average (GPA). Our expectation was that higher levels of action crisis with respect to one’s 
studies predict lower academic performance, when prior-term ECTS credits or grades, 
respectively, are controlled. The present study methodologically advances a previous 
investigation (Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015) in three ways: First, we considered, aside from 
the number of ECTS credits collected, students’ GPA as arguably most direct indicator of 
academic performance. Second, we relied on the university’s official academic records 
instead of students’ self-report. Third, we controlled for individual prior-term performance 
levels in all analyses. Combined, these advancements should provide more conclusive 
evidence that the action crisis predicts performance impairments beyond potentially pre-
existing deficits. 
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Method 
Participants and design. We tested our hypothesis using a combined dataset of three 
samples that were collected within larger research projects on self-regulation and goal pursuit 
in daily life. All three samples included students of a public Swiss university enrolled in 
various fields of studies. Participants were recruited via flyers, notice in lectures, 
advertisements on university billboards, and mailing lists, and compensated financially or 
with partial course credit. Reasons for combining the samples were twofold. First, study 
procedures were nearly identical. Within each longitudinal study, participants were asked to 
release their academic records for three consecutive terms, that is, the term during which the 
study was conducted, the previous, and the following term. Participants of all three samples 
reported their level of action crisis with respect to their goal to complete their course of 
studies at the beginning (Sample A and B) or in the mid of the term (Sample C) and again at 
the end of the term, shortly before exams took place. Table 4 illustrates the time course for 
each sample.  
Table 4: Overview of Study Procedure for the Three Samples in Study 1 
 
Note. ST = spring term, WT = winter term.  
The second reason for combining the samples referred to insufficient statistical power 
to detect the effect of an action crisis on academic performance in each of them individually, 
given that the release of the college academic records was optional. Sample A consists of n = 
121 of 157 (77%) participants for whom college academic records were obtained (as students 
had given their consent, reported a valid student ID, and had taken part in courses that 
included a performance assessment or at least ECTS credits). Post-hoc power analysis 
revealed a power of 1 - β = .72 to detect a significant effect in a multiple regression with three 
predictors (α = 0.05) and an effect that we, based on previous findings (Herrmann & 
Brandstätter, 2015), expected to be small to moderate in size (f 
2
 ≈ .08). Sample B includes n 
= 41 of 118 participants (35%) for whom college academic records were available. Post-hoc 
T1 T2 previous data collection subsequent
Sample A  March June WT 2013 ST 2014 WT 2014
Sample B September December ST 2015 WT 2015 ST 2016
Sample C May June WT 2015 ST 2016 –
Academic performance: termAction crisis
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power-analyses revealed a power of 1 - β = .27.4 In the third study, students’ participation was 
contingent on their agreement to release their academic records. Of 78 participants, 4 gave an 
invalid student ID. Thus, Sample C consists of n = 74 participants for whom college academic 
records could be released, implying a statistical power of 1 - β = .49. By merging the three 
samples to one dataset of N = 236 participants, power strongly increased. The analysis testing 
the effects of an action crisis on the number of ECTS credits obtained, including 6 predictors, 
was based on n = 226 participants (missings in one of the variables used resulted in case-wise 
deletion), which equals statistical power of 1 - β = .90. The analysis testing the effects of an 
action crisis on students’ GPA, including 7 predictors, was based on n = 176 participants, 
resulting in statistical power of 1 - β = .77. 
In the combined sample, mean age was 22.51 years (SD = 3.52) and 197 of 236 
participants were female. The three samples did not significantly differ from each other with 
regard to composition of sex, but marginally significantly differed with respect to 
participants’ age, F(2, 232) = 2.84, p = .060. Age differences were small (Sample A: M = 
22.56 years, SD = 4.01; Sample B: M = 21.41 years, SD = 2.98; Sample C: M = 23.03 years, 
SD = 2.78) and including age as covariate in the models did not change the results. 
Measures. Action crisis. Participants’ level of action crisis with regard to their goal to 
complete their study degree was measured with a modified version of the ACRISS-Scale 
(Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). The ACRISS-Scale has proven eligible to assess different 
facets of an action crisis. Items (T1: α = .78; T2: α =.80) were answered on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree in Sample A and C, and on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree in Sample B. Due to diverging 
answer scales, action crisis scores were z-standardized in each sample before merging the 
data. In all samples, action crisis was measured twice. The first measurement (T1) was taken 
in the beginning (Sample A and B) or in the mid (Sample C) of the term; the second 
measurement was taken at the end of the term (T2). 
Academic performance. Academic performance was operationalized by two 
indicators, both extracted from students’ official academic records. First, the total number of 
                                                 
4
 In Sample A, participants for whom academic performance indicators could not be requested (n = 34) 
had significantly higher action crisis levels than participants for whom academic performance 
indicators were made available, t(43.96) = 2.65, p = .011. Although this might limit the generalizability 
of findings, it need not question the validity of the results obtained, as the restriction of variance in 
upper action crisis levels might most likely lead to an underestimation of hypothesized effects. In 
Sample B, action crisis levels differ not between individuals for whom academic performance indicators 
were available vs. were not available, t(158) = 0.51, p = .609.  
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ECTS credits obtained in all graded as well as ungraded courses was summed. Second, we 
calculated students’ end-of-term grade point average (GPA) by weighting all graded courses 
on their respective number of ECTS credits and dividing their sum by the overall number of 
credits that could be achieved in the graded courses. The resulting measure indicates the 
achieved grade per credit.  
Results and brief discussion 
Preliminary analyses. Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among 
the study variables are presented in Table 5. Mean action crisis levels at T1 (Sample A: M = 
2.07, SD = 0.64 on a 5-point scale; Sample B: M = 3.09, SD = 1.35 on a 7-point scale; Sample 
C: M = 2.26, SD = 0.73 on a 5-point scale) were comparable with those of previously 
published studies (e.g., Brandstätter et al., 2013; Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015).  
Table 5 suggests that there was a wide range in the number of ECTS credits obtained. 
However, with a mean of 26 credits, students were on average close to the number of 30 
credits recommended per term. Students‘ mean end-of-term GPA scored at 4.74 with a 
standard deviation of .87 and a range from 1 to 6 (see Table 5). In Switzerland, 1 indicates the 
lowest possible performance and 6 indicates the highest possible performance; grades of 4 and 
above signal that the course has been passed. In line with our hypotheses, zero-order 
correlations revealed that students with higher levels of action crisis (both at T1 and T2) 
achieved a lower number of credits and a lower GPA in the previous and the current term.  
Table 5: Means (SDs) and Zero-Order Correlations in Study 1 
 
Note. T (in T1– T2) = time.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Main analyses. We had hypothesized that higher action crisis levels predict the 
attainment of a lower number of credits and lower GPA, controlling for academic 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Z-Action crisis T1 ––
2. Z-Action crisis T2 –.74*** ––
3. ECTS credits prior term 24.41 12.21 –.25*** –.25*** ––
4. ECTS credits current term 26.07 13.53 –.15*** –.19*** –.01*** ––
5. GPA prior term 04.77 00.85 –.23*** –.33*** .38*** .23*** ––
6. GPA current term 04.74 00.87 –.22*** –.29*** .43*** .33*** .64***
Variable
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performance in the previous term. We tested these hypotheses by means of hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses in SPSS (version 23). For both performance outcomes (number 
of ECTS credits obtained and GPA) we proceeded as follows: In Step 1 of the regression 
models, we included our control variables. First, we controlled for the respective performance 
indicator (z-standardized) in the previous term to test whether an action crisis predicted 
performance independent of previous performance. Second, we controlled for differences in 
study procedures across samples (e.g., whether data was collected in the spring or the winter 
term) and potentially diverging means in outcome variables by introducing two dummy 
variables coding the sample (dummy 1: Sample B = 1; dummy 2: Sample C = 1; the largest 
Sample A was the reference sample). In Step 2, action crisis as the focal predictor was 
inserted. As we were interested in the predictive effects of an action crisis on academic 
performance, we used the z-standardized action crisis scores of the measurement point with 
the longer temporal distance to the assessment of performance indicators (T1)
5
. In Step 3, we 
added the two interaction terms between action crisis and type of sample to test whether the 
effect of an action crisis on academic performance was robust across samples.  
ECTS credits. As Table 6 illustrates, the hierarchical regression analysis predicting 
ECTS credits revealed that the control variables, entered in Step 1, explained 13% of variance 
in students’ number of obtained credits. The number of credits obtained in the previous term 
marginally significantly predicted the number of credits obtained in the current term. Students 
of Sample B obtained on average less credits than students in Sample A, while average 
number of credits did not differ between Sample A and Sample C.  
Importantly, including action crisis levels in Step 2 significantly improved the 
prediction of the model. As expected, students with higher action crisis levels at the beginning 
of the term collected fewer credits by the end of the term, when number of credits obtained in 
the previous term was controlled. This analysis based on the total, sufficiently powered 
sample may give the most reliable estimate of the effect: It suggests that students with action 
                                                 
5
 We also tested our hypotheses with action crisis levels measured at T2. Analyses revealed that 
students with higher action crisis levels at T2 collected significantly fewer ECTS credits, β = -.19, b = -
2.63, SE = 1.25, t(204) = -2.11, p = .036, controlling for the number of credits obtained in the previous 
term, type of sample (dummy 1: Sample B = 1; dummy 2: Sample C = 1), and the action crisis by type 
of sample interactions. The predictive effect of action crisis levels at T2 on students’ GPA achieved 
failed to reach statistical significance, β = -.17, b = -0.15, SE = 0.09, t(158) = -1.62, p = .108, when GPA 
in the previous term, number of credits obtained in the previous term, type of sample, and the action 
crisis by type of sample interactions were controlled. Given that the effect went in the expected 
direction, non-significance might be due to random variation across measurements. 
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crisis levels one standard deviation above the mean, measured at the rather beginning of the 
term, collect 1.75 credits less by the end of that term.  
The interaction effects between action crisis levels and the dummy variables coding 
sample entered in Step 3 were both not significant, suggesting that the relationship between 
action crisis and number of credits obtained was similar across samples. In sum, the analysis 
suggests that students with higher levels of action crisis collected fewer ECTS credits at the 
end of the term, controlling for the number of credits they had obtained in the previous term.  
Table 6: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Number of ECTS Credits 
Obtained in Study 1 
 
 
GPA. Next, we were interested in whether the experience of action crisis predicted a 
lower GPA beyond possible pre-existing performance impairments, which may have 
contributed to the experience of action crisis in the first place. As Table 7 shows, Step 1 of the 
hierarchical regression analysis included the control variables, with which 43% of variance in 
students’ GPA could be explained. Previous term GPA strongly predicted current term GPA. 
We also included the number of credits obtained in the current term as a covariate in the 
analysis, as students may (wish to) attain more credits at the expense of the achieved grade 
    β b SE t p ΔF df R 2
Intercept 27.48 1.21 22.64 .000
11.31 223 0.13
ECTS credits prior term .13 1.75 0.94 1.87 .063
Sample A vs. B -.35 -12.50 2.57 -4.86 .000
Sample A vs. C .09 2.64 1.91 1.39 .166
4.13 222 0.15
ECTS credits prior term .09 1.21 0.97 1.25 .211
Sample A vs. B -.34 -11.95 2.57 -4.65 .000
Sample A vs. C .10 2.75 1.89 1.45 .148
Action crisis T1 -.13 -1.75 0.86 -2.03 .043
0.28 220 0.15
ECTS credits prior term .09 1.24 0.98 1.27 .205
Sample A vs. B -.34 -11.99 2.58 -4.65 .000
Sample A vs. C .10 2.73 1.90 1.44 .152
Action crisis T1 -.18 -2.34 1.18 -1.99 .048
Action crisis T1 x Sample A vs. B .03 1.10 2.36 0.47 .640
Action crisis T1 x Sample A vs. C .06 1.30 1.88 0.69 .491
Predictor variable
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
When Doubting Impairs Acting 66 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
per credit. However, the number of credits obtained only marginally significantly (positively) 
predicted individuals’ GPA.  
In Step 2, action crisis levels at T1 were included, and the prediction of the model 
significantly improved. As expected, higher levels of action crisis significantly predicted a 
lower GPA achieved by the end of the term, when students’ GPA in the previous term, and 
thus, an indicator of their “typical” performance, was controlled. The analysis suggests that 
students with action crisis levels one standard deviation above the mean attain a 0.14 points 
lower end-of-term GPA than students with mean levels of action crisis.  
In Step 3, we tested whether the effect of an action crisis on students’ GPA was robust 
across samples by additionally including the two interactions between action crisis and type 
of sample in the analysis. The first interaction revealed that the relationship between action 
crisis and GPA was not significantly different based on Sample A and Sample B. The second, 
marginally significant interaction suggested that the relationship between action crisis and 
GPA tended to be less negative based on Sample C than based on Sample A. Due to this 
difference, we ran another regression analysis for the so far missing comparison between 
Sample B and Sample C. We exchanged the two dummy-coded variables for type of sample. 
This time, Sample B was the reference (dummy 3: Sample A = 1; dummy 4: Sample C = 1). 
With otherwise unchanged results, the analysis revealed a marginally significant interaction 
suggesting that the relationship between action crisis and GPA was less negative based on 
Sample C than based on Sample B, β = .21, b = 0.29, SE = 0.15, t(169) = 1.89, p = .060, ΔR2 
= .02, ΔF(2, 169) = 2.57, Δp = .079. In sum, these results suggest that higher levels of action 
crisis predict lower GPAs based on Sample A and B, but that Sample C deviated from this 
pattern. Yet, overall, findings suggest that higher levels of action crisis predict lower grades, 
controlling for previous performance levels as well as current work load (operationalized by 
the number of ECTS credits students obtained in the current term).  
In sum, Study 1 suggests that higher levels of study-related action crisis predict worse 
performance, indicated by a lower number of credits collected and a lower end-of-term GPA. 
These performance impairments emerged when prior levels of performance were controlled, 
suggesting that impairments attributable to an action crisis go beyond potentially pre-existing 
difficulties that may have invoked the action crisis. Given that Study 1 assessed the 
experience of action crisis with respect to a personal goal, and relied on a goal-related, valid 
performance measure, its contribution was to document the relevance of performance effects 
of an action crisis in real-life goal striving. However, a correlational study prohibits firm 
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conclusions about causality; therefore, we used a complementary methodological approach in 
Study 2. 
Table 7: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Grade-Point-Average (GPA) in 
Study 1 
 
Study 2 
Study 2 followed an experimental design to put our assumption to a test that an action crisis 
causally compromises performance. Furthermore, Study 2 analyzed whether performance 
impairments may spill over to an unrelated task worked on in temporal proximity to an action 
crisis. To induce the experience of action crisis, we asked participants to empathize with a 
student who was described to be in an action crisis (vs. to be confident) with regard to the 
goal of completing his study degree. Immediately thereafter, participants’ performance was 
measured in a task requiring the efficient implementation of routines. Therewith, we used a 
procedure similar to that used in studies on mindset theory documenting carry-over effects of 
    β     b SE t p ΔF df R 2
Intercept 4.71 0.07 71.66 .000
32.59 172 0.43
GPA prior term .62 0.50 0.05 10.48 .000
ECTS credits current term .12 0.10 0.05 1.87 .063
Sample A vs. B .09 0.19 0.13 .1.43 .154
Sample A vs. C .08 0.13 0.10 1.34 .182
7.52 171 0.46
GPA prior term .59 0.47 0.05 9.94 .000
ECTS credits current term .11 0.09 0.05 1.74 .083
Sample A vs. B .09 0.18 0.13 1.39 .165
Sample A vs. C .09 0.14 0.10 1.42 .157
Action crisis T1 -.16 -0.14 0.05 -2.74 .007
2.57 169 0.47
GPA prior term .58 0.47 0.05 9.76 .000
ECTS credits current term .11 0.09 0.05 1.75 .082
Sample A vs. B .09 0.17 0.13 1.31 .191
Sample A vs. C .10 0.16 0.10 1.64 .103
Action crisis T1 -.24 -0.20 0.07 -2.85 .005
Action crisis T1 x Sample A vs. B -.04 -0.10 0.15 -0.65 .520
Action crisis T1 x Sample A vs. C .14 0.19 0.10 1.86 .065
Predictor variable
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
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distinct cognitive orientations to subsequent, unrelated tasks (Fujita, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 
2007; Gollwitzer, 1990; Henderson, Liver, & Gollwitzer, 2008).  
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-four (57 female) students (Mage = 23.28 years, SD = 
4.18 years) from a public Swiss university participated in the online-study voluntarily or in 
exchange of partial course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions of a one-
factorial (action crisis vs. control condition) between-subjects design.  
Procedure and measures. Experimental manipulation. To induce the experience of 
an action crisis, we used a written scenario designed by Brandstätter and Schüler (2013). 
Participants were asked to read a one-page text and put themselves in the position of the main 
character. The scenario depicted an episode in the life of a university student that participants 
were familiar with (i.e., examination period, heavy course load, incompatibility of study and 
leisure time goals). Depending on experimental condition, the protagonist of the story was 
described as facing serious difficulties with his studies and considering dropout (action crisis 
condition) or as confident to finish his degree (control condition).  
Manipulation check. After reading the scenario, participants were given time to 
imagine the thoughts and feelings that would, if they were in the protagonist’s place, cross 
their mind. To check whether our manipulation had been successful, intensity of action crisis 
was assessed with an adapted version of the ACRISS-Scale (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013), 
each item including the prefix “In this situation, I would…” (e.g., “doubt whether I should 
continue my studies or drop out of university”, α = .89). Participants indicated their level of 
agreement with each of the six items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree. As it is well-known that the action crisis is associated with a specific 
mindset-shift, as a second manipulation check, we assessed individuals’ goal-related mindset. 
For this purpose, two scales were developed to assess deliberative (7 items; e.g., “I would 
think about whether my studies really fit my interests”, α = .81) and implemental (6 items; 
e.g., “I would focus on passing the exams”, α = .67) thoughts in response to the scenario by 
asking participants what they would think about in the described situation. Participants 
indicated their level of agreement on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. If the manipulation was successful, participants in the action crisis condition 
should report more deliberation than participants in the control condition, while both 
conditions should report being cognitively concerned with goal implementation. 
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Performance. Performance was assessed with four blocks of the test “Count 
Numbers” (Pokorny, 2008), which requires participants to follow a simple rule under time 
pressure. Within 75 seconds, participants had to count the frequency of ones and sevens in a 
block of random numbers; this procedure was repeated four times. A response was evaluated 
as correct if it equaled the true number of ones and sevens in the respective block. Deviations 
from the true frequency represented errors. We summed the errors to obtain a total error score 
for each task block. 
Control questions. After the performance test, identification with the scenario was 
assessed with three items (e.g., “It was easy to put myself in the main character’s position”, α 
= .66). We also queried how satisfied participants were with their studies (“I am happy with 
my studies”). Items were taken from Brandstätter and Schüler (2013) and used a 5-point 
answer scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Then, participants were thanked 
and debriefed. 
Results and brief discussion 
Hypotheses were tested with linear regressions and hierarchical linear modeling. 
Experimental condition was dummy coded (control = 0, action crisis = 1). 
Preliminary analyses. As satisfaction with own studies could affect thoughts in 
response to the scenario as well as subsequent performance, we verified that there were no 
significant differences in satisfaction with own studies between conditions, β = -.11, b = -.24, 
SE = .26, t(70) = -.94, p = .349. Moreover, participants of both conditions were equally able to 
identify with the scenario presented to them, β = .06, b = .08, SE = .15, t(70) = .53, p = .600, 
suggesting that scenarios were equal with regard to emotional involvement. Mean action crisis 
was higher in the action crisis than in the control condition, β = .63, b = 1.22, SE = .18, t(72) 
= 6.94, p < .001, indicating the success of our manipulation. We also tested whether 
conditions differed with regard to the amount of deliberative and implemental thought 
content. Therefore, we regressed implemental and deliberative mindset separately on 
experimental condition. As displayed in Figure 6, participants of both conditions reported a 
comparable amount of implemental thoughts, β = -.13, b = -.17, SE = .15, t(72) = -1.11, p = 
.271. However, the amount of deliberative thoughts was significantly higher among 
participants in the action crisis than in the control condition, β = .49, b = .74, SE = .16, t(72) = 
4.77, p < .001. These results are consistent with previous findings that in an action crisis, the 
focus on goal implementation is mingled with a resurgence of deliberative thoughts. 
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Figure 6: Number of errors in the performance test depending on experimental 
condition in Study 2. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Main analyses. To analyze possible performance impairments in the action crisis, we 
had presented individuals with four blocks of a cognitive test, which constitutes a repeated 
measure. To acknowledge the dependency of observations, we used hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM), which captures correlations among repeated observations by introducing 
random effects (Bauer et al., 2006). Our random intercept model consisted of two levels of 
variance, with one predictor on each level: Number of task block (centered at the first block: 0 
– 3) was entered as a predictor on trial-level (Level 1). Experimental condition (control = 0, 
action crisis = 1) was entered as a predictor on participant-level (Level 2). Because changes in 
performance over task blocks might also depend on experimental condition, we included a 
cross-level interaction between experimental condition and number of task block. We 
estimated the model in R (version 3.1.1; R Core Team, 2014) with the multilevel package 
(Bliese, 2013) using maximum likelihood estimation. 
Results are presented in Table 8 and illustrated in Figure 6. The intercept of the model 
represents mean performance across all task blocks when experimental condition is zero (i.e., 
when participants are in the control condition). The main effect for the trial level variable 
number of task block did not reach statistical significance, indicating that, across experimental 
conditions, performance did not vary between task blocks. The expected main effect for 
experimental condition was significant, suggesting that individuals in the action crisis 
condition (vs. control condition) made more errors, and hence showed lower performance. 
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The interaction term between condition and number of task block was also significant. Using 
Preacher, Curran, and Bauer’s (2006) online tool for probing HLM 2-way interactions, we 
found that in the first task block, participants in the action crisis condition made significantly 
more errors than participants in the control condition, b = 4.16, SE = 3.26, z = 3.26, p = .001. 
This difference between conditions was still significant in the second task block, b = 2.91, SE 
= 1.12, z = 2.61, p = .009, but vanished in the third, b = 1.66, SE = 1.41, z = 1.17, p = .241, 
and in the fourth task block, b = 0.41, SE = 1.97, z = 0.21, p = .837. Descriptively, action 
crisis participants’ performance approached control participants’ performance over the course 
of the four task blocks. However, the change in error rate over time was not significant both in 
the action crisis condition, b = -1.17, SE = 0.80, z = -1.45, p = .146, and the control condition, 
b = 0.08, SE = 0.64, z = 0.13, p = .896. The observed pattern of results may suggest that 
performance impairments of participants in which the experience of action crisis had been 
induced vanished over task blocks and with increasing temporal distance to the experimental 
manipulation.  
Table 8: Random Intercept Model Predicting Error Scores in Study 2 
 
Note. B = unconditional model estimate, SE = standard error, Est = estimate, CI = confidence 
interval, AIC = Akaike Information Criteria, BIC = Bayesian Information Criteria. Condition 
is coded: control = 0, action crisis = 1. Results are based on 74 participants and 290 
observations.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
b SE t p lower upper
Intercept 6.07 1.15 -5.26 .000 -3.79 -8.34
Number of task block (Level 1) 0.08 0.41 -0.21 .838 -0.72 -0.88
Condition (Level 2) 4.16 1.63 -2.55 .013 -0.91 -7.41
Condition x number of task block -1.25 0.57 -2.20 .029 -2.37 -0.13
Est
Residual (Level 1) 5.41 -4.92 -5.95
Intercept (Level 2) 5.33 -4.33 -6.55
Est
ICC    .49
AIC 1921.93
BIC 1943.86
-2 log likelihood -954.96
Model fit
Random effects
CI 95
Fixed effects
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Taken together, in line with the hypothesis, Study 2 provided evidence of a causal, 
performance detrimental effect of the action crisis on a temporally close, even if unrelated 
task. The effect was significant for the first two task blocks; the pattern remained constant 
across the following blocks but became weaker and non-significant. This might result from 
our subtle induction of the action crisis, which was done by scenario and may have produced 
rather weak effects that faded over time and with individuals getting increasingly absorbed by 
the demands of the current task. 
Discussion 
When recurrent obstacles in goal striving make goal attainment unlikely or unduly 
troublesome, individuals may enter a phase in which further striving for the goal is called into 
question. In an action crisis (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013), initial doubts have developed into 
a decisional conflict, in which the individual is torn between the opposing options of holding 
on to the goal and letting it go. The present studies document detrimental effects of an action 
crisis on individuals’ performance. Both when the experience of an action crisis was 
experienced with respect to a personal goal as well as when it was experimentally induced, 
consistent evidence for subsequent impairments in performance was found.  
The present research benefits from two different methodological approaches that 
complement conclusions that can be drawn. Study 1 illustrated that the action crisis predicts 
performance impairments measured with temporal distance in real life goal pursuit. Study 2 
suggests a causal, immediate effect of the action crisis that may transfer to an unrelated task. 
The predictive effects of the action crisis are particularly noteworthy as both studies used 
objective measures instead of subjective estimates of performance, which means that reported 
effects are not overestimated due to a common method that was used (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). A further strength of this research lies in the high relevance of the 
performance indicator used in Study 1. University grades tend to be regarded as indicative of 
students’ ability and motivation, and are often used, for instance, by employers, to predict 
occupational success (for reviews on their actual predictive effects, see Roth, BeVier, Switzer, 
& Schippmann, 1996, Roth et al., 1996; Roth & Clarke, 1998). Thus, results of Study 1 
illustrate that the action crisis has impedimental effects for an outcome that is not only 
subjectively relevant, but highly noticed and valued in our society.  
A weakness of the present research is that we studied only one personal goal (i.e., 
completing a study degree), what limits conclusions about the universality of the effect. 
When Doubting Impairs Acting 73 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Future research is warranted to address whether action crises compromise performance also in 
completely different goal domains (e.g., health, sports, or relationships); this, however, will 
imply the methodological challenge to operationalize performance in a meaningful and 
interindividually comparable way.  
A further limitation is that we cannot tell with certainty why the action crisis leads to 
impaired performance. As outlined in the introduction, both motivational deficits as well as 
cognitive load due to competing demands (deliberation and implementation) are potential 
candidates to account for it. Motivational deficits are very unlikely to explain findings of 
Study 2, given that the action crisis was experimentally induced and performance assessed in 
a thematically unrelated task. Rather, experiencing an action crisis might have had effects on 
information processing (potentially due to cognitive load) that still endured when individuals 
worked on the following task. Possibly, cognitive load likewise accounted for lower academic 
performance among students experiencing an action crisis in Study 1; however, it is also 
possible that it was a combination of processes or motivational deficits alone that predicted 
performance impairments in this context. It would be important for future studies to explicitly 
test these underlying mechanisms. Experience-sampling designs, in which individuals report 
on their goal-related behavior while engaging in it, might be especially worthwhile to 
conduct. 
In the context of the goal to complete a university degree, we would assume that the 
action crisis affects students’ studying. Studying is one of the major variables (and even 
outdoes IQ) in predicting academic performance (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005), so 
performance deficits should be definitely associated with it. Starting from the assumption that 
deliberation inhibits goal-directed activity (Armor & Taylor, 2003; Brandstätter & Frank, 
2002), it would be interesting to investigate to what extent deliberation associated with the 
action crisis is experienced as cognitively interfering with studying. Beyond that, students 
with more severe action crises might have more difficulty shielding their studying activity 
from distractions (e.g., social media, snacking, house cleaning), which may be an expression 
of reduced goal shielding (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) as predicted by the mindset-shift 
(Brandstätter et al., 2013; Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). Finally, a higher amount of study-
related procrastination might underlie these students’ reduced academic performance later on. 
We have not discussed until now the possibility that an action crisis might also lead to 
increased performance in some situations or circumstances. While we do not expect this for 
overall performance measured on the obstructed goal or performance on tasks that are 
processed in temporal closeness to the experience of motivational conflict (as studied in this 
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research), increased performance might result when individuals currently do not feel 
cognitively taxed by the action crisis and interpret a situation as an opportunity to compensate 
prior shortcomings. We based this prediction on findings that failure in self-defining tasks 
(i.e., personal goals) can lead to increased performance in subsequent tasks if they are 
regarded as relevant to a self-definition (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996). Thus, moderating 
variables for the action crisis – performance link, like the context of performance 
measurement, features of the goal, for instance goal commitment (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 
1996), or traits known to influence performance following failure, for instance action- vs. 
state-orientation (Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985) or narcissism (Nevicka, Baas, & Ten Velden, 
2016), should be identified in future research.  
What the present studies, nevertheless, suggest is that there are contexts where 
doubting impairs acting. Our findings further provide first evidence that an action crisis may 
radiate to other life domains and negatively impact performance there; this might be the case 
when people ponder about whether to hold on to or withdraw from an obstructed goal (e.g., a 
romantic relationship) while being engaged with the pursuit of another (e.g., a university 
degree). An examination of the action crisis with respect to a hierarchically high-standing 
goal within the individual’s larger goal system seems as an interesting avenue for future 
research.  
The present research may contribute to our understanding of the disengagement 
process from personal goals. In previous studies, it was shown that an action crisis predicts a 
devaluation of the goal’s desirability and attainability, and low appraisals of these 
motivational features, in turn, predict an increase in action crisis over time (Brandstätter et al., 
2013; Ghassemi et al., 2017). It was concluded that a dynamic interplay between feelings of 
doubt and changing goal appraisals may shape and define the disengagement process from 
personal goals (Ghassemi et al., 2017). The present research adds that an action crisis not only 
affects individuals’ goal appraisals but also the measurable outcomes of their goal pursuit. By 
compromising subsequent performance, an action crisis may lead individuals out of the zone 
of conflict and closer to the point where nothing is left but to abandon the goal. Although, to 
date, several changes in cognition, affect, physiology, and behavior have been identified to 
accompany the action crisis (Brandstätter et al., 2013; Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013; 
Ghassemi et al., 2017; Herrmann et al., 2014; Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015), it will be an 
endeavor for further research to connect these simultaneously operating processes and provide 
a better understanding of their dynamic interplay.  
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Although disengagement is a wise response if a goal is not attainable, tenacity is 
beneficial if chances are still given to attain a valued goal. As long as the individual upholds 
his/her hopes to achieve the goal, he/she should know that experiencing an action crisis may 
be obstructive to reaching it. As the emergence of an action crisis might be irrevocable and of 
adaptive value in many instances (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press), we may derive the 
recommendation that individuals should not remain in a state of action crisis for too long. 
This means that, albeit difficult, research at some point will have to take up the challenge to 
identify strategies that help individuals to know when it is time to hold, and when it is time to 
fold (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press). 
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Abstract 
Does questioning a personal goal threaten an individual’s self-integrity? In two studies, we 
investigated the self-threatening potential of an action crisis, in which individuals feel torn 
between further goal pursuit and disengagement. Frequentist and Bayesian analyses showed 
that merely reflecting on a goal about which an action crisis is experienced (vs. an 
unobstructed goal) led to more negative affect and less positive self-worth. Individuals having 
reflected on an action crisis expressed lower performance expectations for an upcoming 
cognitive task, what, in turn, predicted lower performance. There was preliminary evidence 
that individuals with more severe action crises might have higher physiological arousal (skin 
conductance level reactivity) when thinking about their goal, controlling for dispositional self-
esteem and neuroticism. However, support for the alternative relative to the null hypothesis 
was weak, pointing to the need of replication. Implications of the conceptualization of an 
action crisis as self-threat are discussed.  
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Introduction 
When asked about who they are or what defines them as a person, people often talk about 
their goals. Defined as the “consciously articulated, personally meaningful objectives that 
individuals pursue in their daily lives” (Elliot, Chirkov, Kim, & Sheldon, 2001, p. 505), 
personal goals were identified as fundamental units in the study of human behavior (Emmons, 
2003). They give purpose and structure to life, and are considered as part of individuals’ self-
concept and -definition (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981). People spend a significant part of 
their day working towards their goals, and the (lack of) progress they achieve when striving 
for their aspirations affects their cognitive preoccupation as well as their well-being 
(Brunstein, 1993; Emmons, 2003).  
Due to the high relevance of personal goals, studies find that the inability to reach a 
valued end causes negative feelings (Carver & Scheier, 2005; Wrosch et al., 2007). In the 
research reported here, we build on this knowledge and argue that even being confronted with 
potential goal failure has negative implications for an individual’s sense of self. Although the 
notion of threatened self-concerns lies at the heart of research on entrapment or escalation of 
commitment, where it is used to explain why people fail to give up futile endeavors 
(Brockner, 1992; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), to date, it has rarely been verified 
empirically (for an exception, see Zhang & Baumeister, 2006). In the here reported research 
we focused on the self-threatening potential of an action crisis, a phase in goal striving in 
which the abandonment of a goal has just become an option (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013; 
Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015).  
The action crisis: Crossroads between further goal pursuit and disengagement 
If an individual encounters serious obstacles in goal striving or the goal loses its appeal, 
further engagement to achieve the goal may be turned into question. If higher order goals are 
at stake, raising the question whether to continue goal pursuit or give up the goal may result in 
a decisional conflict between the opposing options of holding on and letting go; a critical 
phase that has been termed an action crisis (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). The experience of 
conflict is thought to result from the fact that both options have benefits and costs, and the 
individual has to anticipate which course of action will turn out advantageous. The high 
uncertainty surrounding this decision and the irreconcilableness of the available options to 
either abandon the goal, or resume it with increased efforts often cause the action crisis to 
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persist over a long time, even if recognized as an issue to be resolved (Herrmann & 
Brandstätter, 2015).  
In line with its conceptualization as conflict, studies have shown that the action crisis 
is associated with negative affect and predicts reductions in psychological and physical well-
being (Brandstätter et al., 2013). Also impairments in goal-related performance have been 
shown to result from an action crisis: Students with more severe action crises regarding their 
goal to complete their study degree collected fewer ECTS-credits and achieved a lower grade-
point average (GPA) at the end of the term, controlling for prior-term performance levels 
(Ghassemi, Bernecker, Herrmann, Wolf, & Brandstätter, in preparation; Herrmann 
& Brandstätter, 2015). In the sports domain, runners with higher levels of action crisis two 
weeks prior to a marathon achieved a lower performance in the race, when training, 
experience, age, body mass index, and physical complaints were controlled; this was partly 
mediated by their steeper increases in cortisol, a concomitant of mental and physical strain, 
measured repeatedly during the run (Brandstätter et al., 2013). First evidence suggests that 
even performance on goal-unrelated tasks can be impaired, when individuals work on them in 
temporal closeness to experiencing an action crisis (Ghassemi et al., in preparation). 
In this research, we aimed to consolidate existing and new findings on the action crisis 
and subsume them under a new theoretical perspective. In line with the view that “the self is 
partly made up of the person’s goals” (Carver & Scheier, 2005, p. 528) we suggest that 
experiencing an action crisis poses a threat to an individual’s self. In our view, evidence for 
this notion would advance the understanding of the characteristics and difficulties of this 
critical phase in goal striving. 
The threatened self  
Comparing the action crisis to a self-threat requires us to think about what this state 
implies. The self is thought to be composed of different domains, including the person’s 
social roles, values, belongingness to groups (e.g., in terms of age, gender, culture, politics) 
and, importantly, his or her life goals (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). It is known that humans are 
motivated to maintain a positive view of themselves and want others to share this view 
(Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Sedikides, 1993; Steele, 1988). The intended “sense 
of global efficacy, an image of oneself as able to control important adaptive and moral 
outcomes in one’s life” has been denoted as self-integrity (Cohen & Sherman, 2014, p. 336; 
Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). 
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Self-integrity can be put into jeopardy by outcomes and experiences that, in the 
individual’s belief, convey undesirable diagnostic information about the self (Crocker & 
Wolfe, 2001). If self-diagnostic experiences in relevant domains are negatively toned, the 
sense of self-integrity is threatened. Although the resulting state of threat is rarely explicitly 
described and has more often been defined operationally than conceptually (Campbell & 
Sedikides, 1999), it is regarded as an uncomfortable and aversive one (Han, Duhachek, & 
Rucker, 2015).  
One of the most central indications of self-threat is negative self-evaluation (Crocker, 
Karpinski, Quinn, & Chase, 2003; James, 1890), which in intensity often exceeds what should 
be expected based on the significance of the threat. The self is a fluid system, in what is 
included varies from moment to moment (Critcher & Dunning, 2014). As threats have the 
characteristic to constrict and hold attention (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & Houwer, 2004; 
Park & Kitayama, 2014), the accessible subset of the self becomes narrowed to the affected 
domain. Accordingly, conclusions prompted by the threat often loom disproportionately large 
and may dominate the evaluation of the self (Critcher & Dunning, 2014). Apart from negative 
self-evaluations, the experience of threat is accompanied by negative affect, arousal, and 
stress (Gruenewald, Kemeny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004). Negative affect and psychological stress 
occur in concert with physiological stress, indicated, for instance, by increased levels of 
cortisol or proinflammatory activity (Dickerson, 2008; Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 
2009). It has been noted that “Like a distracting alarm, psychological threat can consume 
mental resources that could otherwise be marshaled for better performance and problem 
solving” (Cohen & Sherman, p. 335). Impressive evidence comes from the academic domain, 
where students about whom a negative performance related stereotype exists achieve lower 
grades in school, impeded by the threat of being judged according to the stereotype (Steele & 
Aronson, 1995).  
What makes an action crisis threatening? 
We think that an action crisis may be self-threatening for at least four reasons. The 
first is the experience of failure in goal striving. A phase in which further adherence to the 
goal is called into question only arises after setbacks have accumulated to an extent that 
favorable outcome expectancies cannot be maintained despite the shielding function of the 
implemental mindset (Gagné & Lydon, 2001; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Taylor 
& Gollwitzer, 1995). The inability to master important outcomes in one’s life is thought to 
threaten self-integrity (Steele, 1988), why many studies operationalize self-threat by inducing 
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failure (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Gollwitzer, Marquardt, Scherer, 
& Fujita, 2013; Legault, Al-Khindi, & Inzlicht, 2012; Zhang & Baumeister, 2006). Thus, one 
reason the action crisis should be threatening is the repeated failure giving rise to it. 
Besides failure arising from goal pursuit, also the option of goal abandonment is often 
connoted with negative evaluation. People may be reluctant to turn away from failing goals 
because giving up has a bad reputation in Western thought (Wrosch et al., 2013). Indeed, 
whole research traditions on phenomena like entrapment or escalation of commitment suggest 
that people often fail to give up apparently futile endeavors, because of the negative 
implications this would have for their sense of self. Specifically, these approaches assume that 
individuals choose to invest more resources into a failing course of action in order to justify 
their prior decisions to start that action altogether (Aronson, 1968; Brockner, 1992; Brockner, 
Rubin, & Lang, 1981; Staw, 1981). 
Whereas one motivation in an action crisis may include not admitting wrong decisions 
in the past, further challenge should stem from the need to make a decision in the present that 
withstands future evaluation. Finding oneself in a situation where one has to find a balance 
between not letting go the goal too easily and not wasting precious resources by hanging on to 
it at all cost, an action crisis often is experienced as a dilemma (Herrmann & Brandstätter, 
2015). It is known that decisional conflicts can be stressful, and provoke anxiety, agitation, 
and anticipated regret (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Janis & Mann, 1967; Simonson, 1992; van 
Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 2009, van Harreveld et al., 2009; 
van Harreveld, van der Pligt, & de Liver, 2009; Zeelenberg, 1999). Several factors that 
complicate decision making come to play in an action crisis: ambivalence about or similar 
value of the available options, outcome uncertainty (van Harreveld et al., 2009; Zeelenberg, 
1999), personal accountability for and/or irreversibility of the decision, which at times set the 
course for an array of subsequent events (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  
Finally, as goals are closely tied to an individual’s incentive system, cognizance that 
one will not be able to achieve the desired end leads to sadness and disappointment, and if no 
alternatives are present, the individual may end up with empty hands (Wrosch et al., 2003). 
Besides having to realign one’s everyday life following the cessation of goal pursuit, having 
to abandon a goal that is closely tied to one’s identity is difficult (Brandstätter & Herrmann, 
in press; Brandstätter et al., 2013; Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Klinger, 1975; Wrosch 
et al., 2003). Disengagement, therefore, not only involves the cessation of behavioral attempts 
to reach the goal, but also the relinquishment of commitment and a reorganization of the self-
concept in at least one aspect (Wrosch et al., 2003).  
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The present research 
The aim of the present research was to test whether an action crisis, in which 
individuals profoundly question a goal to which they are committed, poses a threat to the self. 
The two studies we conducted, one correlational and one experimental, used an idiographic 
goal approach. After asking participants to thoroughly reflect on a personal goal that was or 
was not marked by the experience of action crisis, we assessed several indicators of self-
threat. Specifically, we assessed individuals’ self-evaluation and affective experience in both 
studies, and added measures of physiological stress and cognitive performance in Study 2. 
Our hypothesis was that individuals with higher (vs. lower) levels of action crisis and 
individuals in the action crisis (vs. no action crisis) condition would, immediately after 
reflecting on their goal, experience increased self-threat – indicated by less positive self-
evaluation, more negative affect, and reduced cognitive performance. We further expected 
that they would have increased physiological arousal while pondering about their goal, 
reflecting increased stress. 
Due to the many significance tests we conducted and the potential inflation of α-
errors, we complemented conventional tests with a Bayesian analysis approach, with which an 
infinite number of hypotheses grouped in a family can be tested. Further advantages of 
Bayesian analyses are that no pre-defined stopping rule in data collection and no a priori 
hypotheses are needed (Dienes, 2011). Most importantly, whereas significance tests tell the 
probability of data under a null hypothesis, Bayesian analyses compare the probability of 
competing hypotheses being true (null hypothesis vs. alternative hypothesis) given the data 
(Dienes, 2011; Ullrich, Krueger, Brod, & Groschupf, 2013; Wagenmakers, 2007). The Bayes 
factor (BF10) is a frequently used statistical index that quantifies the strength of evidence for 
the alternative compared to the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2011; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, 
Morey, & Iverson, 2009). A BF10 of 2, for example, indicates that data is twice as likely under 
the alternative than the null hypothesis. The recommendation has been made that for BF10 
between 0.33 and 3, prior beliefs should not, or only very cautiously, be updated because 
evidence for or against the null hypothesis is weak (Jeffreys, 1961). A BF10 above 3 (below 
0.33), by convention, indicates substantial evidence in favor of (against) the alternative 
hypothesis. A BF10 above 10 (below 0.10) is regarded as strong evidence in favor of (against) 
the alternative hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961). Bayesian analyses were conducted in JASP (JASP 
Team, 2016) using an uninformed prior, meaning that the null model and alternative model 
were given equal prior probability. Frequentist analyses were conducted in SPSS. 
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Study 1 
Study 1 used a correlational approach to test whether individuals with higher levels of action 
crisis with respect to a defining personal goal experience increased levels of self-threat after 
reflecting on that goal.  
Method 
Participants. One hundred fifty-four individuals (108 women; Mage = 27.96 years,  
SDage = 10.00 years, 88 studying, 60 employed, 6 “other”) were recruited via a department 
participant pool and social networks and participated in the study online for partial course 
credit.  
Procedure and measures. After an introduction about what we mean by “personal 
goals”, participants were given time to think of the goals they currently pursued (e.g, 
completing a study degree, entering or maintaining a relationship). Then, subjects were asked 
to select one goal that was important to them and currently took much of their time. It was 
noted that it could either be a goal in whose pursuit they made good progress, or a goal, in 
whose pursuit they repeatedly experienced setbacks, why they considered disengaging from it. 
After selecting a goal, participants were asked to write an essay to make goal-related 
experiences salient. We provided them with auxiliary questions to be addressed in the essay: 
a) how goal striving proceeded recently, b) what thoughts came to their mind when they were 
reminded of their goal, and c) what thinking about their goal made them feel. Subsequently, 
levels of action crisis were assessed with the Action Crisis Scale (ACRISS; Brandstätter 
& Schüler, 2013), which includes six items to assess different aspects constitutive of 
intrapsychic conflict (e.g., “I doubt whether I should continue pursuing my goal or disengage 
from it”, α = .77, 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).  
Immediately afterwards, participants reported their momentary self-worth, their self-
concept clarity, and their current affect. Measures are presented in the following. 
Self-evaluation. Two measures were included to assess individuals’ self-evaluation. 
The first was a scale measuring momentary self-worth by means of 14 statements about the 
self; for our purpose, items were translated into German (Critcher & Dunning, 2014). 
Participants were asked to indicate “how well each statement characterizes how you feel 
about yourself right now” (1 = not at all, 9 = extremely). In the original study, 8 items loaded 
on the factor positive feelings of self-worth (e.g., “Overall, I feel positively toward myself 
right now”) and 6 items loaded on the factor negative feelings of self-worth (e.g., “I currently 
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feel humiliated”). As the two subscales were highly correlated (r = -.77), we recoded items for 
which high scores indicate negative feelings of self-worth and collapsed all items into one 
scale of high internal consistency (α = .96).  
Second, the extent to which participants had a clear view on themselves, their defining 
values and preferences, was assessed with a newly developed pictorial measure. Self-concept 
clarity has been identified as a concomitant of the evaluative component of the self 
(Campbell, 1990), with low self-regard typically involving large parts of uncertainty, 
instability, or inconsistency (Campbell et al., 1996). The measure consisted of five circles that 
became more and more blurred from one circle to the next; participants’ task was to mark the 
circle that best described how clearly they saw their defining values, goals, and preferences. 
We recoded the item such that higher values represent higher self-concept clarity.  
Affect. Affect was measured with 30 items of the extended version of the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1999) translated into German (Röcke 
& Grühn, 2003). Sample items are happy, jittery, downhearted, strong, and determined. 
Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they felt this way right now (1 = not at all, 
5 = extremely). We recoded negative items before calculating a mean score with higher values 
representing more positive affect (α = .94). 
Results  
Table 9 presents means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations between 
action crisis and indicators of self-threat. As expected, individuals who had thought about a 
goal about which they experienced higher levels of action crisis reported less positive feelings 
of self-worth, had a less clear view on their defining values and preferences, and experienced 
more negative affect. All three BF10s were above 100. By convention, BF10s of this size are 
interpreted as decisive evidence for the alternative hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961).  
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Table 9: Descriptives and Pearson Correlations Between Action Crisis and Indicators of 
Self-Threat in Study 1 
 
Note. BF10 = Bayes factor to quantify evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to the 
null hypothesis. For all tests, the alternative hypothesis specifies that the correlation is 
negative. 
 
Brief discussion 
Findings of Study 1 suggest that experiencing an action crisis may be self-threatening. 
Individuals with higher levels of action crisis felt less good about themselves, had less self-
concept clarity, and experienced more negative affect immediately after reflecting on their 
goal. However, as conclusions about causality cannot be drawn in a correlational study, the 
possibility remains that individuals with dispositionally low self-regard questioned their goals 
to a stronger extent, or were more likely to spontaneously think of an obstructed goal. To 
thwart these alternative explanations, we used an experimental design in Study 2. 
Study 2 
As reliance on personal goals seemed to be a precondition for an adequate test of our 
hypothesis, we implemented the experimental design in Study 2 by asking participants to 
reflect on personal goal striving that was characterized by the experience of action crisis 
(action crisis condition) or that was pursued without notable doubt (no action crisis 
condition). Still, our assumption was that reflecting on a goal about which individuals were in 
an action crisis (vs. were not in an action crisis) would lead to increased levels of self-threat. 
We included several additional measures to assess self-threat. First, we assessed 
individuals’ implicit self-esteem to investigate how far-reaching the effects of an action crisis 
on self-evaluation are. Second, given that self-threat is often described as an aversive state of 
arousal and agitation (Staw et al., 1981), we assessed subjects’ electrodermal activity (EDA). 
EDA is the change in electric properties of the skin as a result of sweat secretion (Lajante, 
Variable         M SD r action crisis p BF10
Action crisis 2.48 0.74
Feelings of self-worth 6.59 1.58 –.68 < .001 9.73e +27
Self-concept clarity 3.91 0.94 –.59 < .001 7.20e +16
Positive affect 3.79 0.63 –.68 < .001 1.27e +28
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Droulers, Dondaine, & Amarantini, 2012; Sequeira, Hot, Silvert, & Delplanque, 2009) and 
reflects changes in activation in response to affective experience (Boucsein et al., 2012). We 
were interested in the tonic level of electrical skin conductivity, an often used indicator of 
sympathetic nervous system arousal (Boucsein et al., 2012), which is susceptible to threat 
(Bohlin, 1976). Specifically, we tested whether the change in skin conductance levels from 
baseline to the time when individuals reflected on their goal was higher in the action crisis 
than in the no action crisis condition. This would indicate increased agitation when being 
exposed to a goal about which an action crisis is experienced. 
Third, as performance impairments have been identified as consequence of threat 
(Steele & Aronson, 1995), we intended to replicate the finding that experiencing an action 
crisis can impair performance not only on the goal, but also on tasks processed in temporal 
proximity (Brandstätter et al., 2013; Ghassemi et al., in preparation; Herrmann 
& Brandstätter, 2015). This may be explained by the action crisis consuming cognitive 
resources that consequently cannot be devoted to the ongoing task. As increased mental strain 
may be expressed in physiological arousal, we tested it as a mediator for the effect of an 
action crisis on performance. Such a finding would be consistent with a previous study 
(Brandstätter et al., 2013), and extend it to a broader goal context. Consistent with the notion 
of the action crisis as constituting a threat to the self, one could also expect that experiencing 
an action crisis decreases confidence in one’s capacity to master upcoming tasks, which may 
translate into performance impairments (Bandura, 1993; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). To test 
this possibility, we queried individuals’ performance expectations prior to the task.  
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred sixty-six individuals (125 women;  
Mage = 25.74 years, SDage = 6.64 years), mainly students (38 psychology majors) from a public 
Swiss university, took part in the experiment for monetary compensation (approximately $15) 
or partial course credit. They were recruited via a department participant pool and 
advertisements on university boards, and tested in individual laboratory sessions. Two 
subjects registered for the experiment twice. We excluded data of their second participation 
from all analyses. The study was approved by the local ethical committee and informed 
consent obtained from all participants. 
Procedure and measures. As part of participants’ online registration to the study, we 
assessed two traits that we expected to influence the amount of self-threat. First, dispositional 
self-esteem was assessed with a revised German version of Rosenberg’s (Rosenberg, 1965) 
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self-esteem scale (Collani & Herzberg, 2003), consisting of 10 items (e.g., “On the whole, I 
am satisfied with myself”, 1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree, α = .87). Second, 
neuroticism was measured with a German short version of the NEO-FFI subscale (Borkenau 
& Ostendorf, 2008), consisting of 6 items (e.g., “I often feel inferior to others”, 1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree, α = .83).  
The main part of the study took place several days after this pre-assessment. After 
being greeted by the experimenter, participants completed the study at the PC to prevent 
demand effects (only the writing task was assessed paper-pencil; instructions were given 
online). Subjects randomly assigned to the action crisis condition were asked to name a 
personal goal, which had repeatedly given rise to difficulties and/or lost part of its appeal, 
why they considered disengaging from it. It was stressed that participants should still be in 
doubt about whether to hold on to or give up the goal and not have made a decision yet. 
Participants randomly assigned to the no action crisis condition named a personal goal they 
pursued with good progress, why they were confident and motivated to attain it. It was 
stressed that participants should still be pursuing the goal and not have reached it yet. After 
selecting the goal that best fit instructions, participants reported the area of life their goal 
stemmed from (e.g., social relationships, education/job, leisure).  
To strengthen the experimental manipulation, participants in the action crisis 
condition described in a written essay a) why they originally had decided to pursue their goal 
and what the goal had meant to them back then, b) the difficulties or doubts they experienced 
in goal striving, c) the thoughts and feelings that came to their mind when confronted with the 
question whether to stick to or to abandon the goal, and d) what abandoning the goal would 
mean to them. Participants in the no action crisis condition described a) why they had 
originally decided to pursue their goal and what it meant to them, b) the action steps they 
intended to take next with regard to their goal, c) the thoughts and feelings that came to their 
mind when thinking about their goal, and d) what reaching the goal would mean to them. 
Goal-related action crisis levels were assessed with the ACRISS-Scale (α = .78).  
Then, participants worked on the dependent measures presented in the following. 
Self-evaluation. Apart from feelings of self-worth (α = .92) and the measure of self-
concept clarity used in Study 1, we applied the self-esteem Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) to assess individuals’ automatic association of self with 
positive and negative valence. The task version from the Millisecond Test Library was 
slightly adapted and translated into German. In a total of seven task blocks, participants had to 
categorize, by pressing a left or right key as fast and accurately as possible, a word (e.g., me 
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vs. you, lovely vs. painful) presented in the middle of the computer screen. Categories (self 
vs. other, pleasant vs. unpleasant) appeared in the left and right upper corner of the screen. 
The IAT compares response latencies to different kinds of category pairings. Latencies are 
regarded as indicative of the strength of a person’s automatic association between mental 
representations, with faster responses indicating stronger associations. Of interest in the self-
esteem IAT is to what extent individuals show faster responses when the self is paired with 
positive valence compared to negative valence; a higher positive difference in mean latency is 
interpreted as higher implicit self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). For analyzing IAT 
data, which was available for 160 participants, we relied on the improved algorithm, which 
includes practice trials in the analysis, implements error penalties, and uses individual 
standard deviations in latencies as scale units (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).  
Affect. Current affect was assessed with a modified 9-point version of the Self-
Assessment-Manikin scales (Suk, 2006). The SAM is a pictorial measure that captures the 
valence, arousal, and power component of people’s affective reactions (Bradley & Lang, 
1994). For all three dimensions, individuals marked on a series of nine pictures the one that 
illustrated best how they felt right now (1 = very sad / calm / helpless, 9 = very happy / 
agitated / strong). 
Physiological arousal. Electrodermal activity was assessed with two electrodes 
(constant voltage 0.5 V) placed on the thenar and hypothenar eminences of the palm of 
subjects’ non-dominant hand. Following recommendations of Boucsein et al. (2012) and 
Lajante et al. (2012), we used sintered disposable (10 mm in diameter) Ag/AgCl electrodes 
filled with skin conductance electrode paste (0.5% saline in a neutral base) to improve the 
electrical conductivity of the skin. Before electrode attachment, participants were asked to 
wash their hands with clear water. Cables were fixated with an adhesive strip on participants’ 
wrist to prevent unwanted movement. For measurement, the BITalino (DiY biosignals) 
recording device was used with a sampling rate of 1000 readings per second. The signal was 
transferred via Bluetooth to the software OpenSignals on the experimenter’s PC. After a 
check whether the measurement worked and reactivity was shown, baseline EDA was 
recorded at the beginning of the study for four minutes, while participants were instructed to 
sit quietly and breathe normally. The second measurement was taken when subjects wrote 
about their goal. Recording was started one minute after participants began reading task 
instructions, to give them time to get involved in the task. The duration of the recording 
varied in length (M = 7.88 min., SD = 1.80) depending on how long individuals spent on the 
task, but lasted at least four minutes.  
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Complete physiological data was available for 142 participants as a result of some 
instances of measurement artifacts and equipment failure. First, EDA was converted into 
microSiemens (µS) and recordings were edited to the duration of 4 minutes using Matlab. 
Then, data was downsampled to 10 readings per second, and tonic and phasic activity was 
decomposed using Ledalab (version V3.4.7). As we were interested in within-subjects 
changes in tonic EDA states from baseline to the writing period, we subtracted (average) 
baseline skin conductance levels from skin conductance levels during the writing task to 
obtain a measure of individual skin conductance level reactivity (SCLR). 
Performance expectations and cognitive performance. To measure cognitive 
performance, we used a phonemic fluency task as a validated measure of executive 
functioning (Henry, Hippel, & Baynes, 2009). Executive functions are cognitive processes 
that have been identified as important for the initiation and monitoring of actions and suffer 
under psychological stress (Arnsten, 1998). Phonemic fluency was assessed with the letters N, 
Z, and P. Participants had 1 minute to produce as many words as possible beginning with each 
letter. After reading task instructions, subjects reported their performance expectations with 
two items (“How good will you perform compared to the average student of your age and 
field?”, 1 = much worse, 7 = much better; “How many words will you be able to produce 
within 1 minute?”). After the performance measure, participants were thanked, compensated, 
and debriefed. 
Results 
The majority of participants (113; 68.1%) named a goal from the studies / education / 
job domain; 29 (17.5%) participants named a leisure goal, 10 participants (6%) named a goal 
from the relationship domain, and 14 participants (8.4%) categorized their goal as stemming 
from “other” domains (e.g., personal development, health)6.   
Difficulties associated with an action crisis. In order to validate the aforementioned 
aspects that could make an action crisis threatening, an independent rater coded the content of 
the essays participants in the action crisis condition had written. We were interested in the 
                                                 
6
 When checking whether participants in the action crisis and no action crisis condition selected 
personal goals from different life domains, the test statistic χ
2
(3) = 7.69 was close to significance, p = 
.053. Further analyses clarified that more participants (n = 9) in the action crisis condition than in the 
no action crisis condition (n = 1) named a goal from the social domain, χ
2
(1) = 7.02, p = .008. When 
entering domain (social vs. non-social) as a covariate in our models, its effect was only marginally 
significant in one out of 12 tests. Since the interpretation of results was unaffected, we do not control 
for goal domain in the final model report. 
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occurrence (1 = yes, 0 = no) of each of the four difficulties outlined in the introduction: a) 
failure experiences in goal pursuit (coded when individuals mentioned setbacks in goal 
striving or questioned own abilities); b) negative evaluations related to giving up (coded when 
individuals wrote about regret over wrong past decisions, sunk costs, feeling of failure, or 
negative social evaluation); c) difficulties related to decision making under uncertainty (coded 
when individuals mentioned uncertainty about the better option, fear about making the wrong 
decision, anticipated regret); and d) negative affect about the potential loss of a valued end 
(coded when individuals mentioned sadness about not being able to reach their goal, or the 
necessity to redefine themselves in some aspect). Of 82 essays, one went missing and one 
could not be coded due to unreadable handwriting. In the remaining 80 essays, 47 (58.8%) 
discussed failure experiences in goal pursuit, 31 (38.8%) referred to feelings of failure related 
to abandoning the goal, 36 (45.1%) mentioned uncertainty about whether persistence or 
withdrawal was advisory, and 46 (57.5%) expressed negative affect about the potential 
inability to reach their goal. Thus, our sample suggests that difficulties stem from all four 
domains.  
Manipulation check. An independent sample t-test confirmed that participants in the 
action crisis (vs. no action crisis) condition experienced significantly higher levels of action 
crisis, pointing out that the experimental manipulation had been successful. Still, there was a 
high amount of variance in action crisis levels also within experimental conditions (range was 
in both conditions 1.2 – 4.5), suggesting that conditions were not mutually exclusive. Due to 
this circumstance, we additionally tested our hypotheses with a regression analytic approach, 
in which continuous action crisis levels were used to predict outcomes of interest. Controlling 
for dispositional self-esteem and neuroticism, we could be more confident that the influence 
of the action crisis occurred irrespective of individuals’ habitual self-regard.  
Hypotheses tests. Descriptive statistics depending on experimental condition and 
results of conventional and Bayesian independent sample t-tests are shown in Table 10. 
Results of multiple regressions with the corresponding p-values and Bayes factors are 
presented in Table 11. The null model includes the intercept, dispositional self-esteem, and 
neuroticism (by using the option “is nuisance” in JASP). BFInclusion indicates to what extent 
data speak in favor of including the action crisis as predictor in the model. 
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Table 10: Descriptives, Conventional and Bayesian t-Tests for Indicators of Self-Threat 
Depending on Experimental Condition in Study 2 
 
Note. SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin, SCLR = Skin conductance level reactivity, IAT = 
Implicit Association Test, BF10 = Bayes factor to quantify evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis. 
a 
The alternative hypothesis specifies that group 0 is 
greater than group 1. 
b 
The alternative hypothesis specifies that group 0 is less than group 1. 
 
Self-evaluation. Consistent with our hypothesis, there was strong evidence that 
reflecting on an action crisis (vs. unobstructed goal striving) results in less positive feelings of 
self-worth. This finding was supported by decisive evidence for the alternative relative to the 
null hypothesis on the correlational level of analysis, controlling for trait self-esteem and 
neuroticism. The study was not very informative about whether the action crisis results in 
reduced self-concept clarity beyond the influence of dispositional self-esteem and 
neuroticism. Both when analyzed experimentally and correlationally statistical significance 
was just missed. Bayes factors around 1 suggest that beliefs about the validity of the 
alternative vs. the null model should not be updated in either direction. With respect to 
implicit self-esteem, a BF lower than 0.33 provided substantial evidence for the null relative 
to the alternative hypothesis, suggesting that implicit self-esteem is not reduced by reflecting 
on an action crisis (vs. unobstructed goal striving). This conclusion was supported in the 
correlational analysis. 
Affect. Both the experimental as well as the correlational analysis provided strong 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that reflecting on an action crisis makes individuals feel 
less happy (sadder). Moreover, individuals who experienced higher levels of action crisis felt 
    M    SD     M    SD t   df     p BF10
Action crisis 002.53 000.68 003.26 000.67 –6.98 164 < .001 1.09 00002.29e +8
b
Feelings of self-worth 006.88 001.39 '006.25 '001.50 –2.82 164 < .005 0.44 12.49
a
Self-concept clarity 003.88 000.83 003.65 000.95 –1.70 159.96 < .092 0.27 01.21
a
Implicit self-esteem 000.58 000.29 000.61 000.33 –0.67 158 < .501 0.11 00.11
a
Affect 
SAM: Valence 006.33 001.82 005.52 001.57 –3.07 164 < .003 0.48 24.12
a
SAM: Arousal 004.69 002.15 004.82 001.72 –0.42 157.91 < .675 0.07 00.24
b
SAM: Power 006.12 001.55 005.62 001.64 –2.01 164 < .046 0.31 02.09
a
SCLR (µS) 002.79 001.94 00'3.42 002.68 –1.61 140 < .111 0.27 01.09
b
Performance expectations   –   –   –   – 2.23 163 < .027 0.35 03.26
a
Phonemic fluency (words) 038.06 008.96 037.46 00'7.90 –0.45 163 < .651 0.07 00.25
a
IAT: Errors (%) 005.52 004.22 006.98 004.48 –2.13 158 < .035 0.34 02.64
b
Cohen's d
Performance 
No action crisis Action crisis
Variable
Self-evaluation
Physiological arousal
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less strong (more helpless). Data are inconclusive about whether reflecting on an action crisis 
makes individuals feel more agitated (less calm). 
Physiological arousal. With regard to the question whether an action crisis leads to 
objectively measured physiological arousal, evidence was not conclusive. Even though action 
crisis levels were significantly positively correlated with SCLR, controlling for dispositional 
self-esteem and neuroticism, the BF shows that evidence for the alternative hypothesis 
relative to the null hypothesis is weak, and more data on this question is needed. 
Cognitive performance. With respect to cognitive performance, operationalized by 
phonemic fluency, the Bayesian analysis provided substantial evidence that conditions did not 
differ. Continuous action crisis levels tended to correlate negatively with phonemic fluency, 
controlling for dispositional self-esteem and neuroticism; however, the BF suggests that this 
finding has to be considered preliminary. Interestingly, exploratory analyses revealed that 
individuals in the action crisis (vs. no action crisis) condition made significantly more errors 
in the self-esteem IAT, a finding that was supported on the correlational level of analysis. 
This may point to performance impairments resulting from an action crisis. We will return to 
this possibility in the discussion. 
A further objective of this study was to test two possible mediators for performance 
buffering effects of an action crisis, increased physiological arousal and reduced performance 
expectations. In a first mediation model conducted with the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) 
(model 4) in SPSS, individuals’ SCLR was analyzed as mediator. We used continuous action 
crisis levels instead of experimental condition as predictor, given that conditions did not differ 
in SCLR. However, SCLR did not significantly predict performance, b = -0.34, SE = 0.30, 
t(138) = -1.13, p = .261, when action crisis was controlled, b = -0.77, SE = 0.91, t(138) = -
0.85, p = .395, ruling it out as mediator. The second mediation model tested performance 
expectations for the upcoming task as mediator. The first requirement for mediation that 
performance expectations differed depending on condition was met (Table 10). Moreover, 
performance expectations significantly positively predicted performance, b = 3.85, SE = 0.80, 
t(162) = 4.80, p = < .001, while the influence of condition on performance was not significant, 
b = 0.44, SE = 1.25, t(162) = 0.35, p = .726. The confidence interval of the indirect effect did 
not include zero, b = -1.04, SE = 0.55, 95% CI = [-2.38 – -0.18], suggesting that an action 
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crisis, compared to unobstructed goal striving, results in reduced performance expectations, 
which, in turn, predict lower performance
7
.  
Table 11: Conventional and Bayesian Regression Analyses Predicting Indicators of 
Self-Threat with Action Crisis Levels in Study 2 
 
Note. SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin, SCLR = Skin conductance level reactivity, IAT = 
Implicit Association Test, BFInclusion = Bayes factor in favor of including the action crisis as 
predictor into the null model consisting of intercept, dispositional self-esteem, and neuroticism 
(“nuisance”). 
Brief discussion 
Study 2 strengthened our assumption that the action crisis is self-threatening. 
Consistent with Study 1, individuals experienced less positive self-worth, more negative 
affect, and a reduced sense of personal control after thinking about an action crisis. Whether 
also self-concept clarity is reduced, beyond the influence of dispositional self-esteem and 
neuroticism, cannot be told based on this study. Given that the test was inconclusive, prior 
beliefs should not be updated in either direction.  
The study provided substantial evidence that implicit self-esteem is not affected by an 
action crisis. With some thought, this initially surprising finding became less so. Explicit and 
implicit self-esteem are separate, at best weakly positively correlated factors (Greenwald 
& Farnham, 2000). Whereas current events have a strong impact on how people see and 
evaluate themselves (Critcher & Dunning, 2014), there is only limited evidence that also 
implicit self-esteem is susceptible to change (DeHart & Pelham, 2007; Dijksterhuis, 2004). 
                                                 
7
 Also when testing mediation with continous action crisis levels instead of experimental condition, 
there was a significant indirect effect excluding zero, b = -0.58, SE = 0.26, 95% CI = [-1.18 – -0.14]. 
β b SE p β b SE p β b SE p
Feelings of self-worth –.38 –1.07 0.26 <.001 –.17 –0.30 0.18  .087 –.26 –0.50 0.13 <.001 159.90
Self-concept clarity –.35 –0.60 0.20 <.003 –.03 –0.03 0.13  .800 –.12 –0.14 0.10 <.149 0.62
Implicit self-esteem –.10 –0.06 0.08 <.453 –.04 –0.02 0.05 .753 –.05 –0.02 0.04 <.609 0.34
SAM: Valence –.25 –0.85 0.38 <.024 –.13 –0.28 0.25 .268 –.35 –0.78 0.18 <.001 784.70
SAM: Arousal –.13 –0.50 0.44 <.262 –.20 –0.46 0.30 .122 –.14 –0.34 0.22 <.112 0.90
SAM: Power –.18 –0.56 0.33 <.097 –.13 –0.26 0.22 .245 –.28 –0.59 0.16 <.001 91.11
SCLR (µS) –.20 –0.92 0.57 <.113 –.27 –0.75 0.38 .049 –.20 –0.60 0.28 <.036 2.23
Performance expectations –.27 –0.41 0.18 <.022 –.33 –0.31 0.12 .010 –.20 –0.21 0.09 <.019 3.49
Phonemic fluency (words) –.13 –2.18 1.96 <.269 –.20 –2.07 1.32 .119 –.15 –1.69 0.95 <.079 1.21
IAT: Errors (%) –.17 –1.45 1.05 <.168 –.20 –1.04 0.70 .139 –.18 –1.02 0.51 <.048 1.75
Predictor:  Action crisisCovariate 1: Trait self-esteem
Self-evaluation
Covariate 2:  Neuroticism
BFInclusion
Physiological arousal
Performance
Affect 
Models
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Rather, it seems to capture the “automatic, overlearned, and nonconscious evaluation of the 
self” (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000, p. 631). As the more global measure, is should be 
less easily influenced.  
On a correlational level, the study provided preliminary support for increased skin 
conductance level reactivity in relation to more severe action crises, consistent with a study in 
which higher levels of action crisis predicted stronger cortisol increases during goal striving 
(Brandstätter et al., 2013). Contrary to Brandstätter and colleagues we measured physiological 
arousal in a situation in which individuals merely reflected on their goal, arguably resulting in 
a smaller effect that is more difficult to detect. Indeed, Bayesian analyses, which are known to 
be rather tentative (Wagenmakers, 2007), suggest that the test was inconclusive and more data 
is needed.  
When analyzed across experimental conditions, individuals with higher levels of 
action crisis tended to lower phonemic fluency, even though no difference between conditions 
emerged. In retrospect, we think that the phonemic fluency measure was not fully appropriate 
to operationalize performance. Tests of verbal fluency are often applied to detect impairments 
in cognitive functions (Henry & Crawford, 2004; Henry, Crawford, & Phillips, 2004), so they 
might not sufficiently discriminate in other populations. Interestingly, individuals who had 
just thought about an action crisis (vs. unobstructed goal striving) had a higher percentage of 
wrong category attributions in the self-esteem IAT. Interpreting the IAT as a performance test 
that requires high amounts of attention and cognitive flexibility, this may indicate that 
individuals with an action crisis still had their goal-related doubts in mind and were not able 
to devote their full cognitive capacities to the task. Even though more studies on underlying 
mechanisms are needed, this study, for the first time, suggests that an action crisis reduces 
people’s expectation to perform well on a subsequent task, and this reduced expectation 
predicts reduced performance. This pattern is fully consistent with the understanding of the 
action crisis as self-threatening. 
Discussion 
Individuals are motivated to predict and master important outcomes in their life (Steele, 
1988). The important outcomes people strive for are reflected in their personal goals, the 
internal representations of desired end states individuals try to achieve in the future, or to 
maintain over time (Emmons, 2003). Whereas research on motivation and volition 
traditionally focuses on how individuals reduce discrepancies to their goals (Carver 
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& Scheier, 1998), a growing strand of research acknowledges that not in all cases these goals 
can be met (Brandstätter, 2003; Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Klinger, 1977; Wrosch et 
al., 2003). Based on the notion that disengaging from personal aspirations is troublesome 
(Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Klinger, 1977), the current research illustrates the self-
threatening potential of an action crisis, in which further adherence to a goal is questioned 
(Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013).  
Findings of two studies showed that reflecting on an action crisis, compared to 
unobstructed goal striving, leads individuals to evaluate themselves less positively and 
experience more negative affect; suggesting that the action crisis is something people use to 
make inferences about themselves. A qualitative analysis of the essays participants had 
written suggests that difficulties associated with the action crisis are many-faceted. As 
outlined in the discussion of Study 2, more studies should be conducted to investigate in 
which situations the action crisis is associated with increased physiological agitation or stress, 
and which mechanisms might underlie performance impairments. 
Limitations 
Given that only few experiments have to date been conducted on the action crisis, it 
was an announced objective of this research to study the effects of an action crisis on self-
evaluation, affect, physiological arousal, and performance experimentally. Only with 
experiments can one demonstrate causal effects, why we regarded this as a relevant extension 
to past research. The used idiographic goal approach comes with the additional benefit that 
results are externally valid and can be generalized across a wide range of goals. However, 
several limitations need to be discussed. 
First, instructing participants to name a personal goal with certain properties was not 
successful in all instances. In Study 2, some of the stated goals did not meet instructions, what 
run counter the necessity to create mutually exclusive conditions in terms of levels of action 
crisis experienced. In our view, this may explain the stronger support for our hypotheses when 
analyzed correlationally rather than experimentally. Focusing on the upside, that group 
differences were supported by correlations with continuously measured action crisis levels 
speaks in favor of the validity of the experimental manipulation. Moreover, controlling for 
dispositional self-esteem and neuroticism, we could be more confident that the action crisis is 
self-threatening independent of habitual self-regard. Second, we faced the methodological 
difficulty to make the action crisis salient in a situation (i.e., the lab) in which it usually is not. 
Being instructed to think about an action crisis arguably does not produce the same effects as 
Questioning a Goal Poses a Threat to the Self 96 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
questioning a goal in response to current experiences in goal striving. Future studies might for 
instance use experience-sampling designs to investigate the predictive effects of an action 
crisis on indicators of self-threat. Advantages of this study design are that individuals’ 
experiences in goal striving can be assessed, and that person-means in the respective outcome 
variables can be controlled. Third, we would like to note that when we formulated our 
hypotheses we thought of action crises in the pursuit of high-level goals (e.g., continuing or 
ending a romantic relationship, sticking to or abandoning an initiated career path) more than 
action crises in the pursuit of less self-relevant goals. Although we expect that our hypotheses 
do not equally hold for all kind of goals, we did not include a measure for goal centrality in 
this study and, hence, could not test a moderation effect. This should be addressed in future 
research. Taken together, as probably not all participants were able to name a high-level goal, 
about which they were in an action crisis, and considering that we made its experience salient 
in a situation in which it naturally was not, the effects we obtained might underestimate those 
of action crises in real-life goal pursuit.  
Implications  
Given its relevance for many theories, it is striking that the experience of self-threat 
has received relatively little empirical attention (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). Whereas many 
studies have focused on its consequences, the state of self-threat and its determinants are only 
rarely addressed. In research on escalation of commitment, for instance, it is a strongly held 
assumption that feedback that challenges the correctness of own actions arouses threat 
(Brockner, 1992). The validity of this assumption is inferred from the regulatory behaviors 
that individuals show in response to negative feedback, such as staying on course, as well as 
the impact of specific moderators augmenting escalation effects (e.g., personal responsibility; 
(Staw, 1976). However, only few studies have directly investigated the relevance of 
threatened self-concerns for unwise persistence (for an exception, see Zhang & Baumeister, 
2006), and studies seem to be missing that test whether questioning a goal arouses self-threat. 
The here reported findings show that it does, and emphasize the relevance of self-related 
processes in goal disengagement.  
The present research also offers a theoretical perspective under which various effects 
of the action crisis can be subsumed. This should be informative as we know a lot about how 
people respond to threats, and may use this knowledge to make predictions about individuals’ 
behavior in an action crisis. It is well known that self-threat arouses the motivation to re-
establish self-integrity (Aronson, 1992; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Steele, 1988). This may 
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be achieved by denying, rationalizing, or counteracting threatening information, or engaging 
in other defensive behaviors that help to re-establish self-serving construals of reality (Cohen 
& Sherman, 2014; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). With regard to a failing goal, becoming 
entrapped may be a defensive response (Brockner, 1992); here, individuals may tell 
themselves that the project will turn out successfully if they simply invested more resources 
(Kelly & Milkman, 2013). However, individuals may also choose an indirect response for 
dealing with a threat, for instance by affirming independent values or life domains. Studies on 
self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) have shown that the self is a flexible system and 
defensiveness can be prevented if individuals are reminded of cherished self-conceptions not 
targeted by a current threat. This may help to put threat into perspective and mitigate its 
negative impact on the self (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Critcher & Dunning, 2014; Sherman 
& Cohen, 2006). With self-integrity no longer on trial, the threatening issue may be 
approached more openly (Howell & Shepperd, 2012). Translated to the action crisis, one 
could assume that affirming an unrelated aspect of the self might have implications for how 
the decisional conflict between persistence and disengagement is resolved (Sivanathan, 
Molden, Galinsky, & Ku, 2008; Vohs et al., 2013). By pointing to the self-threatening nature 
of the action crisis, we hope that this research will not only contribute to our understanding of 
the action crisis, but also set the stage for an identification of strategies that help individuals, 
in the right moment, to disengage from their goal or to dissipate doubt. 
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Abstract 
The action crisis defines the self-threatening experience of conflict between the opposing 
options of holding on to and letting go of a personal goal. In previous research, the need has 
been expressed to identify strategies that help individuals to resolve the action crisis either in 
the direction of further goal pursuit or disengagement, depending on the characteristics of the 
goal in question. Drawing from self-affirmation theory, four experimental studies tested 
whether individuals who had the chance to affirm a cherished, unrelated value would 
incorporate subjective appraisals of goal desirability and attainability to a stronger extent, a) 
with respect to the amount of planning for further goal pursuit as well as b) their preference 
for further goal pursuit versus disengagement. While two studies offered hypothesis-
consistent evidence, two other studies did not. Potential limitations are discussed and 
recommendations given for future research. 
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Introduction 
The striving for personal goals is an indispensable aspect of human life and constitutes, if 
successful, an important source of well-being (Brunstein, 1993; Emmons, 2003). However, 
goal striving does not always flow smoothly. When a goal was set unrealistically high or the 
person does not possess the abilities required for goal achievement, when conditions for goal 
pursuit have deteriorated, or when the goal has lost its appeal, goal striving may be fraught 
with obstacles. Sometimes these obstacles become so insurmountable that the individual faces 
the unpleasant decision whether to stick to or disengage from the goal, despite considerable 
investments (e.g., time, energy) already incurred. Research has conceptualized this 
intrapsychic conflict, in which the individual feels caught between persistence and 
disengagement, as an action crisis (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). As one of its main 
characteristics, deliberation about the costs and benefits of the goal, usually found before a 
goal is set, resurges (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013).  
Despite the generally adaptive potential of an action crisis to, as a result of thorough 
deliberation, renew commitment to a valued goal or initiate disengagement from a goal that 
has become unrealistic or too troublesome (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013), it certainly has its 
pitfalls. Both persistence and the ability to disengage from unfruitful projects are important 
aspects of effective self-regulation (Brandstätter, 2003; Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; 
Wrosch et al., 2003); in an action crisis, difficulty arises from the fact that it is often anything 
but clear which option is advantageous. Even in case of repeated setbacks there usually 
remains a slight hope that, with increased effort, the goal can still be attained (Brandstätter et 
al., 2013; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Klinger, 1977). If this hope was warranted, even partial 
disengagement would be a mistake (Wrosch et al., 2003). On the other hand, failing to 
disengage from a futile goal is detrimental as it causes ongoing failure and consumes 
resources that cannot be used for more promising projects (Wrosch et al., 2013).  
In some instances, intrapsychic conflict may be aggravated by the fact that (at least) 
one of the options, holding on or giving up, holds unfavorable implications for the 
individual’s sense of self. There may be some instances where adhering to the goal causes 
negative self-regard, when the goal contradicts the individual’s personal or moral standards. 
However, much more discussed is the case where disengagement implies negative self-
evaluation due to the often made reference of “giving up” to weakness and failure (Janoff-
Bulman & Brickman, 1982; Wrosch et al., 2003). Questioning a goal, hence not only means 
to give up something valued, but to deal with the threat to the experience as competent and 
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adequate person. As a result, people may become locked in clearly failing endeavors by ever 
investing more resources (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1981). Research on escalation of 
commitment and entrapment discusses people’s willingness to sacrifice decisional accuracy to 
re-establish self-serving construals of reality. 
Recently, the assumption has been put to empirical test that experiencing an action 
crisis is self-threatening, with supportive findings. In an experimental setting, reflecting on a 
personal action crisis (vs. unobstructed goal striving) immediately caused negative affect and 
led to reduced self-worth (Ghassemi & Brandstätter, in preparation). Moreover, several 
studies suggest that experiencing an action crisis jeopardizes goal-related performance, and 
that impairments may spill over to unrelated tasks in temporal proximity (Brandstätter et al., 
2013; Ghassemi et al., in preparation; Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015). From real-life goal 
striving it is known that an action crisis is associated with negative affect, and predicts 
reductions in psychological and physical well-being over time (Brandstätter, Herrmann, & 
Schüler, 2013). Accordingly, the need has been expressed to identify strategies that help 
individuals solve the action crisis in a timely fashion (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press; 
Ghassemi & Brandstätter, in preparation). At present, however, not much is known about how 
this could be achieved. 
Finding a suitable intervention  
Thinking about an intervention that helps to solve the action crisis raises the question of what 
the desired outcome should be. Western societies have for long emphasized the need to persist 
in the face of obstacles, and to never give up on personal dreams. Disconfirming this belief, 
there is now scientific consensus that for keeping up well-being, everybody has to quit 
sometimes, as some goals are simply out of reach. Hence, more than persistence per se, the 
flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and the wisdom to “know when to hold and when 
to fold” seems to be at the core of living a happy and fulfilled life (Emmons, 2003; Janoff-
Bulman & Brickman, 1982; Lench & Levine, 2008; Wrosch et al., 2003).  
The lack of all-round solutions points to the need to evaluate cues of the situation 
carefully and base the decision on the outcome of this evaluation process. However, it is 
exactly the capacity to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant pieces of information that 
may become restricted under threat. As Cohen and Sherman (2014) noted, individuals at times 
“adopt a tunnel-vision focus on the threat and lose sight of what really matters” (p. 359). 
Moreover, they tend to avoid information with potentially unwanted implications and trade 
off decisional accuracy for self-justification (Hart et al., 2009; Simpson, Ickes, & Blackstone, 
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1995; Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller, & Shepperd, 2010). Clearly, the challenge an intervention has 
to meet is to offset these adverse effects of threat.  
To conclude, a helpful intervention might be one that reduces the need for self-
justification and helps to process relevant information systematically, to achieve a well-
reasoned preference for persistence or disengagement appropriate to the situation (Simonson 
& Staw, 1992). Which information, however, can be regarded as relevant? At the most basic 
level, the factors pertinent to the question whether a goal should be pursued are its subjective 
value as well as the expectancy that it can be attained (Atkinson, 1964; Feather, 1982; Vroom, 
1964). Supporting this notion, a realistic evaluation of opportunities for goal achievement and 
a reanalysis of goal value have been denoted as essential for decisions about persistence and 
disengagement (Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1982; Wrosch et al., 2013).  
Whether the identification and consideration of relevant information is more likely 
achieved through an intensified engagement with the goal or, by contrast, through increasing 
distance to it, is difficult to say. There is, however, evidence that psychological distance can 
improve decision making in situations of information overload (Fukukura, Ferguson, & 
Fujita, 2013). The claim has been made that approaches that direct individuals’ focus on 
something else than the current threat may work equally well, and sometimes even better than 
head-on assaults on it (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Critcher & Dunning, 2014). In the present 
research, we tested such an “indirect” approach based on self-affirmation theory. 
Benefits of affirming the adequacy of the self 
Self-affirmation theory holds that individuals are motivated to maintain an experience of the 
self as adequate (Steele, 1988), and act defensively when this experience is threatened. 
However, as individuals’ primary goal is not to undo any particular threat, but to maintain an 
overarching positive view on the self, defensiveness can be prevented by affirming other 
valued self-aspects. In many studies, self-affirmation is achieved by asking participants to 
reflect on a cherished value not targeted by a threat (McQueen & Klein, 2006). Doing this, 
“the inconsistency would remain, of course, yet in the context of other valued self-concepts it 
should pose less threat to global self-integrity and thus be more tolerable” (Steele, 1988, p. 
262). 
The assumption that short reminders of self-integrity reduce defensiveness has been 
supported in an impressive body of research (for a review, see Cohen & Sherman, 2014, for 
meta analyses in the context of health behavior, see (Epton, Harris, Kane, van 
Koningsbruggen, G. M., & Sheeran, 2015; Sweeney & Moyer, 2015). When affirmed, 
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threatening issues can be approached (rather than avoided) and processed more thoroughly 
(Harris & Napper, 2005; Harris & Epton, 2009, 2010; Howell & Shepperd, 2012; Klein & 
Harris, 2009; Legault et al., 2012; van Koningsbruggen, Guido M. & Das, 2009).  
A more thorough processing of information can heighten receptivity to its core 
features and change the conclusions derived from it. Klein, Harris, Ferrer, and Zajac (2011) 
found that affirmed (vs. non-affirmed) individuals only expressed feelings of increased 
vulnerability to risk, and consequently, stronger intentions to change risky health behaviors, 
when a threatening message of high quality was presented to them, but actually reported 
decreased feelings of vulnerability and lower intentions to change when the message was of 
low quality. Similarly, whereas affirmed (vs. non-affirmed) individuals responded more 
favorably to a persuasive message if it was of high quality, their responses turned out less 
favorably if the message was weak, arguably due to increased in own judgment and reliance 
on these judgments when forming an attitude (Brinol, Petty, Gallardo, & DeMarree, 2007; 
Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004).  
Even when individuals did not receive new information, but had to rely on their own 
thoughts about a topic, self-affirmation led to a polarization of established beliefs (van 
Prooijen, Sparks, & Jessop, 2013). Vohs and colleagues (2013) argued that self-affirmed 
individuals more readily internalize the informative value of self-relevant experiences (e.g., 
success and failure), with implications for motivation and performance. They assigned 
participants a task and manipulated self-affirmation and the experience of failure. Consistent 
with prior work, self-affirmation boosted performance expectations and performance in 
unobstructed tasks. Conversely, after failure, self-affirmation deflated performance 
expectations for and actual performance on subsequent task attempts, a pattern indicative of 
goal disengagement. While the authors interpreted this internalization of experiences as “not 
immediately beneficial to the task at hand” (Vohs et al., 2013, p. 26), it could be of particular 
use in an action crisis.  
In the lab studies conducted by Vohs et al. (2013), participants’ goals were much less 
complex and relevant than real life goals typically are. With these simple goals, where the 
path to goal achievement is scribed and future success can easily be judged based on prior 
experience, disengagement following failure is evident. Self-affirmation seems to help people 
to accept that, leading them to withdraw effort from an apparently useless endeavor. This 
conforms to studies, in which individuals who affirmed an important, unrelated value were 
less prone to escalation of commitment, measured as the amount of money reinvested in the 
initial, but failing decision (Sivanathan et al., 2008). Still, it is unclear whether self-
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affirmation promotes quitting when it comes to difficulty in the pursuit of personal goals. Few 
higher-order goals are reached without occasional setbacks, which, in reverse, are not 
indicative of ultimate goal failure. Moreover, aside from perceived goal attainability, the 
subjective value of a goal is a main factor for the ease of letting it go (Jostmann & Koole, 
2009; Wrosch et al., 2003). Given that prior studies did not test the effects of self-affirmation 
depending on varying levels of goal desirability, we deemed it insightful to study self-
affirmation in the realm of obstructed personal goals.  
In the action crisis as a threatening phase, we think that self-affirmation does not 
always promote disengagement. Based on findings suggesting that self-affirmation changes 
individuals’ processing and use of relevant information, we hypothesized that in the action 
crisis, in which the view is blurred and individuals feel under pressure to make the best 
choice, self-affirmation functions as a “moment to pull back and regain perspective on what 
really matters” (Cohen & Sherman, 2014, p. 338). In this situation, self-affirmation might 
promote an unbiased processing of the available paths of action, going on and giving up, and 
help to form a preference not driven by self-protecting motives. Thus, after affirming the self 
in an action crisis, the characteristics of the goal in question, its desirability and attainability, 
might be the essential determinants of choice. 
The present research 
This research tested the hypothesis that when feeling caught in an intrapsychic conflict 
between holding on to and letting go of a personal goal, self-affirmation helps to align one’s 
preference for persistence or disengagement to the goal’s desirability and attainability. We 
assumed that, after affirming an unrelated value (vs. performing a control task), individuals 
would be more inclined to hold on if they subjectively appraised their goal as attainable and 
desirable, but would be less inclined to hold on if they appraised their goal as scarcely 
attainable and desirable. We tested this assumption in four experimental studies, relying on 
idiographic personal goals about which individuals were in an action crisis. Outcome 
variables of interest to this research are individuals’ spontaneous amount of planning further 
goal pursuit when being led to think about their goal, and their preference in the decision 
conflict on a continuum between further goal pursuit and disengagement.
8
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 Depending on the study, more outcome variables were assessed than are in the focus of this paper. 
For better readability, these variables are not reported in this manuscript but can be requested from 
the authors. 
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Study 1 
Method 
Study design and sample. Study 1 followed a one-factorial (self-affirmation vs. no 
self-affirmation) between-subjects design. Two hundred forty-six U.S. residents were 
recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and completed the online study for monetary 
compensation. For reasons stated below, we excluded 12 participants from analyses, resulting 
in a sample of 234 participants (100 women; Mage = 34.89 years, SDage = 16.32 years). 
Procedure. Goal assessment. After participants had been introduced to the goal 
concept and were given some time to think of their personal goals, they were asked to 
specifically think of a goal in whose pursuit they experienced an action crisis (i.e., recurrent 
setbacks, implemental disorientation, disengagement impulses, conflict between holding on to 
and disengaging from the goal). After stating the goal that best fit the instruction, the intensity 
of action crisis with respect to that goal was assessed with the Action Crisis Scale (ACRISS; 
Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013), consisting of 6 items (e.g., “I have doubts whether I should 
continue striving for my goal or disengage from it”, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree, 
α = .65). Furthermore, individuals’ momentary preference for persistence versus 
disengagement was assessed with a scroll bar anchored at “I will disengage from this goal” 
(1) and “I will continue the pursuit of this goal” (101). Goal desirability was assesed with four 
items (e.g., “This goal is important to me”, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree, α = .86) 
and goal attainability was assessed with three items (e.g., “Pursuing this goal seems difficult 
to me”, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree, α = .53) applied in previous research 
(Ghassemi et al., 2017). 
Self-affirmation manipulation. Using a standard manipulation of self-affirmation 
(Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006), participants ordered ten values or life purposes (e.g., 
social relationships, independence; adapted from Harber, 1995; quoted from Cohen et al., 
2000) in terms of personal importance. Subjects randomly assigned to the self-affirmation 
condition wrote an essay explaining why their top-ranked value was important to them, while 
participants in the control condition wrote an essay explaining why their lowest-ranked value 
could be important to someone else. As a value affirmation was found to have different 
effects depending on whether individuals reflect on the importance of the currently threatened 
domain or the importance of a domain unrelated to the current threat (Sherman & Cohen, 
2006; Sherman et al., 2009; Sivanathan et al., 2008), we excluded data of 12 participants (11 
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in the experimental condition) who wrote in their essay about their obstructed goal (and how 
it was important to them or someone else). 
Dependent variables. After the experimental manipulation, participants were asked to 
think about their goal again and let their mind wander. After the 1-minute “mind-wandering” 
exercise, a thought sampling was conducted following a procedure proposed by Heckhausen 
and Gollwitzer (1987). Subjects first wrote down their most recent thought, thereafter their 
second most recent thought, the first thought they had when being led to think about their 
goal, and finally, everything they thought of in between. The main dependent variables 
assessed individuals’ self-reported inclination to plan further goal pursuit in the mind-
wandering exercise (“Calling to mind the thoughts you had about your goal, to what extent 
can you agree with the following statement?” – “I made plans on how to achieve this goal”, 
1= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), as well as their current preference for further goal 
pursuit (vs. disengagement), which was assessed using the scroll bar described before.  
Results 
Multiple regression analyses were calculated in SPSS. We dummy coded experimental 
condition (self-affirmation = 1, no self-affirmation = 0) and z-standardized continuous 
predictor variables for testing interaction effects between categorical and continuous measures 
(Aiken & West, 1991). 
Preliminary analyses. Participants experienced moderate to high levels of action 
crisis with respect to the goal they had selected (M = 3.64, SD = 0.55). Conditions did not 
significantly differ in mean levels of action crisis, β = -.04, b = -0.05, SE = 0.07, t(232) = -
0.64, p = .522, goal attainability (M  = 2.75, SD = 0.65), β = .06, b = 0.08, SE = 0.08, t(232) = 
0.92, p = .359, or goal desirability (M  = 4.17, SD = 0.68), β = .12, b = 0.16, SE = 0.09, t(232) 
= 1.83, p = .068; a marginal difference in goal desirability indicated that randomization had 
not been fully successful. In the self-affirmation condition, most participants (56 out of 125; 
45%) wrote about “Social Relationships (with Friends, Family, or Partner)” as their top-
ranked value. In the control condition, most participants (69 out of 121; 57%) wrote about 
religion as their lowest-ranked value. 
Goal attainability and desirability in the amount of planning. We hypothesized 
that self-affirmation increases individuals’ reliance on relevant goal characteristics (goal 
attainability, goal desirability) when it comes to planning further goal pursuit. In the 
regression conducted to test this hypothesis, we first entered condition (self-affirmation vs. no 
self-affirmation), standardized goal attainability, and standardized goal desirability as 
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predictors. It would be conceivable that affirmed individuals base their amount of planning on 
the goal’s attainability and the goal’s desirability independently from each other; this would 
be manifested in two significant two-way interactions with additive effects. However, it also 
would be possible that affirmed individuals base their amount of planning on their combined 
appraisal of the goal’s attainability and desirability; this might be manifested in a significant 
three-way interaction. To test both possibilities, we included all possible two- and three-way 
interactions between condition, goal attainability, and goal desirability to predict the amount 
of planning during the mind-wandering exercise. The model, R
2 
= .19, F(7, 226) = 7.79, p < 
.001, revealed that both goal attainability, β = .33, b = 0.41, SE = 0.11, t(226) = 3.93, p < .001, 
and goal desirability, β = .27, b = 0.33, SE = 0.10, t(226) = 3.50, p = .001, significantly 
positively predicted the amount of planning. There was no significant main effect for self-
affirmation condition, β = -.01, b = -0.02, SE = 0.15, t(226) = -0.14, p = .891. Against our 
expectation, none of the two- or three-way interactions was significant (all ts < 1). 
Goal attainability and desirability in the preference for further goal pursuit vs. 
disengagement. A preliminary analysis revealed that individuals tended toward further goal 
pursuit to a significantly stronger degree after the experimental manipulation (M = 82.20, SD 
= 22.04) than at baseline (M = 75.98, SD = 20.08), F(1, 232) = 45.82, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.17. To test our hypothesis that self-affirmation helps to acknowledge relevant goal 
characteristics when it comes to the preference for persistence versus disengagement, we 
included the same predictors as for our first outcome variable, the amount of planning. 
Additionally, we included individuals’ baseline preference for further goal pursuit versus 
disengagement as predictor. The model, R
2 
= .64, F(8, 224) = 50.67, p < .001, revealed that 
when the baseline preference was controlled, β = .69, b = 15.20, SE = 1.04, t(224) = 14.59, p 
< .001, both goal attainability, β = .15, b = 3.41, SE = 1.31, t(224) = 2.61, p = .010, and goal 
desirability, β = .12, b = 2.62, SE = 1.20, t(224) = 2.19, p = .030, significantly positively 
predicted the preference for further goal pursuit. There was no significant main effect for 
condition, β = -.02, b = -0.66, SE = 1.80, t(224) = -0.37, p = .712. Against our expectation, 
none of the two- or three-way interactions was significant (all ts < |1.31|). 
Brief discussion 
Study 1 did not provide evidence in favor of our hypotheses. Both individuals having 
performed a control task as well as affirmed individuals acknowledged the goal’s attainability 
and desirability in their amount of planning and their preference for further goal pursuit 
versus disengagement. However, we noticed that after (vs. before) the experimental 
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manipulation, participants were significantly more inclined to hold on to their goal. This made 
us think of the possibility that participants of both conditions might have experienced a boost 
in confidence or self-efficacy related to a self-affirmation. First, this might be owed to the fact 
that the control task required participants to rank-order values as well, what may suffice to 
instigate cognitive processes that promote some clarity when being stuck with a personal goal. 
Second, reading control participants’ essays, we wondered to what extent dissociating oneself 
from others in terms of specific values might be affirming as well (e.g., participants wrote: “I 
do not believe in any god(s) so religion is not important to me, but I know it can be very much 
so for others”). Although we are not aware of this question being discussed in self-affirmation 
research, it is known that participants tend to turn most self-reflective writing tasks into self-
affirming ones (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000). To address this possibility, we used a 
control task unrelated to values in Study 2. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, we aimed to address three limitations inherent in Study 1. First, we chose a 
revised procedure that did not allow participants to affirm a value directly related to the 
obstructed goal. Second, we used a control task that was unlikely to exert any beneficial 
effects (e.g., by surreptitiously confronting an individual with his/her values). Third, to 
increase cognitive involvement with the action crisis, we asked participants to describe the 
difficulties they experienced with respect to their goal. 
Method 
Study design and sample. Study 2 was based on a one-factorial (self-affirmation vs. 
no self-affirmation) between-subjects design. Seventy-nine (60 women; Mage = 23.3 years, 
SDage = 6.26 years) individuals, mainly students from a Swiss university, were reached via a 
department mailing list and completed the online study voluntarily or for partial course credit.  
Procedure. Procedure and measures were identical to Study 1, with the following 
exceptions: To make the experience of action crisis more salient, participants described the 
difficulties they experienced with respect to their goal, before action crisis levels (α = .64), 
goal desirability (α = .86), and goal attainability (α = .46) were assessed. This time, we did not 
include a baseline measure of individuals’ preference for further goal pursuit versus 
disengagement. To ensure the decoupling of the value affirmation from the domain in which 
the action crisis was experienced, we asked all participants, right after stating their goal, to 
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categorize it to one out of 10 values. Participants randomly assigned to the self-affirmation 
condition were later presented with a list of 9 values that excluded the chosen value. After 
rank-ordering the values, participants in the self-affirmation condition were asked to think of 
a time in their life when their top-ranked value had been meaningful and to explain in a 
written essay why this value was so important to them (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 
2006). The control task was procedurally similar but not related to values (cf. (Brinol, Petty, 
Gallardo, & DeMarree, 2007; Cohen et al., 2000; Critcher, Dunning, & Armor, 2010). 
Participants randomly assigned to the control condition received a list of 9 animals (e.g., tiger, 
elephant) and ordered them in terms of their body weight (they were told not to worry if they 
were uncertain and just give their best guess), before they described in a short essay the living 
environment of the animal they had estimated to be the heaviest.  
Results 
Hypotheses were tested by means of multiple regressions in SPSS. Due to the smaller sample 
size and insufficient statistical power for a multiple regression with six predictors, we only 
tested two-way interactions between self-affirmation and goal attainability or desirability, 
respectively. 
Preliminary analyses. Mean levels of action crisis (M = 3.34, SD = 0.57) did not 
significantly differ between conditions (self-affirmation = 1, no self-affirmation = 0), β = -.02, 
b = -0.02, SE = 0.13, t(77) = -0.15, p = .881. Conditions did not differ in goal attainability (M  
= 3.07, SD = 0.61), β = .07, b = 0.08, SE = 0.14, t(77) = 0.61, p = .547, or goal desirability (M  
= 3.79, SD = 0.81), β = .07, b = 0.12, SE = 0.18, t(77) = .64, p = .526. In the self-affirmation 
condition, most participants (30 out of 45; 66%) chose “Social Relationships (with Friends, 
Family, or Partner)” as their top-ranked value. In the control condition, most participants (28 
out of 34; 82%) rated “Elephant” as heaviest animal.  
Goal attainability and desirability in the amount of planning. We hypothesized 
that self-affirmation increases individuals’ reliance on goal attainability and desirability when 
it comes to the amount of planning for further goal pursuit. In the first regression, we entered 
condition, standardized goal attainability, and the condition by goal attainability interaction to 
predict planning. The model, R
2 
= .13, F(3, 75) = 3.05, p = .034, revealed no significant main 
effect of goal attainability, β = -.07, b = -0.25, SE = 0.24, t(75) = -1.06, p = .292, and no main 
effect of condition, β = -.03, b = -0.07, SE = 0.27, t(75) = -0.28, p = .783. However, the 
proposed condition by attainability interaction was significant, β = .48, b = 0.70, SE = 0.28, 
t(75) = 2.46, p = .016. Simple slope analyses were calculated using the PROCESS macro 
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(Model 1) with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. As shown in Figure 7, self-
affirmation did not significantly affect planning among individuals who rated their goal as 
attainable (1 SD above the mean), b = 0.63, SE = 0.40, t(75) = 1.56, p = .124. However, 
among individuals who rated their goal as scarcely attainable (1 SD below the mean), self-
affirmation decreased planning of further goal pursuit, b = -0.77, SE = 0.33, t(75) = -2.38, p = 
.020. From another perspective, whereas non-affirmed individuals did not base their amount 
of planning on the attainability of their goal, b = -0.25, SE = 0.20, t(75) = -1.24, p = .218, 
affirmed individuals took their goal’s attainability into account, b = 0.45, SE = 0.15, t(75) = 
2.99, p = .004. 
 
 
Figure 7: Individuals’ inclination to plan further goal pursuit as a function of self-
affirmation condition at ±1 SD goal attainability in Study 2. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
In the second regression, we entered condition, standardized goal desirability, and the 
condition by goal desirability interaction to predict planning. The model, R
2 
= .10, F(3, 76) = 
2.69, p = .053, revealed no significant main effect of goal desirability, β = -.03, b = -0.03, SE 
= 0.19, t(75) = -0.16, p = .872, and no main effect of condition, β = -.04, b = -0.10, SE = .27, 
t(75) = -0.36, p = .719. The proposed condition by goal desirability interaction was 
significant, β = .33, b = 0.56, SE = 0.27, t(75) = 2.09, p = .040. As displayed in Figure 8, self-
affirmation did not significantly affect planning among individuals who rated their goal as 
desirable (1 SD above the mean), b = 0.46, SE = 0.41, t(75) = 1.11, p = .269. However, among 
individuals who rated their goal as hardly desirable (1 SD below the mean), self-affirmation 
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tended to decrease planning, b = -0.65, SE = .34, t(75) = -1.90, p = .061. From another 
perspective, whereas non-affirmed individuals did not did not base their amount of planning 
on the desirability of their goal, b = -0.03, SE = 0.18, t(75) = -0.17, p = .864, affirmed 
individuals did, b = 0.52, SE = 0.19, t(75) = 2.77, p = .007.  
 
Figure 8: Individuals’ inclination to plan further goal pursuit as a function of self-
affirmation condition and goal desirability at ±1 SD in Study 2. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
Goal attainability and desirability in the preference for further goal pursuit vs. 
disengagement. We also expected that self-affirmation increases participants’ reliance on 
goal attainability and desirability when it comes to the preference for further goal pursuit 
versus disengagement. In the first regression, condition, standardized goal attainability, and 
their interaction were included to predict the preference in the decision conflict. The model, 
R
2 
= .20, F(3, 75) = 6.11, p = .001, revealed no significant main effect of goal attainability, β 
= .09, b = 1.99, SE = 3.96, t(75) = 0.50, p = .618, and no main effect of condition, β = .12, b = 
4.98, SE = 4.47, t(75) = 1.11, p = .269. The hypothesized condition by attainability interaction 
reached marginal significance, β = .34, b = 8.91, SE = 4.79, t(75) = 1.86, p = .067. Figure 9 
shows that among individuals who rated their goal as attainable (1 SD above the mean), self-
affirmation marginally significantly increased the preference for further goal pursuit, b = 
13.89, SE = 7.92, t(75) = 1.75, p = .084. Self-affirmation did not significantly affect 
individuals’ preference among those who rated their goal as scarcely attainable (1 SD below 
the mean), b = -3.93, SE = 8.66, t(75) = -0.45, p = .651. Whereas control participants did not 
base their current preference on the attainability of their goal, b = 1.99, SE = 5.74, t(75) = 
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0.35, p = .731, self-affirmed participants had a significantly stronger preference for further 
goal pursuit when they perceived their goal as attainable (1 SD above the mean), b = 10.90, 
SE = 3.43, t(75) = 3.18, p = .002.  
 
Figure 9: Individuals’ preference for further goal pursuit versus disengagement as a 
function of self-affirmation condition and goal attainability at ±1 SD in Study 
2. Error bars represent standard errors. 
In the second regression, we entered condition, standardized goal desirability, and 
their interaction to predict individuals’ preference in the decision conflict. The model, R2 = 
.35, F(3, 75) = 13.24, p < .001, revealed a significant main effect of goal desirability, β = .54, 
b = 11.56, SE = 2.87, t(75) = 4.03, p < .001, and no main effect of condition, β = .09, b = 4.01, 
SE = 4.03, t(75) = 0.09, p = .323. Against our expectation, the condition by goal desirability 
interaction was not significant, β = .05, b = 1.45, SE = 4.02, t(75) = .36, p = .719 (see Figure 
10). Participants of the experimental and control condition equally based their preference for 
further goal pursuit versus disengagement on the desirability of their goal.  
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Figure 10: Individuals’ preference for further goal pursuit versus disengagement as a 
function of self-affirmation condition and goal desirability at ±1 SD in Study 
2. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Brief discussion 
Study 2 provided evidence in favor of the hypothesis that self-affirmation helps to 
acknowledge the goal’s motivational features when facing the decision whether to stick to or 
give up a personal goal. We found that self-affirmed, but non-affirmed individuals based the 
extent to which they engaged in planning for their obstructed goal on their appraisals of goal 
desirability and attainability. Likewise, self-affirmed, but not non-affirmed individuals tended 
more towards further goal pursuit (vs. disengagement) the more they perceived their goal as 
attainable. Affirmed individuals also tended more towards further goal pursuit the more they 
perceived their goal as desirable; however, this last interaction was not significant, given that 
also control participants took their goal’s desirability into account.  
Study 3 
The objective of Study 3 was to replicate findings of Study 2 with a revised procedure and 
larger sample size. In Study 2, participants in the control condition had worked on a task that, 
in content, stood out from the remaining study material. To rule out that bifurcation effects 
due to the value affirmation resulted because subjects engaged in a more meaningful exercise, 
Study 3 used another control task. Second, to reduce error variance related to the 
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heterogeneity of goals (e.g., in terms of self-relevance), we investigated action crises in the 
context of one shared goal. We focused on the goal to complete a study degree as a high-level 
goal that often gives rise to doubt, and about which we could be quite certain that goal 
abandonment (i.e., study dropout) would be self-threatening. By cooperating with student 
counselling centers, we reached students who were currently in an action crisis with regard to 
their study goal.  
Method 
Study design and sample. The study followed a one-factorial (self-affirmation vs. no 
self-affirmation) between-subjects design. One hundred seventy-six students (125 women; 
Mage = 24.78 years, SDage = 4.94 years) who currently were in an action crisis with regard to 
their study goal were recruited via counselling centers across Switzerland, online forums 
discussing study dropout, and the department mailing list. They completed the online study 
for partial course credit or monetary compensation. To achieve a sufficiently large sample, 
data were collected in two time periods one year and two months apart. As the difference in 
timing within the academic term could affect the experience of action crisis, we included data 
collection wave as covariate in our analyses. 
Procedure. Goal assessment. An adapted version of the ACRISS-Scale measured 
participants’ level of study-related action crisis (e.g., “I have thought of quitting my studies”, 
1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree, α = .71). Likewise, goal attainability (e.g., 
“Successfully pursuing my studies seems difficult to me”, reverse coded, 1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree, α = .62) and desirability (e.g., “Pursuing my studies is important 
to me”, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree, α = .79) were assessed with reference to the 
study goal (Ghassemi et al., 2017; Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015). A baseline measure of 
the scroll bar anchored at “I will drop out of my studies” (1) and “I will continue my studies” 
(101) queried participants’ baseline preference for further goal pursuit versus disengagement. 
Participants described the difficulties and doubts that caused them to consider study dropout 
before they were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. 
Self-affirmation manipulation. Participants in the self-affirmation condition rank-
ordered 10 values unrelated to academic or intellectual achievement. Then, they wrote an 
essay about how their first-ranked value was important to them and described a situation in 
which that value had made them feel good about themselves (Cohen et al., 2000). Subjects in 
the control condition received a list of 10 points of interest neutral in valence and supposedly 
unrelated to goal pursuit (e.g., train station, grocery store). After rank-ordering points of 
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interest in terms of how frequently participants visited them, they wrote turn-by-turn 
directions from their home to the most frequently visited point. 
Dependent variables. After the mind-wandering exercise and the thought sampling 
described before, participants’ planning was assessed with two items (“I made plans what to 
do to successfully complete my studies”, “I thought about when, how, and where to work for 
my studies”, 1= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree, α = .69). The current preference for 
further goal pursuit versus disengagement was assessed with the scroll bar anchored at “I will 
drop out of my studies” (1) and “I will continue my studies” (101). 
Results 
Hypotheses were tested by means of multiple regressions in SPSS, using the same approach 
as in Study 1, including both two-way and three-way interaction between condition, goal 
attainability, and goal desirability. 
Preliminary analyses. Mean level of action crisis (M = 3.60, SD = 0.61) did not 
significantly differ between conditions (self-affirmation = 1, no self-affirmation = 0), β = -.07, 
b = -0.08, SE = 0.09, t(174) = -0.91, p = .364. Conditions did not differ in goal attainability 
(M = 3.30, SD = 0.74), β = .00, b = 0.00, SE = 0.11, t(174) = -0.03, p = .973, or goal 
desirability (M  = 3.60, SD = 0.72), β = .03, b = 0.05, SE = 0.11, t(174) = 0.45, p = .656. In the 
self-affirmation condition, most participants (53 out of 88; 60%) chose “Social Relationships 
(with Friends, Family, or Partner)” as their top-ranked value. In the control condition, most 
participants (55 out of 88; 63%) wrote directions to the station as the most visited place.  
Goal attainability and desirability in the amount of planning. Condition, 
standardized goal attainability, standardized goal desirability, as well as all two- and three-
way interactions were used as predictors in a multiple regression predicting planning. In 
addition, to control for potential differences between the two data collection periods, we 
included (dummy coded) time of data collection, and its two-way interaction with condition. 
The model, R
2 
= .14, F(9, 166) = 4.13, p < .001, revealed no significant main effect of goal 
attainability, β = -.01, b = -0.01, SE = 0.11, t(166) = -0.09, p = .927, a significant main effect 
of goal desirability, β = .33, b = 0.35, SE = 0.11, t(166) = 3.13, p = .002, and surprisingly, a 
significant main effect for condition, β = .19, b = 0.39, SE = 0.17, t(166) = 2.31, p = .022, 
suggesting that affirmed (vs. non-affirmed) individuals planned significantly more on how to 
best pursue their study degree. In the second period of data collection, individuals planned 
significantly more than in the first data collection period, β = .24, b = 0.63, SE = 0.25, t(166) 
= 2.48, p = .014. There was some evidence that self-affirmation increased planning especially 
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among participants recruited in the first period, β = -.18, b = -0.62, SE = 0.37, t(166) = -1.70, 
p = .091. None of the interactions was significant (all ts < 1.15). 
Goal attainability and desirability in the preference for further goal pursuit vs. 
disengagement. To predict individuals’ preference for the continuation versus termination of 
their studies, we used the same predictors described above. Additionally, we included 
individuals’ baseline preference in the model, R2 = .79, F(10, 165) = 63.78, p < .001. Findings 
showed that individuals’ preference before the experimental manipulation strongly predicted 
their preference after the manipulation, β = .82, b = 10.88, SE = 1.04, t(165) = 20.05, p < .001. 
Beyond that, there was a marginal significant main effect for condition, β = .07, b = 3.64, SE 
= 2.08, t(165) = 1.76, p = .080, suggesting that affirmed individuals tended to favor the option 
of continuing their studies more than non-affirmed individuals. The attainability of the study 
goal had a significant positive effect, β = .12, b = 3.17, SE = 1.40, t(165) = 2.26, p = .025, 
whereas the study goal’s desirability did not, β = .06, b = 1.62, SE = 1.37, t(165) = 1.19, p = 
.238. There was no effect of data collection period, and none of the interactions was 
significant (all ts < 1). 
Brief discussion 
In Study 3, we did not find support in favor of our hypothesis, but rather found that affirmed 
(vs. performing a control task) students were more inclined to hold on to their goal to 
complete their study degree. On the on hand, this may be interpreted as evidence that self-
affirmation has an effect in the action crisis; on the other hand, given the inconsistency of 
findings, this may also point to random error. As the goal to complete a study degree is a 
particularly high-level and defining one for most students, it could be speculated that the 
affirmation of an unrelated cherished value boosted individuals’ confidence to go on, but, 
given its high relevance, rarely directed individuals to disengagement. As a methodologically 
closer replication of Study 2, in Study 4, we returned to the use of idiographic personal goals. 
Study 4 
Apart from going back to the study of idiographic goals, we used an even larger and more 
heterogeneous sample (with regard to sex, age, employment) in a further attempt to replicate 
findings of Study 2. An additional objective of Study 4 was to test whether goal appraisals 
changed in response to the value affirmation. Throughout this paper, we have argued that 
affirmed individuals incorporate their goal’s attainability and desirability to a stronger extent, 
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while not addressing the possibility that self-affirmation might change appraisals of goal 
attainability and desirability. To answer this question, we assessed goal appraisals again after 
the experimental manipulation. To avoid potential influences resulting from a renewed 
assessment, we included the second measurement as additional experimental factor.  
Method 
Study design and sample. The study followed a 2 (self-affirmation vs. no self-
affirmation) x 2 (repeated assessment vs. no repeated assessment of goal characteristics) 
between-subjects design, and was completed by 209 individuals recruited by an online panel 
provider located in Germany. Thirteen participants were excluded because they did not 
provide answers in open text format, e.g., the experimental manipulation, or reported not 
having an appropriate goal (2 participants). Thus, analyses are based on 196 participants (101 
women; Mage = 23.7 years, SDage = 3.75 years), of which 41.3% were employed, 35.2% were 
students, and 23.5% reported doing something else (e.g., raising a child). 
Procedure. Goal assessment. After subjects had named a personal goal about which 
they were in an action crisis, they described in a written essay why they originally had 
decided to pursue the goal, what kind of difficulties they confronted in goal striving, and what 
giving up the goal would mean to them. Action crisis (α = .80), goal attainability (baseline: α 
= .59), goal desirability (baseline: α = .88), and the baseline preference for further goal pursuit 
versus disengagement were assessed with the previously described measures.  
Self-affirmation manipulation. The experimental manipulation was the same as in 
Study 3. 
Dependent variables. After the experimental manipulation, participants were asked to 
think about their goal. Subsequently, they reported the thoughts that had come to their mind 
with the previously described procedure. To analyze whether the value affirmation led to 
changes in goal appraisals, goal desirability and attainability were once again assessed among 
participants randomly allocated to the repeated assessment condition. Participants’ 
spontaneous inclination to plan the further pursuit of their goal was assessed with two items 
(“I make plans on how to successfully attain this goal”, “I think about when, how, and where 
to implement this goal”, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree, α = .77). Furthermore, 
participants rated on the scroll bar anchored at “I will disengage from this goal” (1) and “I 
will continue the pursuit of this goal” (101) their preference for either disengagement or 
persistence.  
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Results 
Preliminary analyses. Mean levels of action crisis (M = 3.11, SD = 0.77) did not 
significantly differ between conditions (self-affirmation = 1, no self-affirmation = 0), β = .02, 
b = 0.03, SE = 0.11, t(196) = 0.26, p = .798. Conditions also did not differ in baseline goal 
attainability (M  = 3.28, SD = 0.77), β = .05, b = 0.08, SE = 0.11, t(196) = 0.72, p = .475, or 
baseline goal desirability (M  = 4.17, SD = 0.79), β = .10, b = 0.16, SE = 0.12, t(196) = 1.40, p 
= .162. Most participants (39 out of 94; 42%) in the self-affirmation condition wrote about the 
importance of “Social Relationships (with Friends, Family, or Partner”). In the control 
condition, most participants (63 out of 104; 60%) described directions to the nearby grocery 
store as the most frequently visited point of interest.  
Goal appraisals. To analyze whether individuals change their goal appraisal in 
response to a value affirmation, we conducted two mixed-model ANOVAs with goal 
attainability (goal desirability, respectively) as repeated factor (before vs. after the 
experimental manipulation) and self-affirmation as between-subjects factor. The first analysis 
showed that goal attainability was not significantly different before and after the experimental 
manipulation, F(1,95) = 1.99, p = .162, partial η2  = .02, and condition did not moderate the 
effect, F(1,95) = 0.65, p = .421, partial η2  = .01. The second analysis revealed that goal 
desirability before and after the manipulation was not significantly different, F(1,95) = 1.55, p 
= .216, partial η2  = .02. Condition did not moderate the effect, F(1,95) = 0.01, p = .929, 
partial η2 < .01. Thus, the study did not provide any reason to assume that the value 
affirmation affected individuals’ appraisal of goal attainability and desirability.  
Goal attainability and desirability in the amount of planning. We ran a multiple 
regression analysis to test the hypothesis that in an action crisis, people who have affirmed the 
self particularly plan further goal pursuit if they regard their goal as desirable and attainable, 
whereas non-affirmed individuals consider the impact of these goal characteristics to a lesser 
extent. The model revealed, R
2 
= .33, F(7,188) = 13.36, p < .001, that individuals who 
perceived their goal as more desirable, β = .41, b = 0.34, SE = 0.07, t(188) = 4.77, p < .001, or 
more attainable, β = .28, b = 0.23, SE = 0.07, t(188) = 3.42, p = .001, planned significantly 
more on how to achieve their goal. There was no main effect of self-affirmation, and none of 
the two-way interactions was significant (all ts < 1). However, the three-way interaction 
between self-affirmation, goal attainability, and goal desirability was significant, β = .22, b = 
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0.34, SE = 0.12, t(188) = 2.91, p = .004.
9
 Using the PROCESS macro (Model 3 with 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors), we could tell that among individuals who had 
performed a control task, goal attainability significantly predicted the amount of planning if 
the goal was not very desirable (1 SD below the mean), b = 0.26, SE = 0.13, t(188) = 2.04, p = 
.042, and marginally significantly predicted planning if the goal was desirable (1 SD above 
the mean), b = 0.20, SE = 0.11, t(188) = 1.78, p = .077 (see Figure 11). Among affirmed 
individuals, goal attainability did not predict planning if the goal was scarcely desirable (1 SD 
below the mean), b = -0.14, SE = 0.18, t(188) = -0.79, p = .430, but significantly predicted 
planning if the goal was desirable (1 SD above the mean), b = 0.49, SE = 0.16, t(188) = 3.05, 
p = .003. From another perspective, among control participants, goal desirability significantly 
predicted planning irrespective of whether the goal was perceived as scarcely attainable (1 SD 
below the mean), b = 0.36, SE = 0.12, t(188) = 3.12, p = .002, or attainable (1 SD above the 
mean), b = 0.31, SE = 0.13, t(188) = 2.38, p = .018. Among affirmed individuals, goal 
desirability only predicted planning if the goal was attainable (1 SD above the mean), b = 
0.56, SE = 0.14, t(188) = 3.94, p < .001, but not if the goal was scarcely attainable (1 SD 
below the mean), b = -0.07, SE = 0.16, t(188) = -0.45, p = .651. Contra-intuitively to these 
findings, among individuals who perceived their goal as both attainable and desirable (1 SD 
above the mean), self-affirmation did not significantly increase planning, b = 0.20, SE = 0.21, 
t(188) = 0.95, p = .345, but among individuals who regarded their goal as scarcely desirable 
and attainable there was a marginally significant effect for self-affirmation increasing 
planning (1 SD below the mean), b = 0.49, SE = 0.25, t(188) = 1.94, p = .054. Given that this 
finding was theory-inconsistent, not significant on the 5% level, and inconsistent with the 
remaining results, it is not discussed further. 
                                                 
9
 When including the experimental factor whether individuals repeatedly reported on their goal’s 
features as a covariate, there was neither a significant main effect, nor a significant interaction with 
self-affirmation condition. Moreover, results were completely unchanged. For parsimonity, we did not 
include the experimental factor as covariate in the model reported. 
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Figure 11: Individuals’ inclination to plan further goal pursuit as a function of self-
affirmation condition, goal desirability at ±1 SD, and goal attainability at ±1 
SD in Study 4. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Goal attainability and desirability in the preference for further goal pursuit vs. 
disengagement. The multiple regression analysis predicting individuals’ preference for 
further persistence (vs. disengagement) revealed a multivariate outlier whose residual 
exceeded 7 standard deviations and which we excluded. The model, R
2 
= .85, F(8,186) = 
126.95, p < .001, showed that individuals’ baseline preference in the decision conflict 
strongly predicted their preference after the experimental manipulation, β = .87, b = 18.54, SE 
= 0.79, t(186) = 23.37, p < .001. The goal’s desirability, β < .001, b = -0.01, SE = 0.98, t(186) 
= -0.01, p = .994, and attainability, β = .03, b = -0.66, SE = 0.87, t(186) = 0.76, p = .450, were 
above that no significant predictors. There was no main effect of condition, β = -.02, b = -
0.77, SE = 1.26, t(186) = -0.61, p = .545. Neither the condition by attainability interaction, β = 
-.01, b = -0.20, SE = 1.37, t(186) = -0.15, p = .885, the condition by desirability interaction, β 
= .05, b = 1.71, SE = 1.34, t(186) = 1.28, p = .204, nor the desirability by attainability 
interaction, β = -.05, b = -1.06, SE = 0.71, t(186) = -1.49, p = .139, were significant. However, 
there was a significant three-way interaction between self-affirmation condition, goal 
desirability, and goal attainability, β = .08, b = 3.01, SE = 1.49, t(186) = 2.02, p = .045 10.  
Figure 11 shows that among individuals in the control condition, goal desirability did 
not significantly predict the preference for further goal pursuit irrespective if the goal was 
scarcely attainable (1 SD below the mean), b = 1.10, SE = 1.06, t(186) = 1.04, p = .301, or 
attainable (1 SD above the mean), b = -1.11, SE = 1.43, t(186) = -0.78, p = .438. Among 
                                                 
10
 When including the second experimental factor as a covariate, there was neither a significant main 
effect, nor a significant interaction with self-affirmation condition. However, the three-way interaction 
dropped to p = .055. As the pattern of results remained stable, we did not include the experimental 
factor as covariate in the model reported. 
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affirmed individuals, goal desirability did not increase the preference for further goal pursuit 
if the goal was scarcely attainable (1 SD below the mean), b = -0.27, SE = 1.64, t(186) = -
0.16, p = .872, but did if the goal was perceived as attainable (1 SD above the mean), b = 
3.79, SE = 1.84, t(186) = 2.07, p = .040. From another perspective, among non-affirmed 
participants, goal attainability did not significantly predict the preference for further goal 
pursuit irrespective of whether the goal was scarcely desirable (1 SD below the mean), b = 
1.74, SE = 1.12, t(186) = 1.56, p = .121, or desirable (1 SD above the mean), b = -0.40, SE = 
1.15, t(186) = -0.35, p = .727. On the contrary, among self-affirmed individuals, goal 
attainability did not affect the preference for further goal pursuit if the goal was scarcely 
desirable (1 SD below the mean), b = -1.52, SE = 2.06, t(186) = -0.74, p = .463, but tended to 
increase the preference for further goal pursuit if the goal was desirable (1 SD above the 
mean), b = 2.42, SE = 1.33, t(186) = 1.82, p = .071. Among individuals who regarded their 
goal as not very desirable and attainable (1 SD below the mean), self-affirmation did not 
affect individuals’ preference for further goal pursuit vs. disengagement, b = 0.75, SE = 3.06, 
t(186) = 0.25, p = .806; however, among individuals who regarded their goal as both desirable 
and attainable (1 SD above the mean), self-affirmation significantly increased individuals’ 
orientation towards further goal pursuit, b = 3.73, SE = 1.67, t(186) = 2.23, p = .027. 
 
 
Figure 12: Individuals’ preference for further goal pursuit versus disengagement as a 
function of self-affirmation condition, goal desirability at ±1 SD, and goal 
attainability at ±1 SD in Study 4. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Brief discussion 
Study 4 suggests that self-affirmation promotes the incorporation of goal desirability and 
attainability in the decision whether to hold on to or withdraw from an obstructed goal. It did 
not seem as if self-affirmation alters individuals’ appraisals of goal desirability and 
attainability; rather, affirmed individuals used the goal’s motivational characteristics to a 
stronger extent. Specifically, self-affirmed individuals acknowledged levels of goal 
desirability in their amount of planning when high goal attainability was given (and vice 
versa), whereas non-affirmed individuals also planned for goal pursuit if either goal 
desirability or attainability were missing. Analogous results emerged for the preference for 
further goal pursuit versus disengagement. Unexpectedly, self-affirmation did not increase 
planning among individuals who regarded their goal as both desirable and attainable. This 
may be due to the fact that planning in this subgroup was already high without self-
affirmation, leaving not much space for further increase. For individuals in the control 
condition with goal desirability and attainability one standard deviation above the mean, 
planning was at the upper end of the five-point response scale (ŷ = 4.37), indicating a ceiling 
effect. With regard to the preference for further goal pursuit (vs. disengagement), there was no 
ceiling effect for control participants with high levels of goal desirability and attainability (ŷ = 
83.42). Accordingly, we found that self-affirmation, more than a control task, pushed 
individuals toward goal pursuit if their goal was both desirable and attainable. As we found 
somewhat different results for the two outcome variables, future research should investigate 
whether self-affirmation likewise decreases intentions to pursue a goal that is hardly desirable 
or attainable and increases intentions to pursue a goal that is desirable or attainable; 
theoretically, we had expected both effects. 
Discussion 
People often perceive their worth as contingent on whether they succeed in the pursuit of their 
goals (e.g., completing a study degree, staying in a relationship). In the action crisis, the 
achievement of a personal standard is at risk (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013), and individuals 
find themselves in the ambiguous situation to judge whether it is worth to keep up the struggle 
or they will be better off without the goal. In this research, we tested whether reminding 
individuals of their general worth might give them the required equanimity to devote their 
attentional resources to decision-relevant information and process it impartially (Howell 
& Shepperd, 2012; Klein & Harris, 2009; Legault et al., 2012). Building on the finding that 
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self-affirmation heightens reliance on self-relevant experiences, even if negative (Vohs et al., 
2013), we postulated that affirmed more than non-affirmed individuals would acknowledge 
the informative value of their goal’s motivational characteristics when it comes to a) the 
amount of planning and b) the question whether to stick to or abandon the goal. 
Four experiments conducted to test this hypothesis yielded mixed results. Study 2 and 
4 provided supportive evidence: Affirmed more than non-affirmed individuals based their 
amount of planning for further goal pursuit and their preference for further goal pursuit (vs. 
disengagement) on the attainability and desirability they ascribed to their goal. We might have 
concluded from this that self-affirmation helps to align one’s motivation with relevant goal 
characteristics (Atkinson, 1964; Feather, 1982; Vroom, 1964), hadn’t the finding failed to 
replicate in two other studies, where self-affirmation either did not have an effect (Study 1) or 
oriented individuals toward the further pursuit of their goal, irrespective of its motivational 
features (Study 3).  
The inconsistency of findings raises the question in what respect studies may have 
diverged. The most obvious difference between studies was the value-related control task in 
Study 1 and the investigation of the effects within the context of one shared goal in Study 3. 
The goal to complete a study degree is a particularly important and self-relevant one with life-
organizing properties (Koletzko, Herrmann, & Brandstätter, 2015) that may have diverged 
from the average of goals participants of the remaining studies stated. It might also be 
speculated that the effects of self-affirmation in an action crisis depend not only on the goal’s 
desirability and attainability, but on additional variables. For instance, the amount of self-
threat associated with an action crisis may be relevant, given that self-affirmation is mostly 
examined for its threat-repairing function (Critcher et al., 2010). While we demonstrated in 
previous research that an action crisis is self-threatening (Ghassemi & Brandstätter, in 
preparation), we did not test moderations with self-threat. 
It also should be noted that although our hypothesis fits in with previous findings, it is 
a step ahead of what has been verified empirically. Previous tests of altered processing of 
threatening information as a result of self-affirmation were conducted in much less complex 
situations. For instance, participants were presented with information that was of high or low 
quality; this difference was very easy to see (Brinol et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2011). The 
critical test was to what extent information quality would be incorporated in individuals’ 
response, depending on their status of affirmation. Even though researchers have suggested 
that self-affirmation improves the elaboration of threatening information (Brinol et al., 2007; 
Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004; Klein & Harris, 2009) and helps to discriminate what is 
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primary from what is secondary (Wakslak & Trope, 2009), based on how studies were 
conducted, an alternative interpretation might be that self-affirmation increased individuals’ 
motivation to rely on information that everybody knew to be relevant.  
Unlike in previous investigations, we expected affirmed individuals to make better use 
of their own decision relevant goal appraisals, specifically, goal desirability and attainability. 
Therewith, affirmed participants had in our studies to refer to their own appraisals rather than 
information presented to them, and to select these appraisals out of a wealth of other 
information. Our hypothesis both implied that affirmed individuals would recognize the 
goal’s desirability and attainability as decision relevant and that they would be sufficiently 
motivated to rely on these features as opposed to secondary (e.g., self-justification) concerns. 
However, maybe the identification of the goal characteristics as relevant did not reliably 
work. First, it is possible that self-affirmation simply does not facilitate the identification of 
relevant information when faced with information overload. Second, even if self-affirmation 
helps to identify relevant information, it might be information that is subjectively relevant. 
Notwithstanding researchers’ view that goal desirability and attainability are crucial factors in 
goal setting (Atkinson, 1964; Feather, 1982; Vroom, 1964), this assumption is not necessarily 
held by everyone (or other factors are seen as relevant, too). Counter to this argument, it 
seemed that participants regarded the goal’s desirability and attainability as relevant, given 
that, overall, these goal characteristics were positively related to planning and the preference 
for further goal pursuit.  
In this research, we were interested in finding an intervention for alleviating the action 
crisis, why we studied the effects of self-affirmation in the realm of personal goals. While this 
approach heightens external validity, inconclusive findings point to the absence of the effect 
or too much heterogeneity involved in the methodological approach. Heterogeneity may stem 
from the circumstance that goal pursuits and, hence, difficulties leading to an action crisis 
may vary. Likewise, the effects of self-affirmation seem to be context-specific, and few 
mediators could be verified across domains and studies (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). If both 
difficulties associated with an action crisis and the operation of self-affirmation varies widely, 
it becomes difficult to identify replicating effects. 
Consequently, future studies might benefit from more experimental control. We would 
suggest to study the effects of self-affirmation in the context of decisional conflicts, what has, 
to our knowledge, not been done before. An investigation of self-affirmation in this context 
might be interesting as having to make a decision with far-reaching consequences can be self-
threatening (Diederich, 2003; Janis & Mann 1976; Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992; 
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Zeelenberg, 1999). The advantage of decision making as study context is that all participants 
can be provided with the same information, and that desirability and attainability of given 
options can be varied experimentally. What, then, should be studied is whether self-
affirmation increases individuals’ ability to rely on primary and neglect secondary 
information (cf. Wakslak & Trope, 2009) when faced with information overload. Second, it 
should be studied whether self-affirmation affects the motives behind information search and 
processing. Affirmed (vs. non-affirmed) people should rely more on information that serves 
optimal decision making, even if inconsistent with a personal preference, and less on 
information that serves self-justification (cf. Sivanathan et al., 2008). 
To identify strategies that may be of benefit for resolving the action crisis, studies may 
assess individuals’ spontaneously applied strategies and their outcomes (e.g., time to 
resolution of action crisis, well-being). A first longitudinal study suggests that reminding 
oneself of cherished life domains is a strategy that people apply when confronting difficulty in 
the pursuit of a personal goal. Students (n = 76) who reported having experienced doubts with 
respect to their studies and having considered study dropout at least once in their student life 
were asked what they typically did in these situations. Descriptive statistics of the item 
assessing spontaneous self-affirmation (“In these situations, I think of something positive in 
my life (e.g., my friends, family, or hobbies) to regain strength”, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree) suggest that self-affirmation is a strategy that individuals apply (M = 5.01, SD 
= 1.31), also when compared with conventional strategies (seeking advice from others: M = 
4.17, SD = 1.73; ruminating: 4.78, SD = 1.43). Interestingly, individuals who currently 
experienced more severe action crisis in their studies and used relatively more self-affirmation 
than their peers reported higher life-satisfaction (action crisis x self-affirmation: β = .24, b = 
0.22, SE = 0.08, t(70) = 2.76, p = .007), controlling for life satisfaction at the prior 
measurement point. Thus, maybe self-affirmation is positively linked to another beneficial 
outcome when experiencing an action crisis.  
The here presented studies oblige to a need that has been expressed in the field of goal 
disengagement, where researchers have pointed to the “significance of the development of 
interventions aimed at preventing and overcoming action crises” (Brandstätter & Herrmann, 
in press, p. 31). Unfortunately, they did not offer conclusive evidence. Yet, this should not 
discourage researchers to try to find an answer to one of the most pressing questions in 
research on the action crisis: the way this critical phase can be overcome. 
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General Discussion  
Thinking about goal disengagement, two questions caught my interest: First, how do people 
disengage from a goal they once highly valued and pursued well-intentioned? Second, how 
can the decisional conflict between further goal pursuit and disengagement be resolved? 
Starting from the action crisis, my research addressed both of these questions. Investigating 
the longer-term processes in real-life goal striving, Part I and II allow conclusions about the 
disengagement process. Studying the action crisis from a perspective of decisional conflict, 
Part III and IV give first answers to the question how it can be resolved. What can be 
concluded from this research and what should be addressed in future investigations will be 
outlined in the following. 
Part I and II: Integration of findings and open questions 
Before individuals abandon a personal goal, a devaluation of its desirability and attainability 
takes place. This and previous research (Brandstätter et al., 2013) consistently show that the 
devaluation of the goal’s motivational features is predicted by an action crisis. The analysis of 
trajectories of students who dropped out of their studies clarifies that the decrease in goal 
desirability and attainability, predicted by the experience of action crisis, does not stop until 
individuals finally abandon their goal.  
The analysis of temporal trajectories further revealed that the action crisis becomes 
more and more intense until goal abandonment. This adds to previous knowledge that the 
action crisis increases the probability of goal abandonment, and more severe action crises 
predict earlier goal abandonment (Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015). The present research 
shows for the first time that an increase in action crisis is predicted by low goal attainability. 
This finding demonstrates the relevance of insufficient outcome expectancies for motivation 
also in the course of ongoing goal striving, providing empirical support for a previously made 
assumption (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1982; Jostmann & Koole, 
2009; Wrosch et al., 2013). Based on expectancy-value models of motivation (Atkinson, 
1964; Feather, 1992; Vroom, 1964), we would have expected that also insufficient goal 
desirability predicts an increase in action crisis over time, however, did not find it in the 
studied goal context. The goal of completing a study degree is a highly valued and important 
one (Koletzko et al., 2015), implying that goal desirability might not have fallen below the 
necessary threshold to account for an increase in action crisis. Future studies in other goal 
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domains are needed to clarify whether this finding can be generalized. At present, it can be 
concluded that even in instances in which the action crisis is predicted by low goal 
attainability, people devalue the goal’s attainability, but also (and even more) its desirability. 
Theoretical and empirical approaches to goal disengagement share the view that 
disengaging from a personal goal is linked to depressive symptoms and negative affect 
(Brandstätter et al., 2013; Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Klinger, 1975; Wrosch et al., 
2003). However, evidently, at some point, individuals usually have recovered from their loss 
and continue their lives without lasting impairments of well-being (Brandtstädter 
& Rothermund, 2002; Heckhausen et al., 2010; Taylor, 1983). This raises the question what is 
needed for depression to lift. One could think of restored well-being as an indication of 
disengagement being complete. Researchers have asserted that complete disengagement not 
only means to stop pursuing a goal, but also detach from it emotionally (Brandtstädter 
& Rothermund, 2002; Heckhausen et al., 2010; Wrosch et al., 2003). 
One strategy to detach from a goal is to distance oneself from it, which brings us back 
to the devaluation of goal desirability. It includes the reappraisal that the goal is actually not 
that desirable or at least not essential for fulfillment and happiness (Heckhausen et al., 2010). 
The present research suggests that a devaluation of the goal’s desirability may be adaptive for 
well-being. In the here reported studies, there was some evidence that a decrease in goal 
desirability is related to an increase in life satisfaction in situations in which goal termination 
is under consideration (i.e., the action crisis) or actually imminent. Apart from the need of 
replication, two questions remain to be addressed. First, does the change in goal desirability 
(and attainability) occur automatically or is it intentional to some extent? Both propositions 
have been made (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Heckhausen et al., 2010). Second, does 
devaluing a goal’s desirability (under some circumstances) also has its costs? I wonder to 
what extent downgrading a goal that originally was of subjective value may mar the view of 
one’s own past and foster life regrets (“Why did I waste my time on this goal?”). Thus, the 
strategy’s long-term, unconditional benefit still remains to be verified. Additionally, 
alternative strategies should be studied that contribute to emotional relinquishment and the 
maintenance of well-being in the face of goal failure. 
The here reported findings suggest that the action crisis also is related to change on the 
level of individuals’ overt goal striving and its measurable outcomes. Methodologically 
advancing previous investigations (Brandstätter et al., 2013; Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015), 
this research shows that impairments in goal-related performance result from an action crisis. 
That these impairments were found to spill over to an unrelated task worked on right after an 
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action crisis was experienced suggests that motivational conflict in the pursuit of a (high-
level) goal might have more large-scale implications for the individuals’ goal system; 
deliberation about the costs and benefits of the obstructed goal may be easily instigated (e.g., 
by short reminders of the goal) and distract a person from his/her current activity. Moreover, 
as has been argued for the change in goal appraisals, decreasing performance might be more 
than a mere byproduct of goal disengagement. We have pointed out that detriments in goal-
related performance may provide the objective ground to conclude that it is reasonable to 
abandon the goal. Therewith, performance impairments instigated by the action crisis had to 
be considered as integral part of the disengagement process itself. 
In sum, this research strengthens the perspective that the goal disengagement is shaped 
by processes on various levels, some of which were object of this research. Figure 13 
illustrates processes assumed to be involved in goal disengagement, with making no claims on 
completeness.  
 
 
 
Figure 13: Assumed trajectories of different variables within the goal disengagement 
process. 
Note. T (in T-1 to T-11) = time before goal abandonment. Solid lines represent mean 
trajectories of students who drop out of their studies in Study 2 of Part I. Dashed lines are 
theoretically assumed processes which are not data-based.  
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Future research should continue to investigate how the multiple “levels” displayed in 
Figure 13 are connected. For instance, it might be assumed that low performance in goal 
striving is reflected in subjective appraisals of low goal attainability, which may predict an 
increase in action crisis over time. An action crisis, in turn, predicts a devaluation of the 
goal’s desirability and attainability as well as further performance impairments, which might 
translate into even lower goal attainability. This cycle may repeat itself until the point where 
individuals finally stop pursuing the goal and have detached from it emotionally, that is, 
where disengagement is complete. To note, the here reported studies did not test underlying 
processes. In other words, even though theoretical assumptions were made, we do not know 
yet how the action crisis predicts a devaluation of the goal’s features, how it results in 
performance impairments, and what psychological mechanisms explain that low goal 
attainability predicts an increase in action crisis over time. To investigate these underlying 
processes will be an endeavor for future research. 
Furthermore, one could easily think of additional processes involved in goal 
disengagement. It might be interesting to study trajectories of negative affect or depressive 
symptoms and their relation to other processes involved in goal disengagement. Several 
theories assign functional value to depression within the goal disengagement process 
(Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Klinger, 1975; Nesse, 2000), given that decreased 
interest in incentives (cf. relinquishment of goal commitment) and loss of energy (cf. 
withdrawal of behavioral efforts) are defining features of depression (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Based on a phenomenon known as depressive realism, denoting that, in 
some situations, worldviews of depressed individuals are more realistic than those of their 
non-depressed counterparts (Alloy & Abramson, 1988), it may be asked to what extent 
depression has a role in the devaluation of the goal in timely succession of the action crisis, 
and, further, whether this change in goal appraisals builds the basis for depression to lift. This 
reasoning would transfer Wrosch and Miller’s (2009) reasoning to an actual episode of 
disengagement from a specific goal (to repeat, they found that girls with higher levels of 
baseline depressive symptoms over time improved their goal disengagement capacities to a 
greater extent, which, in turn, was related to a reduction of depressive symptomatology). 
Somewhat counteracting this reasoning, in a previous study, higher levels of action crisis in 
personal goals predicted lower subjective goal attainability at the following measurement 
point even when negative affect at the prior measurement point was controlled (Brandstätter 
et al., 2013).  
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Another interesting development may be expected with respect to individuals’ 
appraisal of alternatives to the obstructed goal. Within the context of romantic relationships it 
is known that over time and with increasing relationship commitment, perceptions of 
alternative partners become increasingly unfavorable (Johnson & Rusbult, 1989), fully in line 
with mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 2012). In a longitudinal study, this tendency was found to be 
more pronounced among individuals in stable relationships, while among individuals who 
later broke up, appraisals of alternative partners became more positive over time. The authors 
noted that it had to be asked “whether the observed findings resulted from devaluation of 
alternatives by highly committed persons or from enhancement by the less committed” 
(Johnson & Rusbult, 1989, p. 979). Based on current knowledge, it seems highly conceivable 
that an action crisis predicts an increasing desirability of alternative goals. Maybe the 
devaluation of the obstructed goal is even a precondition for alternatives to be taken into 
account, following the principle “Even if the grass is greener on the other side of the fence, 
happy gardeners will be less likely to notice” (Miller, 1997, p. 758). Borrowing a procedure 
applied in previous research (Miller, 1997), one might design a study in which participants in 
a committed relationship are presented with pictures of alternative partners (vs. equally 
attractive persons who are ineligible as partner). Behavioral attentiveness to pictures (i.e., 
seconds spent looking at them) and self-reported desirability of alternative partners might be 
positively correlated with action crisis severity in and subjective desirability of one’s current 
relationship, and these measures might predict the probability of later break-up. In sum, in 
light of the relevance that has been attributed to goal reengagement for well-being (Wrosch et 
al., 2013), the role of alternative goals merits further attention. 
To date, not much is known about when individuals stop pursuing their goals, and 
whether the multiple processes involved in goal disengagement are of similar predictive value 
for behavioral and emotional disengagement. For instance, it might be hypothesized that a 
decrease in goal desirability mostly predicts emotional disengagement, while a decrease in 
goal attainability mostly predicts behavioral disengagement. It could also be hypothesized that 
emotional disengagement only is complete when the desirability of the goal has decreased 
and, additionally, desirable alternatives have entered individuals’ mind (cf. Wrosch et al., 
2013). With regard to highly valued goals, (some) individuals may only be able to cease their 
efforts when negative affect in relation to the goal has reached a certain threshold. Future 
research should examine which moderators (related the person, goal, or situation) influence 
how long an action crisis prevails and under what conditions it results in goal abandonment 
(Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015). 
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Finally, not much is known about the micro-dynamics of the experience of action 
crisis (i.e., doubt, disengagement impulses) on a day-to-day basis. The proposition has been 
made that the dilemma between persistence and disengagement may be manifested in 
“wavering between holding on and letting go” (Brandtstädter & Renner, 2002, p. 123), or, in 
other words, fluctuating levels of action crisis. An empirical investigation of the amplitudes of 
an action crisis depending on experiences in goal striving (e.g., failure and success) would be 
of interest for a better understanding of the goal disengagement process. 
Part III and IV: Integration of findings and open questions 
Part I and II of this research focus on how the action crisis fits into the disengagement 
process. The perspective this research takes can be compared to that of a bird’s eye, covering 
an extended time-span. However, as described before, the action crisis does not inevitably 
lead to goal abandonment (Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press). In the first place, it is an 
intrapsychic conflict between persistence and disengagement, in which the individual weighs 
the costs and benefits of both alternatives (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). Due to its 
subjective aversiveness, it can be assumed that individuals will be motivated to overcome this 
conflict timely. Researchers have identified the investigation of interventions that help to 
resolve the action crisis in either the direction of continued goal pursuit or disengagement, 
depending on the characteristics of the situation, as an important avenue for further research 
(Brandstätter & Herrmann, in press; Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015).  
The identification of interventions to the action crisis requires some diagnosis of the 
difficulty associated with it. Part III did so by testing the assumption that experiencing an 
action crisis is self-threatening. While the decision whether or not to continue a personal goal 
arguably is difficult in its own, it may be complicated by the fact that people do not make it 
independently from their self. Findings of Part III suggest that individuals’ self-evaluation and 
affective experience is buffered by reflecting on an action crisis (vs. unobstructed goal 
striving), providing support for the hypothesis. An analysis of the essays participants had 
written suggests that difficulties associated with an action crisis are diverse: Participants 
mentioned as difficult failure experiences in goal pursuit, negative (self-)regard related to 
abandoning the goal, the imminent loss of a valued end, and the risk of making a decision 
they will later regret. Thus, several phenomena seem to concur that were to date addressed in 
separate strands of research: failure experiences in goal striving (Carver & Scheier, 1990), the 
need for self- and external justification in decisions about persistence and disengagement 
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(Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1981; Zhang & Baumeister, 2006), the relevance of goals for identity 
and well-being and the resulting difficulty of disengagement (Brunstein, 1993; Emmons, 
2003; Wrosch et al., 2003), and psychological stress associated with decisional conflicts 
(Janis & Mann, 1967; van Harreveld et al., 2009).  
From previous research it is known that self-threat often has maladaptive 
consequences (Steele, 1988; Cohen & Sherman, 2014). Studies have shown that in situations 
that share similarities with the action crisis (i.e., failure on a self-initiated course of action) 
people stubbornly persist instead of ending the failing action (Brockner, 1992). This sacrifice 
in decisional accuracy was explained with individuals’ need for self-justification, in other 
words, their motivation to mitigate self-threat (Zhang & Baumeister, 2006). Threat has also 
been discussed to be associated with constrictions in information processing and a loss of 
sight on what is essential (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). Thus, feeling threatened may get in the 
way of a well-reasoned resolution of the action crisis.  
Reversely, a strategy that counteracts self-threat might heighten decisional accuracy 
and reduce individuals’ motivation to misuse decisions about persistence and disengagement 
for self-justification (Simonson & Staw, 1992). Decisional accuracy seems particularly 
important given that a major challenge in real-life goal striving lies in accurately 
discriminating situations with potential for success from situations doomed to failure 
(Emmons, 2003; Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1982; Lench & Levine, 2008; Simonson 
& Staw, 1992; Wrosch et al., 2003). Based on these considerations, in Part IV, we tested 
whether self-affirmation (Steele, 1988), a strategy known to alleviate self-threat (Cohen 
& Sherman, 2014), could be of use in an action crisis, and found mixed results. Two studies 
provided supportive evidence that the affirmation of an independent value helps individuals to 
align their preference for goal pursuit or disengagement on the motivational features of their 
goal, its desirability and attainability. However, in two other studies, this finding failed to 
replicate, for which potential explanations were offered in the discussion of Part IV; mostly 
they can be subsumed under the heterogeneity of action crises as well as the context-
specificity of self-affirmation effects.  
Integrating Part III and IV, I would like to discuss a further limitation. Part III of this 
research was devoted to the investigation whether or not the action crisis may be self-
threatening. However, it did not investigate the consequences of such an experience of self-
threat. Even though, based on previous research, it seems plausible to assume that feeling 
threatened has negative consequences, this proposition has not been empirically verified in an 
action crisis. In future research, it should be investigated if and under what circumstances 
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individuals suffer from reduced clarity in the action crisis and the subjective difficulty to 
discriminate between what is primary and what is secondary – an experience known as 
hypervigilance (Janis & Mann, 1967). Furthermore, it might be insightful if and under what 
conditions an action crisis leads to entrapment. In the context of personal goals, an adapted 
operationalization of entrapment had to be found, which might be a longer time until the 
person gives up. 
Following from the heterogeneity of personal goals, it can be assumed that in specific 
action crises, some difficulties will be more paramount than others. Our proposition was that 
self-affirmation changes how decision-relevant information is processed, specifically, that it 
helps people to align their intentions to the circumstances they encounter in goal pursuit. 
However, it may be that only among individuals who have lost focus on what is essential (i.e., 
the goal’s attainability and desirability), self-affirmation helps to undo this adverse effect of 
threat. In a similar vein, it might be expected only among individuals who fear the negative 
implications that one option would have for their self, self-affirmation puts the threat into 
perspective and make it loom less large (Critcher & Dunning, 2014), giving people the 
required equanimity to deal with the situation independently of these self-justification 
concerns. In situations in which these difficulties do not exist or are of a completely different 
nature, self-affirmation might not have an effect.  
Taken together, future research should more systematically analyze the difficulties that 
prevent individuals from resolving the action crisis. Depending on the predominant difficulty, 
interventions may be targeted to overcome it specifically. This means that different 
interventions might be needed in an action crisis, depending on the characteristics of the 
situation. The present research has laid the foundation by suggesting that experiencing an 
action crisis is self-threatening. 
Methodological limitations and directions for future research 
In this section, I will discuss methodological limitations of this research, and present ideas 
how to investigate the action crisis in future studies.  
Online vs. lab studies. Most of the here reported studies were online rather than lab 
studies. The disadvantages of internet based studies are obvious and well-known; they 
include, but are not limited to the difficulty that the situation in which data are collected is, 
compared to the lab, much less controlled (Reips, 2002). For instance, it is unknown, what 
confounding influences operate during survey taking (e.g., noise, distractions), how much 
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time participants spend on it, and whether they interrupt their participation, which is 
especially detrimental when an experimental manipulation is involved. Due to the easy access 
to study material, there will always be a certain proportion of participants that does not fully 
read task instructions and clicks through the study without much care. Of course, to some 
extent these problems may also arise in the lab, however, in the presence of the experimenter 
and the expectation that participation will take a certain amount of time, most subjects will 
probably feel more obliged to take study demands seriously. In light of these disadvantages, 
why rely on online studies?  
The outlined disadvantages are confronted with a number of advantages that explain 
the tremendously increasing use of internet-based studies that psychological science has 
experienced over the past years. Online studies allow for such efficient testing that sample 
sizes can be achieved that would be impossible to reach when participants were tested in the 
lab, mostly due to time-constraints, but also due to money-constraints if experimenters need 
to be paid (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; Reips, 2002; Wright, 2005). These 
significantly larger sample sizes not only are assumed to outweigh increased data “noise”; 
they also conform to a requirement that is posed for peer-reviewed publication in the 
aftermath of the replication crisis in empirical psychology (Cumming, 2014; Fiedler, 2017; 
Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). A further advantage 
of online studies is their providing access to more diverse and heterogeneous samples, for 
instance, by using panel providers or platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk (Gosling et al., 
2004; Reips, 2002; Wright, 2005). Laboratory studies, on the contrary, are typically taken by 
students coming from the same field of study (i.e., psychology), cultural background (i.e., 
German speaking), gender (i.e., female), and age (i.e., between 20 and 30 years). When 
conducting the here presented studies, in the majority of cases, I came to the conclusion that 
the advantages of online studies outweigh their disadvantages. In my view, whether future 
studies on the action crisis should be conducted online or in the lab has to be decided on a 
case-by-case basis.  
Experiments vs. correlational studies. Published research on the action crisis is 
mostly based on longitudinal studies, in which participants are repeatedly queried about the 
pursuit of a personal goal (for an exception, see Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). As 
correlations by nature a) prohibit conclusions about causal effects and b) can be distorted by 
unstudied third variables, three of the here presented projects at least partly used experimental 
designs. This, however, came with methodological difficulties on its own. 
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For a valid test of my research questions it seemed mandatory to study personal goals 
rather than assigned task goals. This raised the question how to get access to people who 
currently experienced an action crisis. Specifically recruiting participants who met this 
condition was an option we relied on in Study 3 of Part IV, where we invited students who 
considered study dropout. While this procedure is suitable for a study design, in which all 
participants are supposed to be in an action crisis, it is less applicable when the comparison of 
interest lies between individuals with and without an action crisis (as it was the case in Part 
III). Moreover, inviting a selective sample bears the risk that individuals are not only selective 
in the intended criterion (i.e., the action crisis) but also in other criteria, for instance, 
psychological health (e.g., depression). Generalizations of results have then to be made with 
even greater caution.  
Based on these considerations, in the experimental studies presented here, the action 
crisis was induced by means of procedures that were successfully applied in previous 
research. Whereas in Part II, the experience of action crisis was induced by means of a written 
scenario depicting a protagonist that participants would supposedly find it easy to identify 
with (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013), in most experiments, participants were asked to select a 
personal goal about which they did versus did not experience an action crisis (Part III and IV). 
Even though manipulation checks revealed the overall success of this procedure, two 
methodological difficulties were mentioned in the discussion of Part III. First, the goals 
participants selected not always matched instructions in terms of action crisis levels 
experienced. Obliterated exclusiveness of experimental conditions (i.e., high within- and low 
between-group variance) may impede the detection of group differences. Second, the 
detection of effects may have been complicated by the fact that, in our studies, the action 
crisis was studied isolated from current goal striving and in a situation, in which its 
experiential features were not necessarily salient. 
Although experimental studies, generally and in the investigation of the action crisis, 
are desirable, the correlational approach occurred to me more easily applicable and more 
fruitful in its results. Also for correlational studies, methodological advancements are 
conceivable that could be applied in future research. Future studies could carry on an 
investigation that we started in Study 2 of Part I, namely the examination of trajectories of 
individuals who ultimately disengage from their goal. This prospective approach requires a 
quite large number of participants to begin with, and benefits from an investigation in a goal 
domain in which a high dropout rate can be expected. Such domains include, but are not 
limited to, goals where individuals have to pass difficult selection processes (e.g., assessment 
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exams for psychology students, entrance exams for prospective medicine students, 
assessments for pilot training or for entering the Swiss army, model or singing contests) or 
where individuals have to undergo medical treatment with uncertain outcome (e.g., fertility 
treatment to attain the goal of having a child). These studies would allow to study individuals’ 
well-being after goal failure depending on processes related to goal disengagement in the final 
phase of goal striving. A further methodological advancement would be the use of diary or 
experience-sampling studies (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014; Mehl & Conner, 2012). 
These would be particularly suited to study more fine-grained processes in relation to the 
action crisis. These micro-processes could not be analyzed within the longitudinal studies 
implemented to date, in which several weeks passed between consecutive measurement 
points. Diary or experience-sampling studies also imply the potential to present interventions 
repeatedly, a procedure that previous research has relied on to increase their impact (e.g., 
Miyake et al., 2010). To note, using these study designs, the investigation of the action crisis 
would even more call for the necessity to study personal goals that are pursued on a regular 
basis.  
Goal domain. Several of the here presented, but also previous studies have examined 
the action crisis in the context of the goal to complete a university degree (e.g., Ghassemi et 
al., 2017; Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2015). This can be ascribed to the several advantages of 
this goal domain, which were outlined in Part I and II: First, the easily accessible student 
population pursues this goal; second, it is an important and self-defining goal; third, it can be 
ensured that the goal is regularly pursued; fourth, there is a sufficient proportion of students 
who experiences doubts; fifth, with study dropout, the investigation of goal disengagement is 
of high personal, but also societal relevance. Nevertheless, an extension of the investigation of 
action crisis to other goal contexts would be desirable for a generalizability of findings. 
Potentially, intimate relationships could be a worthy context of investigation. Most people 
pursue the goal of living in a happy and stable relationship, and most people, at some time in 
their lives, face the question whether to stay with or leave the current partner. Certainly, an 
investigation within a completely different goal domain than that of intellectual or physical 
achievement would extend our current knowledge of goal disengagement. 
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Epilog 
In the last two decades, psychological research has made significant progress in investigating 
how and when people disengage from personal goals. The action crisis has proven a suitable 
starting point to address questions related to persistence and disengagement. However, as the 
previous discussion may show, research on goal disengagement in general and the action 
crisis in particular has just begun. More studies on how the action crisis unfolds over time, 
how it is experienced, and how it can best be resolved are needed. Answering these questions 
may be of interest for the many people experiencing doubt with respect to a personal goal, and 
lay the foundation for psychological interventions. 
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Supplement of Part I 
We intended to analyze hypothesis 2 in the full sample of Study 2 as similar as possible to 
Study 1, despite the obvious differences in study designs. To acknowledge for repeated 
observations, HLM was used. As when testing hypothesis 1, between-person effects were 
differentiated from within-person effects. First, we ran a random intercept model, in which 
goal desirability was regressed on goal desirability at the previous measurement point. We 
extracted residuals and saved them as new variable in our data file, indicating the residual 
change in goal desirability (Δ goal desirability) between two consecutive measurement points. 
For hypothesis testing, a random intercept random slope model was estimated, in which life 
satisfaction at a given measurement point was predicted by fluctuations in action crisis around 
the person mean at the previous measurement point, fluctuations in the change in goal 
desirability from the previous to the current measurement point, and the two predictors’ 
product term (to capture within-person effects). Further, the person mean in action crisis, the 
person mean in change in goal desirability, and their product term were included (to capture 
between-person effects). Control variables were fluctuations in life satisfaction at the previous 
measurement point, fluctuations in goal attainability at the previous measurement point, the 
person mean in goal attainability, and time. Random slopes were estimated for fluctuations in 
action crisis at the previous measurement point and the change in goal desirability between 
the previous and the current measurement point. 
Table 9 displays results of the model. Most important are the two interactions between 
action crisis levels and change in goal desirability between two consecutive measurement 
points. There was no significant interaction on the within-person level. The interaction on the 
between-person level was marginally significant.  
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Table 12: Results of a Multilevel Model Predicting Fluctuations in Life Satisfaction in 
the Full Sample of Study 2. 
 
 
 
Using Preacher, Curran, and Bauer’s (2006) online tool for probing HLM two-way 
interactions we found that among individuals with low levels of action crisis (1 SD below the 
mean), an increase in the desirability of one’s studies was descriptively positively linked to 
life satisfaction, b = 0.17, SE = 0.11, t(194) = 1.52, p = .128; by contrast, among students with 
high levels of action crisis (1 SD above the mean), change in goal desirability was not related 
to life satisfaction, b = -0.001, SE = 0.07, t(194) = -0.02, p = .988. Rather, among students 
Fixed effects B SE Lower Upper
–5.200 0.065 *** 5.074 5.327
Action crisis t –1 –0.127 0.039 ** –0.203 –0.051
Δ Goal desirability t –1 to t –0.246 0.044 *** 0.161 0.332
Goal attainability t –1 –0.063 0.037 † –0.010 0.135
Life satisfaction t –1 –0.103 0.025 *** –0.054 0.152
Time –0.007 0.004 –0.015 0.002
Action crisis t –1 x 
Δ Goal desirability t –1 to t –0.003 0.075 –0.150 0.145
Action crisis –0.641 0.086 *** –0.810 –0.471
Δ Goal desirability t –1 to t –0.084 0.080 –0.073 –0.241
Goal attainability –0.042 0.075 –0.188 0.105
Action crisis t–1 x 
Δ Goal desirability t–1 to t –0.085 0.047 † –0.178 0.008
Random effects Est Corr Lower Upper
Residual 0.531 0.512 0.551
Intercept 0.759 0.682 0.844
Action crisis t –1 0.201 –0.149 0.124 0.326
Δ Goal desirability t –1 to t 0.226 –0.134 0.140 0.363
Model fit Est
–2 log likelihood –1728.842
AIC –3493.685
BIC –3592.169
ICC –0000.710
Life satisfaction t
Intercept
Level 1 (within-person)
Level 2 (between-person)
CI 95
CI 95
Level 1 (within-person)
Level 2 (between-person)
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experiencing an action crisis, life satisfaction was significantly reduced compared to students 
not experiencing an action crisis. There was a significant negative relationship between action 
crisis and life satisfaction both for students who upgraded the desirability of their studies from 
the previous to the current measurement point (1 SD above the mean), b = -0.73, SE = 0.11, 
t(194) = -6.76, p < .001, and for students who downgraded the desirability of their studies 
from the previous to the current measurement point (1 SD below the mean), b = -0.56, SE = 
0.09, t(194) = -6.37, p < .001 (see Figure 14).  
 
 
Figure 144: Life satisfaction as a function of action crisis and change in goal desirability 
between two consecutive measurement points at ±1 SD in Study 2. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
Taken together, the analysis in the full sample of Study 2 does not justify the 
conclusion that, in the presence of an action crisis, downgrading the goal’s desirability 
benefits life satisfaction. However, it seems as if elsewise (descriptive) benefits of increasing 
goal desirability are nullified in an action crisis.  
